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Abstract
Even though it is not clear when (or if) quantum computers will be built, the
theoretical existence of quantum computing has potentially far-reaching consequences
for the future of cryptography. This thesis aims to provide an in-depth analysis of
the security of existing (non-quantum) symmetric encryption schemes against an
attacker with quantum capabilities.
Here, formal security models will be developed and justified in the provable security
framework. Our results add to existing efforts in post-quantum cryptography by
providing security proofs for cryptographic schemes within the concrete security
paradigm. In practice, this is more relevant than the asymptotic security paradigm
that is usually assumed in post-quantum cryptography.
We begin by exploring how existing classical confidentiality notions translate into a
security model, where a quantum adversary is only allowed to make classical queries.
Then we give a formal analysis of the security of encryption schemes, such as Counter
mode, in this model.
Next we turn our attention to another natural and conservative security model where
a quantum adversary is permitted to make quantum queries. To demonstrate the
quantum adversary’s power in this model, we show how it can break the security
of block ciphers such as the Even-Mansour scheme. We further discuss the security
of existing symmetric encryptions by defining security notions for confidentiality in
this model. Specifically, we give a formal definition of the security of symmetric
encryption schemes under both a quantum superposition chosen plaintext attack
and a quantum superposition chosen ciphertext attack. Attention is also given to
semantic security in this model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2 Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis, and presents its overall structure. We
provide the motivation for our research and describe the contributions of our work.
We also present the overall structure of the chapters to follow.
1.1 Motivation
Cryptography was once used only by authorities for confidential communication, but
now it is part of our everyday lives. Any call we make using our mobile phones, most
of web browsing we do, any payment we make using our electronic cards, etc., are all
use some sort of cryptographic protocols to provide us with some sort of security.
Cryptographic protocols are built upon a deep theoretical background from both
mathematics and computer science. In general, their security is rigorously analysed in
a formal mathematical framework where computational power of a classical adversary
(who is in possession of a classical computer) is considered. This approach is called
provable security, and was proposed by Goldwasser and Micali [64] primarily to
formalise the security of asymmetric schemes. Security proofs via this approach
only hold within specific security definitions and with regard to a number of secu-
rity parameters about the assessed scheme and assumptions about the adversary’s
capabilities. Therefore they do not rule out all classes of attack, and there may
exist a practical attack against a scheme that is provably secure. To address this
shortcoming, Bellare and Rogaway [15, 14, 13] introduced practice-oriented provable
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security. This applies the provable security approach to practical cryptographic
schemes, and formulates its results in a concrete manner that is more meaningful to
practice. This approach is also known as concrete security. Symmetric encryptions
are fundamental cryptography primitives, and before the development of concrete
security, it was not possible to analyse them in the provable security framework. This
is because symmetric encryptions such as block ciphers have no security parameter,
and hence it is not possible to define their security merely in terms of an adversary’s
computational power.
In 1981, while cryptography was mainly concerned with classical adversaries, in
another part of the scientific world, Feynman [60] raised a question about the
possibility of building quantum computers. Following Feynman’s idea, a number of
quantum algorithms such as Shor’s algorithm [103] were developed that would, if fully
realised on a quantum computer, break modern cryptosystems such as those based
on the difficulty of factoring [94] or the discrete log problem. Emerging quantum
technologies raise the question that if an adversary possesses a quantum computer,
then which modern cryptosystems are secure, and which are not? In other words,
since the security of modern cryptographic schemes is based on the computational
power of the classical adversary, they must be re-examined for the case of a quantum
adversary who is in possession of a quantum computer. Moreover, understanding
which modern cryptosystems are secure against quantum adversaries is a relevant
and important question because, for example, highly confidential information that is
encrypted today should remain protected even if quantum computers are built in
couple of decades. This is the subject of a new research field, called post-quantum
cryptography [22]. This field attempts to design cryptographic schemes which will
be secure even in the presence of quantum computers. To be secure in a quantum
setting, a cryptosystem must have an underlying problem that is hard for a quantum
computer, as well as a security reduction that shows how to solve this hard problem
by using a quantum adversary that breaks the cryptosystem.
Quantum computing appears to have very little impact on symmetric encryption.
The generic quantum attack on block ciphers using Grover’s algorithm [65] requires
O
(
2n/2
)
queries for key length n and thus can be countered by doubling the key
length. For this reason, symmetric encryption has not been the subject of research
in post-quantum cryptography, and there has not been a systematic exploration to
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see whether their security proofs carry over to this quantum setting. Therefore we
will miss out on any case where a symmetric encryption scheme might have flaws in
its construction that could be exploited by a quantum adversary.
In contrast to the above, there is also another natural and conservative security
model that is beyond post-quantum cryptography. This is a model that allows the
quantum adversary to issue quantum queries. This is possible if any cryptosystem
is run on a quantum computer. So far, there has been little discussion, however, of
the security of existing symmetric encryptions in this security model. Furthermore,
the question has not been explored much of how existing classical security notions
translate into this quantum setting, and whether they can be satisfied.
1.2 Contribution
This thesis considers the security of symmetric encryptions in two different models.
These are: a quantum computation security model where a quantum adversary is
only allowed to make classical queries, and a quantum superposition security model
where quantum queries are permitted.
In the case of the quantum computation model, we explore how existing classical
confidentiality notions translate into this model by formally analysing the security of
encryption schemes such as Counter mode. We provide our security analysis in the
concrete security framework. In this way, the security of an encryption scheme is
quantified based on properties of its underlying primitive, such as the block length
or key length, as well as resources available to the quantum adversary.
We then turn to the quantum superposition model, where we discuss the security
of simple block ciphers such as the Even-Mansour scheme [57]. We show that a
quantum adversary with superposition access to an encryption oracle can break the
Even-Mansour block cipher with key length n using O(n) queries. This should be
compared to the lower bound given by Even and Mansour for their scheme, and to
the generic quantum attack against symmetric encryption schemes using Grover’s
algorithm, both of which require O
(
2n/2
)
queries. Our O(n) attack extends to two
special cases of the multiple-round Even-Mansour scheme. These are the case of
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arbitrarily many rounds using a single permutation with identical round keys, and
the case of two rounds using a single permutation with round keys derived from a
very basic key schedule.
Furthermore, we explore how existing classical confidentiality notions translate into
this model. We introduce a new confidentiality notion called Real-or-Permutation
(RoP). We show that the notion of RoP in the quantum superposition model arises
as its classical counterpart, as opposed to the other classical confidentiality notions
which need to be rethought from scratch. We demonstrate that RoP is satisfiable in
the quantum superposition model by proving the security of a generic symmetric
encryption schemes under both a quantum superposition chosen plaintext attack and
a quantum superposition chosen ciphertext attack. Since ultimately we are interested
in the security of our schemes in the semantic security model [64, 12], we also propose
a quantum analogue of semantic security and discuss its implication with RoP.
1.3 Thesis Structure
We start off Chapter 2 by explaining the structure of security definitions and security
proofs in the provable security framework. This is followed by a discussion on
asymptotic and concrete approaches in the provable security framework. We then
turn to quantum mechanics, where we explain some of its basic principles through
describing the Mach-Zehnder interferometer. These principles are: quantum superpo-
sition, unitary evolution, measurement, entanglement, and the density operator. In
Chapter 3 we discuss the idea of quantum computers before explaining the quantum
circuit model as a model of quantum computation. We also discuss the possibility
of quantum computers being built, and we mention several advances in the field.
The quantum algorithms of Simon and Grover are explained in Chapter 3. Some
limitations of quantum computers are also pointed out. We give a definition for a
quantum adversary, and explain two different models of quantum attack.
In Chapter 4, we define the basic building blocks of symmetric encryption such as
block ciphers and modes of operation. We also provide definitions for pseudorandom
function families, pseudorandom permutation families, and quantum pseudorandom
function families. Furthermore, we discuss the basic security models used for symmet-
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ric encryption and state the relations which hold between these models. Considering
these security definitions, we assess the security of Counter mode against quan-
tum computation attacks. At the end of this chapter, we discuss other symmetric
primitives that help us to achieve other cryptographic goals such as integrity.
Chapter 5 shows how powerful quantum superposition attacks could be. We explain
the construction of the Even-Mansour scheme, and how the slide with a twist attacks
work on it. Then we discuss the possibility of exploiting this attack using Simon’s
algorithm. We explain why this attack is successful even though it is only partially
satisfies Simon’s problem. At the end, an extension of this attack to other variations
of the Even-Mansour scheme is discussed.
In Chapter 6, we define the basic security models used for symmetric encryption
in the quantum superposition model. This chapter begins by arguing that existing
classical security models for encryption schemes need to be rethought from scratch
in the quantum superposition model. Moreover, we define a new confidentiality
notion, Real-or-Permutation (RoP), and discuss its achievability under a quantum
superposition chosen plaintext attack and a quantum superposition chosen ciphertext
attack. We also define a quantum analogue of semantic security and show a reduction
from RoP to semantic security.
In the final chapter, Chapter 7, we discuss the meaning of our results, further works,
and open problems.
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This chapter briefly explains a number of key ingredients of both cryptography and
quantum mechanics. We start by giving the notation, followed by a discussion on
the main cryptographic framework we will use in the thesis, and finally we finish off
the chapter by giving a hint of quantum mechanics and its properties (mostly) via
describing a physical experiment.
2.1 Notation
Let X be a set. Then |X | denotes its size and x←$X denotes sampling an element
uniformly at random from X and assigning it to x. We use {0, 1}∗ to denote the set of
all finite binary strings. Let x be a binary string. We use |x| to denote its bit length.
Let {0, 1}n represents the set of all binary strings of length n where n is any positive
integer. For a bit b, let bn denotes the strings of n consecutive b. For any two strings
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x and y, x⊕ y denotes their bitwise addition and x || y denotes their concatenation.
To show the set of all functions with domain X and range Y we use Func (X ,Y). We
use Perm (X ) to show the set of all permutations on domain X . If X = {0, 1}l or
X = {0, 1}∗, and Y = {0, 1}n for any positive integers l and n then for compactness
of notation we will often use Func (l, n), Func (∗, n) and Perm (l), respectively. An
algorithm may be randomised, unless otherwise stated. An adversary is an algorithm.
We use capital letters (such as A) to denote a classical adversary. For any algorithm
A, we use y ← A (x1, x2, . . .) to denote the operation of running algorithm A on
inputs x1, x2, . . . with fresh coins and assigning its output to y. When a definition
involves multiple experiments, if the name of an experiment is surrounded by a box,
the experiment includes the boxed codes , otherwise it dose not. Often the boxed
code replaces the code adjacent to it.
2.2 Provable Security
Traditionally, the approach towards designing a cryptographic scheme has been seen
as a cycle of ‘build’, ‘break’, and ‘fix’. That is, a cryptographic goal is recognised,
and a cryptographic solution is proposed. One then tries to discover its weaknesses
through concrete attacks. If any are found, the solution is amended to remove the
weaknesses. If any new weaknesses are found at any later point in time, then the
solution is amended again. There are a number of difficulties with this heuristic
approach. Assume that at one point no new weaknesses are found. It is unclear
whether this is because all the solution’s weaknesses have been found and fixed, or
whether there are still weaknesses yet to be found. In the other words, it is unclear
when the cycle has concluded. Hence, the cycle should be iterated until one feels
confident that the solution is adequate. But, one should always consider that a
design error might be discovered at any time.
Shannon [100] introduced a more systematic approach to cryptography by taking
proofs and definitions into account. Shannon showed what it means for a scheme
to be perfectly secure. Shannon set a goal to achieve privacy, then he defined a
symmetric encryption scheme and proved that the scheme achieves the goal perfectly.
The symmetric encryption scheme is known as ‘one-time pad’. Shannon argued
that given two different messages, M0 and M1, and a ciphertext C, where C is the
14
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encryption of either M0 or M1 with equal probability, then the scheme is perfectly
secure. The probability is taken over any randomised encryption algorithm and the
choice of key. Perfect security, also called information-theoretic security, though
very powerful and desirable, proved to be difficult to achieve in practice. To achieve
perfect privacy, the size of the messages in bits should not exceed the size of the key
bits. In cryptography, however, it is usually preferred to encrypt many message bits
with a finite key bits instead of some arbitrary key bits. A finite key bits is easier
to manage in practice. Moreover, parties do not need to know the total size of a
message prior to encryption.
In contrast to Shannon’s perfect security, there is another approach to modern
cryptography. Instead of focusing on the impossibility of any attacks on a scheme, it
focuses on the infeasibility of those attacks. Cryptographic schemes in this approach
are considered breakable in theory but not in practice. In order to assess the
security of a scheme, the amount of computing power available to an adversary is
considered. As long as the adversary does not have too much computing time or
other computational resources, the scheme is considered secure. Hence, it is called
computational security. Hereafter by ‘security’ we mean computational security
unless otherwise stated. Rabin [92] was one of the first cryptographers to came
up with a mathematical proof of security for a scheme. But it was not until 1982
when Goldwasser and Micali [64] published their pioneering work providing a formal
mathematical framework to rigorously analyse security of cryptographic schemes.
Their proposed formal framework essentially consisted of a ‘security definition’, a
‘cryptographic scheme’, and a ‘reduction proof technique’. This approach has come
to be called provable security.
The first step in provable security is the formulation of security definitions in a precise
mathematical form. That is, what it actually means to say that a cryptographic
scheme is secure and what goal it intends to achieve. For instance, the goal of a
scheme may be is to achieve confidentiality or to achieve ciphertext integrity. A
security definition is usually expressed as an ‘experiment’ conducted by a ‘challenger’.
An adversary plays the experiment with regards to a cryptographic scheme while it
might be given access to a set of ‘oracles’ maintained by the challenger. Provable
security is concerned with the probability of an adversary ‘winning’ the experiment.
The winning condition could take different forms, such as an adversary distinguishing
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between two experiments, or finding the plaintext corresponding to a given challenge
ciphertext. The winning probability of an adversary is represented by the adversary’s
‘advantage’. The advantage is a measure of how much better an adversary can do
to win the experiment compared to simply guessing. That is, the maximal winning
probability over a class of adversaries which indicates the security of a scheme. The
advantage over a class of adversaries lets us quantify the security of a scheme against
all adversaries with bounded resources. If the advantage of a ‘feasible’ adversary
exceeds some acceptable threshold by a substantial amount, then the scheme is
considered broken. A classical adversary is a randomised algorithm parametrised
by its computational resources. For a quantum adversary see Section 3.4. Usually
the resources of interest are the number of oracle queries made by the adversary, the
size of the oracle queries, and the running time of the adversary. By convention [15],
the running time includes the space required to store the program that describes the
adversary. The latter prevents the adversary from embedding arbitrary large look-up
tables in its description.
The second step of the provable security approach is reduction proof technique. Here,
the security of a scheme with regards to a particular security definition is proved via
a reduction to the security of the underlying cryptographic primitive or some number-
theoretic hard problem, such as factoring. The reduction proof technique enables us
to focus on the security of the underlying primitive or the underlying hard problem
instead of directly looking into cryptanalysis of the original scheme. The basic idea
of reduction is the same as the theory of NP-completeness. Assume, without loss
of generality, an adversary A attacks a scheme S with underlying primitive P . A
reduction transforms A to another adversary A′ which simulates the challenger for
A against S and uses A’s output to break the underlying primitive P . If A is able to
break S then A′ is able to break P . Hence, as long as the underlying primitive P is
secure, then the scheme S is secure.
Note that security proofs only hold within specific security definitions and with
regards to a number of assumptions about the adversary’s capabilities. Therefore
they will not rule out all classes of attack. For instance, there may exist an attack
in practice against a provably secure scheme. Another important point is that the
heuristic provable security approach and the complexity of the constructions make
cryptographic schemes inefficient in practice. Koblitz and Menezes [76, 75] point out
16
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some of the above issues among other criticisms of provable security. The issues they
raise make an important point that when one uses results from provable security,
great attention must always be given to the context of the results and what they
actually mean in practice. Bellare [10] discusses that the term ‘provable security’
is in some way misleading. Provable security does not prove a scheme secure. It is
merely a demonstration of a reduction of the security of a scheme to the intractability
of some underlying primitive. Bellare suggests the term reductionist security instead
of provable security.
It is worth mentioning that the information-theoretic security falls into the provable
security paradigm where the term ‘provable’ makes more sense because the security
proofs are unconditional.
2.2.1 Asymptotic vs. Concrete Security
Since its inception, provable security has mainly evolved in a complexity theoretic
framework where adversaries and transformations are ‘efficient’ if they run in poly-
nomial time, and adversaries’ ‘success probabilities’ are bounded by a negligible
function. In this approach, a ‘security parameter’ is introduced which is relative
to the polynomial running time and success probabilities. A scheme is secure if
every polynomial time adversary obtains only negligible advantage in attacking the
scheme. This is called the asymptotic approach, and is used in all early cryptographic
definitions and security proofs [95]. Results expressed in the asymptotic framework
proved to be unpopular among practitioners because they require precise numbers
about the adversary’s computational resources or the security parameters etc, which
are only loosely captured by the asymptotic framework. For instance, block ciphers
are widely used and very popular in practice, but they seemed to be outside of the
domain of provable security for some time [10].
Bellare and Rogaway introduced ‘practice-oriented provable security’ via a series
of papers [15, 14, 13]. The goal of this is to explicitly capture the quantitative
nature of security, as opposed to the qualitative nature of security captured by the
asymptotic framework, through a concrete treatment of security. This is often called
concrete security. In this approach, the adversary’s advantage is quantified by the
17
2.3 Quantum Mechanics
adversary’s resources. Hence the adversary’s computational model becomes relevant
in the concrete security. For instance, consider a scheme S with underlying primitive
P . We assume that P is secure against an adversary A′ running in time t′, making
q′ oracle queries, totalling µ′ bits. Then the scheme S may be proved to be secure
against an adversary A running in time t, making q oracle queries, totalling µ bits.
Bellare [10] also points out that the quality of a reduction is very important. For
instance, tightness of security bounds in a reduction affects efficiency of the reduction
in practice. A reduction with tighter security bounds is more efficient. Therefore
the concrete security results help protocol designers to understand what security to
expect in practice.
In this thesis, we are interested in concrete security treatment of symmetric schemes
against quantum adversaries.
2.3 Quantum Mechanics
Quantum mechanics is a branch of physics relating to atomic and subatomic scale
phenomenon which classical mechanics could not explain. Quantum mechanics began
at the turn of the 20th century and it gradually gained acceptance and experimental
verification between 1900 and 1930 through the contribution of multiple scientists to
the foundation of its revolutionary principles.
One of the experiments which cannot be reasonably explained with classical mechanics,
but can be easily explained with quantum mechanics, is the interference that happens
in the Mach-Zehnder interferometer. It is a simple experiment which exemplifies a
number of the main principles of quantum mechanics which we explain in this chapter.
Depending on the hardware used in the experiment, it can be run with photons,
electrons, neutrons, atoms, or even molecules. Here we assume the experiment is set
up for photons.
The Mach-Zehnder interferometer, as depicted in the Figure 2.1, consists of two
half-silvered mirrors (or beam splitters), two full mirrors, and two photon detectors.
The interferometer is a device that allows us to measure the interference of photons
following two different paths. We label the lower path with |0〉 and the upper path
18
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|0〉
|1〉
|0〉 Detector
|1〉 Detector
Beam Splitter
Mirror
Figure 2.1: The Mach-Zehnder interferometer
50% probability
50% probability
|0〉
|1〉
Figure 2.2: Each detector clicks with 50% probability
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with |1〉. To see the behaviour of the half-silvered mirror, we simplify the experiment
by replacing the full mirrors with two detectors instead, as shown in the Figure 2.2.
Assume a single photon travelling in the lower path |0〉. Here we assume a photon
always starts in the |0〉 path unless otherwise stated. When the photon passes through
the half-silvered mirror, exactly one of the two detectors clicks. Note that the clicks
we get are discrete. Precisely one of the detectors clicks at any one time. For instance,
we never get two half-clicks, or any other fractions of a click. This discreteness is one
of the main properties of quantum mechanics. By repeating the experiment we notice
that each detector clicks about half of the time. The simplest explanation is that the
half-silvered mirror acts as a classical coin flip, randomly sending each photon one
way or the other with 50% probability. We now consider the full apparatus again
as depicted in Figure 2.1. Note that the two paths to the detectors are the same
length. We know that the first half-silvered mirror, with 50% probability, sends a
photon in one of the two paths. Hence, we expect each of the |0〉 and |1〉 detectors
to detect roughly half of the photons. It turns out that this classical intuition is
false since all the photons are detected at the |1〉 detector. A rough explanation
for now is that when exiting the first beam splitter, the reflected beam picks up
a phase shift while the transmitted beam does not. This phase shift introduces a
phase difference between the two paths. Since the two paths are the same length,
there is constructive interference on the path to the |1〉 detector, and destructive
interference on the path to the |0〉 detector. We can shift the probability distribution
from 100% detection by the |1〉 detector to 100% detection by the |0〉 detector by
placing a pi-phase shifter along the |0〉 path. Therefore, by observing the detectors,
we can distinguish whether this pi-phase shifter exists or not. Moreover, if we place
phase shifters φ0 and φ1 along the |0〉 and |1〉 paths respectively, the proportions are
cos2
(
φ0−φ1
2
)
detections by the |0〉 detector and sin2
(
φ0−φ1
2
)
detections by the |1〉
detector, as shown in Figure 2.3.
We explain the role of the experiment’s key ingredients in the following subsections.
2.3.1 Notation
Let [n] denotes the set {1, . . . , n}. A vector space is denoted with capital script
letters such as V . A vector is denoted with bold lower case letters such as v. We use
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φ0
Phase Shifter
φ1
|0〉
|1〉
p0 = cos
2
(
φ0−φ1
2
)
p1 = sin
2
(
φ0−φ1
2
)
Figure 2.3: The Mach-Zehnder interferometer with two phase shifters. By adjusting
the phase shifter, one can change the probabilities of photons striking the |1〉 detector
and the |0〉 detector.
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Cn to denote the n-dimensional complex vector space. We denote the components
of a vector v ∈ Vn by vi, i ∈ [n]. We use bold capital letters such as M to denote
matrices. The components of a matrix M ∈ Vm×n are denoted by Mi,j where, i ∈ [m]
and j ∈ [n]. Let In denotes the n× n ‘identity’ matrix. We will often use merely I
instead, when the dimension is clear from context. If M is square we use M−1 to
denote the ‘inverse’ of the matrix M. Let M∗ denote ‘complex conjugate’ of the
matrix M, and MT denotes the ‘transpose’ of the matrix M. We use M† to denote
the Hermitian conjugate or ‘adjoint’ of the matrix M. Note that M† =
(
MT
)∗
. For
a matrix M, let Tr (M) denotes the trace of M. For any two matrices M and N,
let M⊗N denote their tensor product. We use Dirac notation to denote quantum
states. Let |v〉 = v and 〈v| = v∗. The latter is called a ‘bra’ and the former a ‘ket’.
For any two vectors v and w, we use 〈v|w〉 to denote their inner product, and we use
|v〉〈w| to denote their outer product. If |v〉 = ∑i∈[n] αi |vi〉 and |w〉 = ∑j∈[n] αj |wj〉,
the tensor product |v〉⊗ |w〉 = ∑i∈[n]∑j∈[n] αij |vi〉⊗ |wj〉. For abbreviation we also
often use, |vi, wj〉, |viwj〉 or |vi〉 |wj〉 instead of |vi〉 ⊗ |wj〉. We use H to denote the
Hilbert space, which is a complex vector space with the inner product 〈·|·〉. Finally,
for two variables i and j, we denote the Kronecker delta by δij .
2.3.2 Superposition
A classical state is a state in which a physical system can be found when it is observed.
Consider a physical system that can be in n different, mutually exclusive classical
states, for instance the states |1〉 , . . . , |n〉. A pure quantum state |ψ〉 is a linear
combination or a superposition of the classical states
|ψ〉 =
∑
i∈[n]
αi |i〉 , (2.1)
where αi is called the amplitude of |i〉 in |ψ〉. It is a complex number. The squared
of the amplitude of |i〉, |αi|2, tells us the probability of observing the system in the
state |i〉. Hence
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∑
i∈[n]
|αi|2 = 1 . (2.2)
We discuss how to obtain the probability in the next subsection.
A system in quantum state |ψ〉 can be in a superposition of all classical states. The
states |1〉 , . . . , |n〉 form an ‘orthonormal basis’ of an n-dimensional Hilbert space
where a quantum state |ψ〉 is a vector in this space. Consider a 2-dimensional Hilbert
space where the states (orthonormal basis) are |0〉 and |1〉. This orthonormal basis
is also referred to as the computational basis. A qubit is a quantum state (a vector)
which can be written as a linear combination of |0〉 and |1〉.
Recall the Mach-Zehnder interferometer. The labels |0〉 and |1〉 are classical states
of the lower and the upper path, respectively. In the experiment, after striking the
first beam splitter, a photon behaves as though it is propagated through all possible
paths to the detectors. Therefore the state of a photon after exiting the first beam
splitter is a superposition of the two states, 1√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉. Similarly, if a photon is
sent through the first beam splitter starting in the |1〉 path, its state after exiting
the beam splitter is 1√
2
|0〉 − 1√
2
|1〉. Note that the negative sign is the phase shift
picked up by the reflected beam. If we bring the phase shifters φ0 and φ1 into the
picture then they change the state in the following way
1√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉
φ0∧φ1−−−−−−−→ e
iφ0
√
2
|0〉+ e
iφ1
√
2
|1〉
=
ei
φ0+φ1
2√
2
(
ei
φ0−φ1
2 |0〉+ e−iφ0−φ12 |1〉
)
.
(2.3)
The second beam splitter operates in the same way as the first. Hence, it transforms
ei
φ0+φ1
2√
2
(
ei
φ0−φ1
2 |0〉+ e−iφ0−φ12 |1〉
)
−→ eiφ0+φ12
(
cos
(
φ0 − φ1
2
)
|0〉+ i sin
(
φ0 − φ1
2
)
|1〉
)
.
(2.4)
Equation 2.4 shows us that the experimental outcomes are influenced by the existence
23
2.3 Quantum Mechanics
of different possible paths leading to detection. For instance, the equation tells us
that a photon can strike the |0〉 detector from two different paths. One with the
probability amplitude of cos
(
φ0−φ1
2
)
, and the other with the probability amplitude
of i sin
(
φ0−φ1
2
)
.
2.3.3 Measurement
Consider the quantum state |ψ〉, which is a superposition of a number of classical
states (see Equation 2.1). Measuring |ψ〉 in the computational basis yields one and
only one classical state |i〉 with probability |αi|2, where αi is the corresponding
amplitude. The outcome is not determined prior to the measurement. We merely
can predict that the measurement outcome is the state |i〉 with probability |αi|2.
This means that measuring a quantum state induces a probability distribution on
the classical states, which implies
∑
i∈[n]
|αi|2 = 1 . (2.5)
Moreover, measuring the quantum state |ψ〉 collapses |ψ〉 to the classical state |i〉
and destroys all other information that the superposition |ψ〉 might have contained.
Thus, a measurement is ‘irreversible’.
The above is an example of a projective measurement. In general, a projective
measurement is described by a set of projectors M1, . . . ,Mm (m ≤ n) which satisfy
the completeness equation
∑
i∈[m]
Mi = I . (2.6)
Let V be a subspace of the Hilbert space H. Let Mi project on subspace Vi. Then
for every state |ψ〉 ∈ V , we can write
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|ψ〉 =
∑
i∈[m]
|ψi〉 , (2.7)
where |ψi〉 = Mi |ψ〉 and |ψi〉 ∈ Vi. Applying this projective measurement to the pure
quantum state |ψ〉 yields the outcome i with probability
‖|ψi〉‖2 = Tr (Mi |ψ〉〈ψ|) , (2.8)
and the quantum state collapses to a new state
|ψi〉
‖|ψi〉‖ =
Mi |ψ〉
‖Mi |ψ〉‖ . (2.9)
Now we can show that measurement in the computational basis is a special case of
the projective measurement, where Mi projects onto the computational basis state
|i〉 and the corresponding subspace Vi is the space spanned by |i〉. Consider a single
qubit |ψ〉 = α0 |0〉+ α1 |1〉 where the two possible outcomes are defined by the two
projectors M0 = |0〉〈0| and M1 = |1〉〈1|. Note that the two projectors satisfy the
completeness equation. The probability of obtaining 0 after the measurement is
‖M0 |ψ〉‖2 = ‖α0 |0〉‖2 = |α0|2 , (2.10)
and the state |ψ〉 collapses to
α0 |0〉
‖α0 |0〉‖ =
α0
|α0| |0〉 . (2.11)
Note that α0/ |α0| is an irrelevant phase factor. Similarly, the probability of obtaining
1 after the measurement is |α1|2 and the quantum state collapses to
α1 |1〉
‖α1 |1〉‖ =
α1
|α1| |1〉 , (2.12)
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where α1/ |α1| is an irrelevant phase factor.
We look back at the state of a photon after exiting the first beam splitter in the
Mach-Zehnder interferometer:
1√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉 . (2.13)
If we measure this state in the computational basis, then we find the photon in the
|0〉 path with probability
∣∣∣ 1√
2
∣∣∣2, and in the |1〉 path with probability ∣∣∣ 1√
2
∣∣∣2. Similarly,
regarding the state of a photon after passing through the second beam splitter,
ei
φ0+φ1
2
(
cos
(
φ0 − φ1
2
)
|0〉+ i sin
(
φ0 − φ1
2
)
|1〉
)
, (2.14)
a photon arrives at the detector |0〉 or |1〉 with probability cos2
(
φ0−φ1
2
)
and
sin2
(
φ0−φ1
2
)
, respectively.
The most general quantum measurement, called a positive operator-valued measure-
ment, or POVM, is described by positive operators Ei satisfying
∑
i∈[m]
Ei = 1 . (2.15)
2.3.4 Unitary Evolution
Consider a closed quantum system, which is a system that is not interacting in any
way with other systems. Quantum mechanics tells us that the state of a closed
quantum system evolves during the time from, say, |ψ〉 at time t1 to |ϕ〉 at time t2.
These states are related by a unitary operator U which depends only on times t1
and t2
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|ϕ〉 = U |ψ〉 . (2.16)
This unitary transformation explains how the states of a closed quantum system at
two different times are related. A linear operator U is unitary if and only if U−1
exists and U† = U−1. Equivalently, U is unitary if and only if UU† = I. Thus, any
unitary operation on quantum states is ‘reversible’. Hereafter we always consider
closed quantum systems unless otherwise stated.
Unitary operators can be described in matrix form. For instance, the action of the
beam splitter in the Mach-Zehnder interferometer is
|0〉 −→ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)
|1〉 −→ 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) ,
(2.17)
which can be described by the matrix

1√
2
1√
2
1√
2
− 1√
2
 , (2.18)
while the action of the phase shifters is described by the matrix
1 0
0 eiφ
 . (2.19)
In Chapter 3 we see the importance of unitary operations in quantum computation
and that they allow us to consider time as ‘discrete’ and discuss ‘computational
steps’.
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2.3.5 Entanglement
Consider a quantum system of more than 1 qubit. The quantum state of this system
is described by the tensor product of its components. For instance, if the system
consists of i qubits, each represented by |ψi〉 where i ∈ [n], then the quantum state
of the system is described by
|ψ1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |ψn〉 . (2.20)
Assume a 2-qubit system. Let |ψ1〉 = α0 |0〉 + α1 |1〉 and |ψ2〉 = α0 |0〉 + α1 |1〉
describe the state of first and second qubit, respectively. For both qubits we have
that |α0|2 + |α1|2 = 1. Also, |ψ1〉 ∈ H1 and |ψ2〉 ∈ H2. The state of the 2-qubit
system is
|ψ〉 = |ψ1〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉
= α00 |00〉+ α01 |01〉+ α10 |10〉+ α11 |11〉 ,
(2.21)
where |α00|2 + |α01|2 + |α10|2 + |α11|2 = 1 and |ψ〉 ∈ H1 ⊗H2. This implies that a
2-qubit system has 4 basis states, |00〉, |01〉, |10〉 and |11〉. More generally, an n-qubit
system has 2n basis states of the form |b1b2 . . . bn〉 where bi ∈ {0, 1}.
The state |ψ〉 is a ‘product state’ if and only if α00α11 = α01α10. The product state
can be factored into the product of two independent qubit states. However, the state
of a bipartite system can also be in a form such that cannot be decomposed as the
tensor product of two independent qubit states. For example the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) [56] state
1√
2
|00〉+ 1√
2
|11〉 . (2.22)
When this is the case, the two qubits are, in a way, strongly correlated. This introduces
an important idea related to composite quantum systems, called entanglement. The
EPR state is interesting because observing either the first qubit or the second qubit
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immediately fixes the unobserved qubit to a classical state. For instance, if the
outcome of measuring the first qubit in Equation 2.22 is the classical state |0〉, then
the EPR state collapses to |00〉. Thus, we obtain information about the second qubit
by only observing the first qubit.
2.3.6 The Density Operator
Consider the state vector of a quantum system that evolves in time via a number
of unitary operations until it is measured. At this time, one can employ projective
measurement to predict the probabilities for different results. Assume we want to
confirm the predictions. We need to prepare a known initial state, apply the unitary
operations on it, and then measure it. If we iterate this process enough, the results
should show statistical agreement with the predicted probabilities. But, in general, it
is impossible to prepare the exact same quantum state every time. Instead, what we
know is that the quantum system is in state |ψi〉 with probability pi. This is known
as ‘statistical mixture’. The state of the quantum system is either |ψ1〉 or |ψ2〉 (or
any others) but we do not know exactly which one. Note that this is not the same
as saying the quantum system is in state |ψ〉 = |ψ1〉+ |ψ2〉+ · · · , which is known as
‘coherent superposition’. In some sense, the quantum system is in both |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉
(and any others) at the same time. In the case of statistical mixture, we have some
probability distribution of states.
Assume a quantum system described by a set of state vectors {|ψ1〉 , . . . , |ψn〉} with
their corresponding probabilities {p1, . . . , pn} such that
∑
i pi = 1. All we know is
that the quantum system’s state is |ψi〉 with probability pi. The density operator is
an operator ρ associated with the ensembles {pi, |ψi〉} and is defined as
ρ =
n∑
i=1
pi |ψi〉〈ψi| . (2.23)
Note that ρ is a positive operator and Tr (ρ) = 1. The density operator, also called
the density matrix, is an alternative mathematical approach to formulate quantum
mechanics. For instance it can be regarded as the state of a quantum system. In
order to measure the state, we can apply an operator Mi, Mi ≥ 0 and
∑
i Mi = 1, to
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ρ to obtain the probability of an outcome i:
Pr [outcome = i|state = ρ] = Tr (ρMi) , (2.24)
where i ∈ [m]. Hence, applying measurement to a density operator results in a
probability distribution. If we are given two density operators ρ0 and ρ1 then after
measuring them we obtain two probability distributions, P0 and P1 respectively. We
can distinguish between these two probability distributions. In fact distinguishing
between probability distributions is an important and well-studied problem in statis-
tical science. This gives us an interesting intuition. Since we are able to distinguish
between two probability distributions, P0 and P1, then we can also distinguish be-
tween their corresponding density operators ρ0 and ρ1. There are different measures
for quantum distinguishability [61]. Here we discuss two of them which we will use
in the thesis: ‘trace distance1’ and ‘fidelity’. Both of these distance measures are
‘static’, meaning they quantify how close two quantum states are.
Given two quantum states ρ and σ, the trace distance between them is
D (ρ, σ) =
1
2
Tr |ρ− σ| . (2.25)
The quantum trace distance can be related to the classical trace distance by consid-
ering the probability distributions induced by a measurement.
Result 1 ([89] Theorem 9.1) Given two quantum states ρ and σ, and a POVM
{Em}, let pm = Tr (ρEm) and qm = Tr (σEm) indicate the probabilities of obtaining a
measurement outcome labelled by m. Then
D (ρ, σ) = max
{Em}
D ({pm} , {qm}) ,
where the maximum is over all POVMs {Em}.
1This is also known as Kolmogorov distance.
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The trace distance is a metric. If the two quantum states (probability distributions)
are identical then D = 0, and if they are orthogonal then D = 1. The trace distance
preserves the unitary transformations
D
(
UρU†,UσU†
)
= D (ρ, σ) . (2.26)
And the triangle inequality holds:
D (ρ, σ) ≤ D (ρ, τ) + D (τ, σ) . (2.27)
The other distance measure is fidelity. Given two quantum states ρ and σ, their
fidelity is defined to be
F (ρ, σ) = Tr
(√
ρ1/2σρ1/2
)
. (2.28)
Similar to the trace distance, the fidelity preserves unitary transformation, and we
can relate it to the probability distributions obtained by a measurement
F (ρ, σ) = min
{Em}
F ({pm} , {qm}) , (2.29)
where the minimum is over all POVMs {Em}. The fidelity is not a metric but
arccos (F (ρ, σ)) (2.30)
is a metric. This also satisfies the triangle inequality:
arccos (F (ρ, σ)) ≤ arccos (F (ρ, τ)) + arccos (F (τ, σ)) . (2.31)
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The fidelity is qualitatively related to the trace distance. When two quantum states
become more distinguishable, the fidelity decreases while the trace distance increases.
On the other hand, when two quantum states become less distinguishable, the fidelity
increases while the trace distance decreases [89]. This can be shown by
1− F (ρ, σ) ≤ D (ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2 . (2.32)
In the next chapter, we explain how one can perform computation by exploiting the
properties of quantum mechanics. Moreover, we discuss quantum algorithms and
define a quantum adversary.
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In this chapter, we give an overview of quantum computation. Then a model of
quantum computation is described. We also discuss the possibility of realisation of
quantum computers. Moreover, we explain a number of quantum algorithms and
their limited ability to solve problems. Finally we provide the definition of a quantum
adversary to use in the next chapters.
3.1 Quantum Computers
The Turing machine [105] is a mathematical model for a ‘universal’ computer.
According to the modern Church-Turing thesis, any ‘reasonable’ model of computation
can be ‘efficiently’ simulated on a probabilistic Turing machine. By ‘reasonable’,
we mean any model of computation that can be defined in a realistic physical
framework. From a complexity theory perspective, an efficient simulation means
that the amount of resources used by the Turing machine is polynomially bounded
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by the amount of resources used by the given realistic model of computation. In
1981, Feynman [60] raised a question about the possibility of simulating ‘quantum
physics’ with a universal computer. He discussed as follows: Given an n-particle (say
n qubits) quantum system that is evolving in time, then the amount of information
required, in classical terms, for simulation of the quantum system grows exponentially
in time. Therefore, in general, simulating the natural evolution of a quantum system
on a probabilistic Turing machine involves exponential slowdown. But, that is in
contrast with the notion of an efficient simulation. Feynman proposed the idea of a
‘quantum computer’ in order to efficiently simulate a general quantum evolution on
a computing apparatus based on quantum physics.
Following the above idea, Deutsch [46] introduced a formal model for universal
quantum Turing machines. He proposed that the quantum Turing machine might
be faster than the classical Turing machine in solving certain classical problems.
These are problems with classical input and output. He also proved that any given
quantum machines can be simulated by universal quantum computers, subject to
exponential slowdown. Later on, a separation between probabilistic classical and
quantum models was shown by Bernstein and Vazirani [23]. They constructed the
first universal quantum computer that could efficiently simulate a large class of
quantum Turing machines with only a polynomial overhead. There are also other
quantum computational models such as the quantum circuit model [47]. Most of
the known quantum algorithms are defined in the quantum circuit model. Yao [111]
showed that the two models, the quantum Turing machine and the quantum circuit,
are mathematically equivalent in terms of their computing power. In this thesis we
only discuss the quantum circuit model.
3.1.1 Quantum Circuit Model
A ‘qubit’ (see Subsection 2.3.2) is the quantum analogue of a ‘bit’, which is a
fundamental elementary unit of classical computation. While a bit represents either
0 or 1, a qubit represents 0 and 1 simultaneously. To build a quantum computer, we
need to prepare a number of qubits to operate on them. Assume we place n qubits
in a quantum register, initially in state
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|ψ0〉 = |0n〉 . (3.1)
There exists an operator U such that if we apply it to the register only once, then
we transform the state |ψ0〉 to another quantum state |ψ1〉 that is a superposition of
all 2n possible configurations of n qubits
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2n
∑
b∈{0,1}n
|b〉 . (3.2)
Therefore, any further operation applied to this quantum register will be applied to
the all 2n configurations in ‘parallel’. Contrast this with the classical computation
where, after an operation on n bits, a classical register only holds one of the 2n
configurations at a time. Hence, any further operation applied to the classical register
will be applied to merely one of the 2n configurations.
In general, during a quantum computation, a quantum system evolves in time
according to the operation U
∑
b
αb |b〉 U−→
∑
b
βb |b〉 , (3.3)
where
∑ |αb|2 = 1 and ∑ |βb|2 = 1. The operation U is a linear transformation
that maps the state on the left hand side to the state on the right hand side. As
discussed in Subsection 2.3.4, the operation U is unitary. In fact, the operation
must be unitary, otherwise we are not able to find the Hamiltonian corresponding
to the closed quantum system by solving the Schro¨dinger equation [99]. Intuitively,
quantum computation can be seen as a sequence of a number of unitary operations
U = U1U2 . . .Um , (3.4)
where m is polynomially bounded in n. The operators Ui, i ∈ [m], are elementary
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|b〉 H 1/
√
2
(
|0〉+ (−1)b |1〉
)
Figure 3.1: Schematic representation of H gate operating on a qubit in state |b〉
|b〉 S eibφ |b〉
Figure 3.2: Schematic representation of S gate operating on a qubit in state |b〉
unitary transformations usually acting on 1, 2 or 3 qubits. They are known as
elementary quantum logic gates [47].
We have already introduced two 1-qubit gates. Recall the beam splitter and the
phase shifter in the Mach-Zehnder interferometer (see Subsection 2.3.4). They are
unitary operations. The beam splitter operation is known as the Hadamard gate and
is denoted by H:
H =
1√
2
1 1
1 −1
 . (3.5)
The phase shifter operation is known as the phase shift gate, and is denoted by S:
S =
1 0
0 eiφ
 . (3.6)
Moreover, in general if we apply a Hadamard transformation to a state of, say, n
qubits such as |i〉 where i ∈ {0, 1}n then we get:
H⊗n |i〉 = 1√
2n
∑
j∈{0,1}n
(−1)i·j |j〉 , (3.7)
where i · j = ∑k∈[n] ikjk denotes the inner product of the n-bit strings i, j ∈ {0, 1}n.
Another important quantum gate is a 2-qubit gate called the controlled-NOT gate
or ‘CNOT’ for short:
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|b〉 ⊕ |b⊕ a〉
|a〉 |a〉
Figure 3.3: Schematic representation of CNOT gate operating on 2 qubits in state
|a〉 |b〉
CNOT =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0

. (3.8)
Any unitary transformation can be built from a ‘universal’ set of quantum gates [47].
It turns out that such a universal set could consist of merely all 1-qubit gates
together with the CNOT gate [8]. Moreover, it is proven that a set consisting of
the Hadamard gate, controlled-NOT gate, and phase shift gate with a suitable phase
φ, is universal [32]. In this thesis, by a ‘universal set of gates’, we mean the latter or
any other possible universal set consisting of a number of arbitrary 1-qubit gates and
the CNOT gate. Other universal sets of gates also exist [52, 80]. This description of
quantum gates suffices for the purposes of this thesis, but for more details we refer
to work of Nielsen and Chuang [89], and Kaye et al. [72].
A ‘quantum circuit’ [47] (also known as a ‘quantum network’ or an ‘acyclic quantum
gate array’), is a finite directed acyclic graph, that is formed by ‘input nodes’,
‘elementary quantum gates’, and ‘output nodes’. There are n input nodes, which
contain the input as classical bits that is essentially a basis state. The quantum
gates each act on at most 2 qubits, and determine how the state of the input
evolves over time. The quantum gates are chosen from a universal gate set. The
outcome is achieved by measuring the output qubits in the output nodes. In general,
that probabilistically yields a string of classical bits as the output of the quantum
computation. The ‘size’ of a quantum circuit is the number of elementary quantum
gates in the circuit. A quantum circuit is ‘efficient’ if the total size of the circuit is
polynomially bounded in the number of bits of the input. The ‘depth’ of a quantum
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circuit is the maximum number of elementary quantum gates placed on any path
from an input to an output, and indicates the required time to implement a quantum
circuit if the quantum gates can perform in parallel. A quantum circuit is required to
be ‘uniformly’ generated. This means that a classical Turing machine can efficiently
output a description of the quantum circuit. For instance, a C program that can
be run on a classical computer and efficiently output a description of the quantum
circuit.
Note that we may use the term ‘register’ instead of ‘node’. A register consists of at
least one node. If we say an n-qubit state is placed in a register, that means the
register consists of n nodes.
Since quantum circuits are reversible, in order to imitate a classical computation on
a quantum computer, the corresponding classical circuit must be reversible too. It
turns out that any classical computation can be represented by a reversible classical
circuit without losing much in efficiency [20]. Therefore, quantum computation can
imitate any classical computation without losing much in efficiency, and possibly
do more. For further reading on quantum gates and circuits, we refer to work of
DiVincenzo [53].
3.1.2 Physical Realisation of Quantum Computers
Developing a large scale quantum computer is not an easy task [51]. To begin with,
a suitable physical presentation of a collection of qubits is required. For instance, a
qubit could be considered as the states of a vertical and horizontal polarised photon,
or the two spin states of a spin 1/2 atom in the ground and excited states. In each
of these cases one state denotes |0〉 and the other |1〉. Realisation of a suitable
qubit means to accurately know a qubit’s physical parameters, such as its internal
Hamiltonian, couplings to its other states, and the interaction with other qubits. We
need to be able to physically prepare these qubits in their initial states. This is not
a trivial task in some cases.
To perform a quantum computation, a physical implementation of a universal set of
quantum gates is needed. We require these unitary transformations to be implemented
38
3.1 Quantum Computers
in a way that each can act on a small number of qubits. This is usually done by
identifying Hamiltonians which generate the unitary transformation. For instance
Uj = e
iHjt/~ where j ∈ [n]. During all these processes, the qubits, as a closed
quantum system, must remain coherent. This means we must be able to keep the
physical qubits from interacting with the environment, also known as ‘quantum noise’.
In practice, however, the qubits are susceptible to perturbation by quantum noise.
This perturbation is called decoherence. Finally, to get the quantum computation
outcome, we require the ability to measure specific qubits. In practice though,
measurements are not 100% efficient. The state of nearby qubits or quantum noise
have a negative effect on the measurement outcome.
There are different proposals for a natural presentation of a qubit. For instance,
electromagnetically trapped particles such as ‘trapped ions’ [39, 66], and ‘trapped
single electrons’ [85]. Others are ‘molecular spins in liquids’, also known as ‘nuclear
magnetic resonance’ (NMR) [70], and ‘nuclear and electron spins in silicon’ [71,
86]. Moreover, there are proposals such as ‘optical photon’ [91], ‘superconducting
qubits’ [102, 110, 90], and ‘solid state qubits with quantum dots’ [7, 81]. The problem
is that none of these proposals overcame all the difficulties mentioned in the above.
At least not until now.
Discussing the above proposals in detail is beyond the scope of this thesis. But
for more details we refer to work of Nielsen and Chuang [89] and Chen et al. [35].
Here we merely point out a number of advances in the field. For example, IBM
opts to develop superconducting qubits but, in general, the error rate of the qubits
is too high to allow operation on them. But, IBM has been able to reduce the
errors in elementary quantum computations [93]. Also recently, researchers built a
superconducting multi-qubit processor with 99% reliability in performing 1-qubit
and 2-qubit quantum gates [9].
There is another possible proposal known as ‘adiabatic’ [58, 37] quantum computing.
This is mainly an approach to address the decoherence problem. It refers to an
evolution in which the quantum system always remains in its instantaneous eigenstates.
The ground state of a quantum system is very robust against decoherence. Hence,
if one can perform adiabatic quantum computation when a system is in its ground
state, then it remains in the ground state all the time and it is only the nature of the
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ground states which evolves into the final outcome of the computation. The D-Wave
company currently builds a 512-qubit superconducting quantum computer which
performs adiabatic computation to solve optimisation problems [42]. The company
has been joined by Google and NASA for further developments of its quantum
computer [38]. Despite this enthusiasm, D-Wave’s quantum computer is the subject
of much debate [101, 97]. The drawback of adiabatic quantum computing is that
the lowest eigenstate of a quantum system might get very close to a higher state.
Therefore, to suppress non-adiabatic transformation between them, the adiabatic
evolutions have to be performed extremely slowly. This, may lead to other problems.
3.2 Quantum Algorithms
At the heart of quantum computation are quantum algorithms which enable us to
harness the power of quantum computation.
Early quantum algorithms were designed after Deutsch [46] suggested that quantum
computers might be faster than classical computers in solving certain problems.
Deutsch and Jozsa [48] gave the first quantum algorithm that showed an expo-
nential advantage over the best deterministic classical algorithm. Call a function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} balanced if it has an equal number of 0 and 1 outputs. Given the
promise that a function f is constant or balanced, the Deutsch and Jozsa algorithm
determines whether it is constant or balanced. This was followed by the work of
Brassard and Berthiaume [24], who recast this problem in complexity theoretic
terms, that showed an exponential advantage over the best probabilistic classical
algorithm with zero error probability. However, a probabilistic classical algorithm
with exponentially small error probability could efficiently solve [104] the problems
explored in [48] and [24].
Simon [104] designed an algorithm that demonstrated an exponential advantage
over the best probabilistic classical algorithms. Later on, Shor [103], inspired by
Simon’s algorithm, discovered a quantum algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm
and factoring problem in polynomial time. Shor’s algorithm meant that a number of
asymmetric cryptographic schemes such as RSA [94] could be broken in a reasonable
amount of time using a quantum computer. This eventually led to the inception
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of a new research field, called post-quantum cryptography [22]. This field attempts
to design cryptographic schemes which are secure even in the presence of quantum
computers.
Grover [65] found another quantum algorithm for solving the database search problem.
Grover’s algorithm showed only a polynomial speed up over classical algorithms, but
it is applicable to solving a wide range of problems (see Subsection 3.2.2).
The quantum algorithms we discuss here, and in fact most of the known quantum
algorithms, can be described in the ‘black-box model’ [107, 40]. This is a model
of computation where a problem is defined in terms of a black-box that can be
applied. A black-box is also, equivalently, called an ‘oracle’ that can be queried.
We use the terms ‘black-box’ and ‘oracle’ interchangeably. The only way to extract
information from an oracle is to query it. That is, to supply an input and receive
the corresponding output. The ‘complexity’ of a black-box algorithm that solves a
black-box problem is the number of oracles used by the algorithm. Intuitively, an
oracle is a sub-circuit that implements a function.
For the purpose of this thesis, we only explain quantum algorithms of Simon and
Grover, but we refer to work of Aharonov [5] and Mosca [87] for more details of
quantum algorithms.
3.2.1 Simon’s Algorithm
Distinguishing between two different classes of computable functions is known to be
hard in classical computation [104]. For instance, it takes a classical algorithm an
exponential amount of time to determine whether a function, given as a black-box, is
two-to-one or one-to-one. A classical lower bound for the number of function queries
is Ω
(
2n/4
)
[104]. Simon’s algorithm, on the other hand, solves this problem by
querying the function O (n) times, where n is size of the domain. Therefore Simon’s
algorithm shows an exponential improvement over the best classical algorithm.
Problem 1 (Simon’s Problem) Given a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n for which
there exists s ∈ {0, 1}n such that for any n-bit strings i and j, f(i) = f(j) if and
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only if i = j or i = j ⊕ s, find s.
We now explain how Simon’s algorithm solves Problem 1. We start by preparing two
quantum registers in the initial state 0,
|ψ0〉 = |0n〉 |0n〉 . (3.9)
Then we apply the Hadamard transformation to the first register to get:
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2n
∑
i∈{0,1}n
|i〉 |0n〉 . (3.10)
Now if we query function f (or equivalently, apply Uf to the two registers) we get:
|ψ2〉 = 1√
2n
∑
i∈{0,1}n
|i〉 |xi〉 , (3.11)
where f (i) = xi. Note that the second register now stores all 2
n configurations
of function f (i). Applying a projective measurement, {(I⊗ |i〉〈i|)}, to the second
register, yields:
|ψ3〉 = 1√
2
(|i〉+ |i⊕ s〉) |xi〉 , (3.12)
for a random i ∈ {0, 1}n. Now the second register stores the measurement outcome
xi while the first register collapses into a superposition of states corresponding to
the measurement outcome. To find s, we only focus on the first register. Again we
apply a Hadamard transformation to the first register. The result is:
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|ψ4〉 = 1√
2n+1
 ∑
j∈{0,1}n
(−1)i·j |j〉+
∑
j∈{0,1}n
(−1)(i⊕s)·j |j〉

=
1√
2n+1
 ∑
j∈{0,1}n
(−1)i·j
(
1 + (−1)s·j
)
|j〉
 .
(3.13)
Note that we used Equation 3.7 and the fact that (i⊕ s) · j = (i · j)⊕ (s · j). The
amplitude of |j〉 in Equation 3.13 is non-zero if and only if s · j = 0 mod 2. If we
measure |ψ4〉, we obtain, say, j1. We repeat this algorithm n times to get j1, . . . , jn.
Therefore we obtain n− 1 linear equations
ji · s = 0 mod 2 where i ∈ [n] . (3.14)
By applying Gaussian elimination modulo 2, we can find a solution of the set of
equations that is either 0n or the correct s. Note that finding the solution also
means determining whether the function f is two-to-one, in the case where s 6= 0, or
one-to-one, when s = 0.
3.2.2 Grover’s Algorithm
Assume we are given an unordered database that contains N entries. We are
interested in an entry i that satisfies a number of properties. It is easy to verify
whether the properties are satisfied. But it is hard to find i, if it exists. This is
known as the database search problem or just the search problem. The best classical
algorithm requires at least Ω (N/2) queries to solve this problem with a probability
of 1/2. In a comparison, Grover’s algorithm [65] solves this problem in O
(√
N
)
queries with quadratic increase in speed.
Problem 2 (Search Problem) Given an arbitrary function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1},
find x ∈ {0, 1}n such that f (x) = 1, otherwise output ‘no solution’.
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In order to solve Problem 2, Grover’s algorithm prepares a quantum superposition of
states that consists of all 2n possible configurations of f each with equal amplitude
1/
√
2n. The configurations are checked to see if they satisfy f (x) = 1, and their
amplitudes are manipulated to produce the correct configuration with probability
at least 1/2. The key to Grover’s algorithm is the selective shifting of the phase of
those configurations that satisfy the desired properties. This is known as amplitude
amplification. Note that manipulating the phase of a state does not change the
probability of being in that state. For instance, if we apply the unitary transformation
S, where φ = pi, to a state (see Equation 3.6) then we put a ‘−1’ in front of |1〉 in the
state. In Subsection 2.3.3, we mentioned that probability disregards the sign of the
amplitude. Therefore the overall measurement probability distribution is intact. The
phase of a state has no analogue in classical computation, and we can exploit it to
our advantage. If we can manipulate the phase of each configuration in a quantum
state in a way such that it induces destructive interference on ‘bad’ configurations
and constructive interference on ‘good’ configurations, then we can increase the
probability of finding the solutions.
We use s to denote the number of solutions for f (x) = 1. We define the oracle O as
|x〉 O−→ (−1)f(x) |x〉 . (3.15)
Moreover, we define the unitary transformation Ug which manipulates the phase of
|0n〉 by placing ‘−1’ in front of it
|x〉 Ug−→ (−1)δx0 |x〉 . (3.16)
We use G to denote the Grover iteration such that G = −H⊗nUgH⊗nO.
Now we explain Grover’s algorithm [65]. We prepare n qubits in the initial state |0n〉.
Then we apply the Hadamard transformation to it to obtain a uniform superposition
of all x:
44
3.2 Quantum Algorithms
|ψ〉 = 1√
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉 . (3.17)
Now we define the following ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states, denoted by |g〉 and |b〉 respectively,
as:
|g〉 = 1√
s
∑
f(x)=1
|x〉 and |b〉 = 1√
2n − s
∑
f(x)6=1
|x〉 . (3.18)
Therefore we can rewrite |ψ〉 as follows,
|ψ〉 =
√
2n − s
2n
|b〉+
√
s
2n
|g〉 . (3.19)
We apply G to |ψ〉 a number of times. The Grover iterate performs two reflections.
The oracle O performs a reflection through |b〉 in the plane defined by |b〉 and |g〉,
and
−H⊗nUgH⊗n = H⊗n (2 |0n〉〈0n| − I) H⊗n = 2 |ψ〉〈ψ| − I (3.20)
is a reflection through |ψ〉 in the plane defined by |b〉 and |g〉. Now if we measure
the final state we obtain a solution.
Note that each G is considered as one oracle query. The number of required oracle
queries depends on the number of solutions s. To see how many oracle queries are
required, we rewrite the state |ψ〉 again
|ψ〉 = sin θ |g〉+ cos θ |b〉 , (3.21)
where θ = arcsin
(√
s/2n
)
. After q oracle queries, the two reflections performed by
G transform the state |ψ〉 to
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∣∣ψ′〉 = sin (2q + 1) θ |g〉+ cos (2q + 1) θ |b〉 . (3.22)
According to the state |ψ′〉, the probability of obtaining a solution after measurement
is p = sin ((2q + 1) θ)2. To increase this probability we need to pick q such that
p = sin ((2q + 1) θ)2 = 1. Note that if we choose q′ such that
q′ =
pi
4θ
− 1
2
(3.23)
then (2q′ + 1) θ = pi/2 hence p = 1. Therefore, we need a discrete number of queries
q. Assuming that |q − q′| ≤ 1/2, and the number of solutions is s ≤ 2n/2, then [31]
p = sin ((2q + 1) θ)2 = (sin θ)2 =
s
2n
. (3.24)
Because arcsin θ ≥ θ, then the number of oracle queries is [31]
q ≤ pi
4θ
≤ pi
4
√
2n
s
. (3.25)
Grover’s algorithm only has a quadratic advantage over the best classical algorithm.
Bennett et al. [21] show that the Grover bound is the best one could do to solve a
search problem. Boyer et al. [31] give tight bounds on any possible quantum search
algorithm and Zalka [113] shows that Equation 3.25 is optimal. Grover’s algorithm
has many application. For instance, it can be used to find the shared secret key of a
symmetric encryption such as AES [3]. Moreover, the work of Brassard et al. [34, 33],
based on Grover’s algorithm, gives a quantum algorithm to find collisions in an
arbitrary r-to-one function after O
(
3
√
N/r
)
oracle query. The latter can be used to
find collisions in hash functions.
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3.3 Limitations of Quantum Computers
So far in this chapter, we have shown the power of quantum computation over
classical computation. We mentioned problems that quantum algorithms can solve
exponentially faster than classical algorithms, as well as problems that quantum
algorithms can solve merely polynomially faster. But as it turns out, there are
problems that quantum algorithms cannot solve efficiently [108]. They are just better
than classical algorithms at solving certain types of problem.
In complexity theory, classes such as P and PSPACE refer to the set of decision
problems that can be solved in polynomial time, and in polynomial space, using
a deterministic Turing machine, respectively. The hardest problems in NP are in
what is known as the NP-complete class. The problems in NP can be reduced to
problems in NP-complete. The general belief is that NP 6= P, this has not been
proven. If an NP-complete problem is found to be in P, then it implies that all NP
problems are in P, which would mean NP = P.
Another important complexity class is one that consists of problems which can be
solved in polynomial time, with bounded error probability, by a probabilistic Turing
machine. These are called BPP. This definition explicitly allows for a small proba-
bility that the solution is wrong. It is conjectured that P = BPP [68]. A quantum
extension of BPP is called BQP [23]. The latter is the class of problems that can
be solved in polynomial time, with bounded error probability, by a probabilistic
quantum Turing machine. Aaronson [4] suggests that P ⊂ BQP. This means that
quantum algorithms could solve, in polynomial time, problems that cannot be solved
efficiently by classical algorithms.
3.4 Quantum Adversary
A quantum adversary is a quantum algorithm that runs on an ideal quantum computer.
We use capital letters such as A to denote a quantum adversary. We define a general
quantum adversary, that without loss of generality, complies with a given security
definition. In Section 2.2, we discussed that a security definition is usually expressed
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as an ‘experiment’ conducted by a ‘challenger’. A quantum adversary plays the
experiment with regards to a cryptographic scheme. To do so, the quantum adversary
maintains a number of registers. Specifically, registers for input and output, a register
for querying its ‘oracles’ that are maintained by the challenger, a register for storing
its internal state between each oracle query, and a register for classical communication.
Formally, all of these registers are quantum registers. The provided oracles could
be classically or quantumly queried, depending on the security definition. Generally
we assume that oracle queries made by a quantum adversary are quantum states.
If a security definition merely allows classical access to the provided oracles, then
the quantum queries are measured by the oracle before being answered. Note that
measuring a quantum state yields a random classical string. On the other hand, if
quantum queries are allowed, then the oracle applies a unitary transformation to the
quantum queries.
Often at the beginning of an experiment, a number of variables with their initial
values are introduced. A quantum adversary might use these variables as its input.
Or it might just simply place |0n〉, or any other string, in its input register. Then the
quantum adversary queries its oracle. The oracle queries are placed in a quantum
register prepared by the quantum adversary. The quantum register is shared between
the quantum adversary and the oracle. The oracle prepares its response by applying
a unitary transformation to the quantum register. If the oracle is merely classically
accessible, it first measures the quantum register. Then the oracle writes its classical
response, based on the measurement outcome, to the quantum register. Note that
this is the same as, say, the quantum register being sent back and forth between the
quantum adversary and the oracle. The quantum adversary performs a number of
unitary transformations on its registers between each oracle query. It finally produces
an output.
Definition 1 [Quantum Adversary] A quantum adversary A maintains a number
of quantum registers. That is, specifically, there are two quantum registers inp and
out for inputs and outputs respectively, a quantum register Q for the purpose of
making quantum oracle queries, a quantum register S for storing its internal state
between each oracle query, and a quantum register R for classical communication
with the environment (such as specifying the type of a query, the length n, and any
other query parameters). The quantum adversary always begins by preparing some
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initial quantum state in its input register. Then, A prepares an n-qubit quantum
query in the register Q. The oracle takes the form of a unitary transformation, Uf ,
defined by its action on the first 2n qubits of the register Q such that
Uf |x, y〉 = |x, y ⊕ f (x)〉 , (3.26)
where x and y are n-bit strings. This defines the action of Uf for arbitrary quantum
states in the register Q. This includes superposition of states, mixed states, and
states entangled with state of the register S. If the oracle merely accepts classical
queries, then it measures the first n qubits in the register Q to obtain a n-bit string
x. The oracle then replaces the first n qubits in the register Q with its response f (x).
The quantum adversary’s ability to store its internal state in the register S means
that it can make interactive oracle queries. Formally, the action of the quantum
adversary is a quantum operation. That is, a completely positive map, acting on
its registers. Finally, A outputs by measuring the out register. We will quantify
resources available to the adversary as follows. The running time of an adversary
A is the time, in seconds, that elapses until A writes its final output and halts,
including any initialisation steps. In addition to the number of oracle queries made
by A, we specify the total size, measured in number of qubits, of all oracle queries.
In some cases, we will also quantify the size of the classical output of A.
The standard formal model for a quantum computer is the quantum circuit model
described in Subsection 3.1.1. The above definition of a quantum adversary, however,
deliberately avoids referring to a particular quantum computing model. The concrete
security reductions given in this thesis are black-box reductions. They assume the
existence of a specific quantum adversary attacking one scheme and, based on this,
construct a specific quantum adversary attacking another scheme. For the reductions,
the hardware realisation of the adversary or the quantum computing model on which
it is based are irrelevant. The resources given in the definition above, which are those
that play a role in the reductions, do not depend on the details of the adversary or
the computational model. This should be regarded as a strength of the concrete
security approach, since it is unknown what form a future quantum computer will
take [97].
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To fully characterise the resources used by a quantum adversary, one needs to quantify,
in addition to the running time, the size of the adversary. In principle there are
many ways of doing this. For instance, one could limit the physical volume, the size
of the available Hilbert space, and the size of the classical memory available to the
quantum adversary. Corresponding resource parameters could easily be added to our
reduction theorems. But since they would simply appear unchanged on both sides of
the equations, they would not add anything and have therefore been omitted in the
above definition of a quantum adversary.
The theorems proved in this thesis are reductions of the following form. Given a
specific adversary A that attacks some scheme SA using certain physical resources,
an adversary B is constructed that attacks another scheme SB using broadly similar
resources. In order to draw conclusions from such a reduction in the concrete security
framework adopted here, one has to make (often heuristic) assumptions about the
security of scheme SB. For example, one might assume that no quantum adversary
which can be physically realised in the next 30 years, and which runs for at most t
seconds and makes at most q oracle queries, can break SB with probability larger
than , where t, q are suitably large numbers and  is a suitably small number. This
allows one to draw similarly concrete conclusions about the security of scheme SA.
Now we give a couple of examples of the interaction between a quantum adversary
and its oracles. When the register Q contains a quantum superposition of states∑
x αx |x, 0〉, then the oracle’s action, Uf , on the register Q, is given by
Uf
∑
x
αx |x, 0〉 =
∑
x
αx |x, f (x)〉 . (3.27)
In a classical n-bit randomised encryption query, the oracle measures the first n
qubits in the register Q to obtain a bit string x. It then replaces the first (n+ nr)
qubits of Q with the oracle response (f (x, r) , r), where nr is the length of the random
string r. In an n-bit randomised quantum encryption query, the oracle takes the form
of a unitary operation, Uf(·,r), defined by its action on the first (2n+ nr) qubits in
the register Q,
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Uf(·,r) |x, y, z〉 = |x, y ⊕ f (x, r) , z ⊕ r〉 , (3.28)
where x and y are n-bit strings and z is a nr-bit string. This defines the action of
Uf(·,r) for arbitrary states in the register Q, including superposition of states, mixed
states, or states entangled with state of the register S. For instance, the action of
Uf(·,r) on the superposition state |ψ〉 =
∑
x αx |x, 0, 0〉 is given by
Uf(·,r)
∑
x
αx |x, 0, 0〉 =
∑
x
αx |x, f (x, r) , r〉 . (3.29)
The resources required to apply the unitary Uf(·,r) to a quantum register are in-
dependent of the initial state |ψ〉 of the register. Applying a unitary operator can
be thought of as a single physical operation, for which the number of terms in the
superposition state |ψ〉 is irrelevant. Since the encryption oracle does not ‘know’
whether it acts on a superposition or on a single basis state, we have assumed above
that the random string r required for the randomised encryption is chosen exactly
once every time Uf(·,r) is applied, i.e., r is the same for all terms in the sum in
Equation 3.29.
In the case where f is a permutation, an alternative way to define a quantum oracle
query would be through a unitary U′f(·,r) acting on (n+ nr) bits. This definition
would be
U′f(·,r) |x, z〉 = |f (x, r) , z ⊕ r〉 . (3.30)
3.4.1 Quantum Computation vs. Quantum Superposition Attack
In the previous section, we discussed that the quantum adversary is given either
classical or quantum access to its oracles with regards to the security definition.
Assume the quantum adversary with classical access to its oracle. By making an
oracle query, the quantum adversary can evaluate one instance of the oracle at a
time. It then can take advantage of the quantum computation power between each
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oracle query to attack a cryptosystem. To describe this approach we use the term
quantum computation attack.
For example, consider the case where the quantum adversary attacks a simple
symmetric encryption scheme such as Even-Mansour [57] with a key size n. We
explain this in details in Section 5.1. The quantum adversary queries the oracle on a
number of messages to get their corresponding ciphertexts. After each oracle query,
the quantum adversary possesses a message/ciphertext pair. Given a message and
its corresponding ciphertext, the key can be recovered using Grover’s algorithm [65]
after 2n/2 quantum operations. This is in comparison with the classical ‘exhaustive
key search’ attack that requires 2n classical operations. Although the key can be
recovered faster than a classical attack in this manner, it still takes the quantum
adversary an exponential time to recover any key. Hence the Even-Mansour scheme
is considered secure against a quantum computation attack. Another example is to
attack an asymmetric encryption scheme such as RSA [94]. Given the public key
and a message/ciphertext pair, the quantum adversary can recover the private key
in polynomial time using Shor’s algorithm [103].
Now assume that the quantum adversary is given quantum access to its oracle. The
quantum adversary can make a quantum superposition query. For example, if the
query is a superposition of all messages then the oracle response contains all the
corresponding ciphertexts. This gives the quantum adversary an additional power
besides its quantum computation power to attack a cryptosystem. We use the term
quantum superposition attack to describe this property. For example, in Chapter 5, we
show that the Even-Mansour scheme is insecure against the quantum superposition
attack.
In general, a quantum computation attack against modern cryptosystems is the
subject of the field of post-quantum cryptography [22]. Here, the assumption is that
the honest parties use classical computation and communication, while the adversary
might be in possession of quantum computers. The quantum adversary is then able
to launch a quantum computation attack against the cryptosystems used by the
honest parties. In contrast, the quantum superposition attack is beyond the field of
post-quantum cryptography. A quantum superposition attack is possible when the
honest parties use quantum computation. Different attacks are possible depending
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on whether the honest parties use classical or quantum communication. We have
already discussed that any classical algorithm can be run on a quantum computer
(see Subsection 3.1.1).
Note that the quantum superposition attack is more powerful that the quantum com-
putation attack. Moreover, a security definition that allows quantum superposition
queries is stronger than a security definition that is restricted to classical queries.
In the next chapter, we discuss the security of a number of symmetric schemes and
the achievability of a number of security definitions against quantum computation
attacks.
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This chapter gives an overview of symmetric encryption. We mostly focus on
primitives and security notions. While discussing the latter, we introduce a new
indistinguishability-based security notion. Then we explain relations among all the
given security notions in this chapter. Moreover, we discuss the security of symmetric
encryption schemes against the quantum computation attack. We finish this chapter
by discussing a security notion for achieving integrity.
4.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Cryptographic schemes are built on a number of smaller and simpler schemes called
primitives. The cryptographic schemes are designed to achieve a goal. For instance,
encrypting messages. Primitives can also be considered as simple cryptographic
schemes, but they merely provide some sort of ‘hardness’ or ‘security’ properties
that must be properly used to design more complex schemes to achieve a goal.
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Cryptographic primitives can be drawn from two main groups: ‘symmetric’ and
‘asymmetric’. Block ciphers such as DES or AES can be used as symmetric primitives,
and RSA, for instance, can be used as an asymmetric primitive. In this thesis we
solely focus on symmetric primitives and symmetric cryptography.
4.1.1 Block Ciphers
At the centre of symmetric cryptography are block ciphers that play a very important
role in modern cryptography. Block ciphers are one of the most widely used primitives.
They are simple and adaptable with efficient implementation. Block ciphers are also
essential to many cryptographic schemes that are used in practice. Widely used
block ciphers such as DES and AES have been subject of intensive cryptanalysis, and
to this day no major security flaw has been found in their design. This is another
reason to consider block ciphers as reliable primitives.
A block cipher is a function E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that takes a k-bit
string and an n-bit string as input, and returns an n-bit string as its output. The
variables k and n denote the key length and the block length respectively. They
are parameters associated with the block cipher, and vary according to its design.
For each K ∈ {0, 1}k we denote EK : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n as the function defined by
EK (x) = E (K,x). A block cipher can be considered as a family of functions where
each key identifies a function. In general, for any block cipher E and any key K, the
function EK is required to be a permutation on {0, 1}n. This implies the existence
of an inverse function E−1K for EK , with E
−1
K (EK (x)) = x.
The popular block ciphers are the ‘Data Encryption Standard’ (DES), triple DES
(3DES), and the ‘Advanced Encryption Standard’ (AES). In the early 1970s, IBM
designed DES. Later in 1976, DES was standardised by the United States National
Bureau of Standards (now known as the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology, NIST) [1]. DES is a 64-bit block cipher designed based on a ‘Feistel cipher’
structure [59], with a 56-bit key. Its relatively short key size left DES vulnerable to
key recovery attacks such as ‘brute-force’ attacks. In 1998 DES was broken. The
Electronic Frontier Foundation built a specific machine with a cost of less than
$250,000, and recovered a DES key in less than 3 days. A simple solution to address
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such attacks is to increase the size of the key. Triple DES (3DES) provides a relatively
simple method of increasing the key size by using DES three times in a form of
‘encrypt-decrypt-encrypt’, with either two or three different keys. In 1985, 3DES was
standardised, and it became part of the Data Encryption Standard in 1999.
Daemen and Rijmen designed the block cipher ‘Rijndael’ as part of a proposal
submitted to NIST during the competition to find a successor for DES in 1997. The
Rijndael block cipher is based on a ‘substitution-permutation network’, and has
a 128-bit block size but three different key lengths of 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256
bits. It won the NIST competition that required the winner to provide at least the
same level of security as 3DES but be substantially more efficient. In 2001, NIST
standardised the Rijndael block cipher under the name of ‘Advanced Encryption
Standard’ (AES) [3].
4.1.2 Pseudorandom Functions and Permutations
This subsection, as well as Subsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, contains background material
from modern cryptography. These subsections do not refer to the quantum adversary
defined in Chapter 3, but to a classical adversary definition based on a Turing
machine model. Here we measure running time in discrete steps rather than seconds.
We follow Bellare et al. [13] in including in the running time, the space required to
store the program that describes the adversary. This prevents the adversary, e.g.,
from embedding arbitrary large look-up tables in the program. Measuring space and
running time in the same units makes sense because the time required to read in a
program is generally proportional to the program length. In this way the number
of Turing machines bounded by a given running time is finite, so that taking a
maximum over all classical adversaries bounded such is well defined.
Normally in the context of provable security, block ciphers are modelled as pseudoran-
dom functions or pseudorandom permutations [82, 83, 15]. A pseudorandom function
is a family of functions such that a function chosen uniformly at random from the
family of functions is indistinguishable from a function chosen uniformly at random
from the set of all functions [62, 63]. This is expressed via the ability of an adversary
to distinguish between two experiments. We are interested in the probability of the
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Experiment Expprf−1F (A)
K ←$K
b← AFK(·)
return b
Experiment Expprf−0F (A)
f ←$ Func (X ,Y)
b← Af(·)
return b
Figure 4.1: The PRF definition
adversary doing so. We now provide a formal definition for pseudorandom functions.
Definition 2 [Pseudorandom Functions (PRF)] Let F : K×X → Y be a family
of functions identified by the set K. Define two experiments Expprf−0F and Expprf−1F
for an adversary A as depicted in Figure 4.1. The adversary A has access to an
oracle, and returns a bit as its output. The advantage of A is defined as
AdvprfF (A) = Pr
[
Expprf−1F (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expprf−0F (A) = 1
]
.
The advantage of the function family is given by
AdvprfF (t, q) = maxA
{
AdvprfF (A)
}
, (4.1)
for any integers t, q. Here the maximum is over all adversaries A with a running time
of at most t, making at most q oracle queries.
A low value of AdvprfF (t, q) indicates that F is a secure PRF for reasonable values
of t and q.
In the previous subsection we explained that block ciphers can be regarded as a
family of permutations. Therefore we can also model block ciphers as a family of
pseudorandom permutations. They can be described in a similar way.
Definition 3 [Pseudorandom Permutations (PRP)] Let F : K×X → X be a
family of permutations identified by the set K. Define two experiments Expprp−0F
57
4.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Experiment Expprp−1F (A)
K ←$K
b← AFK(·)
return b
Experiment Expprp−0F (A)
Π←$ Perm (X )
b← AΠ(·)
return b
Figure 4.2: The PRP definition
and Expprp−1F for an adversary A as depicted in Figure 4.2. The adversary A has
access to an oracle, and returns a bit as its output. The advantage of A is defined as
AdvprpF (A) = Pr
[
Expprp−1F (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expprp−0F (A) = 1
]
.
The advantage of the function family is given by
AdvprpF (t, q) = maxA
{
AdvprpF (A)
}
,
for any integers t, q. Here the maximum is over all adversaries A with a running time
of at most t, making at most q oracle queries.
A low value of AdvprpF (t, q) indicates that F is a secure PRP for reasonable values
of t and q.
Block cipher constructions can be modelled as either PRFs or PRPs. Although PRPs
better model a block cipher, analysis of a block cipher construction is sometimes
easier if one assumes the underlying primitives are PRFs. The following lemma
proves that the prf-advantage and the prp-advantage of a block cipher are always
close to the amount given by the ‘birthday attack’.
Result 2 (PRP/PRF Switching Lemma ([16] Proposition 2.5)) Let F : K×
X → X be a family of functions identified by the set K. For any adversary A that
makes at most q oracle queries, then
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∣∣∣AdvprfF (t, q)−AdvprpF (t, q)∣∣∣ ≤ q (q − 1)2 |X | .
So far, the definitions given in this subsection merely consider classical adversaries.
We now define quantum pseudorandom functions (QPRF). This is analogous to the
definition of PRFs except that now a quantum adversary is given quantum super-
position access to its oracle. Therefore, the quantum adversary can make quantum
superposition queries, and the oracle responds to each query by applying a unitary
transformation to the adversary’s quantum register. The unitary transformation
depends on the experiment that the quantum adversary is playing.
Note that Zhandry [114] shows how to construct a QPRF assuming that one-way
functions exist. However, Zhandry’s work is in the asymptotic setting, as opposed to
concrete setting which applies in this thesis. From a concrete perspective a QPRF
is simply a function family together with the definition of an advantage against a
quantum adversary. Here is the formal definition:
Definition 4 [Quantum Pseudorandom Functions (QPRF)] Let F : K×X →
Y be a family of functions identified by the set K. Define two experiments Expqprf−0F
and Expqprf−1F for a quantum adversary A as depicted in Figure 4.3. The adversary
A has quantum superposition access to an oracle, and returns a bit as its output.
The oracle responds to each query by applying a unitary transformation to the first
2n qubits of the adversary’s quantum register, where n is the length of each query.
The advantage of A is defined as
AdvqprfF (A) = Pr
[
Expqprf−1F (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expqprf−0F (A) = 1
]
.
This advantage refers to a specific quantum adversary using resources as discussed
in Section 3.4. These include the running time t, and the number of queries q.
Notice that in the above we do not provide a definition of the advantage of the
function family similar to Equation 4.1. The reason is that, the maximum of the
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Experiment Expqprf−1F (A)
K ←$K
b← AFK(·)
return b
Experiment Expqprf−0F (A)
f ←$ Func (X ,Y)
b← Af(·)
return b
Figure 4.3: The QPRF definition
advantage over all adversaries limited by a set of given resources is only well defined
with respect to a precise model of computation. But as we explained in Section 3.4,
the concrete security reductions in this thesis do not require the specification of
a formal quantum computing model. Such a specification might even limit the
generality of our reductions unnecessarily.
In Chapter 6 we give constructions based on a QPRF. For these constructions to
be secure, we need to assume that there exists a function family F such that its
QPRF-advantage is very small for any quantum adversary using resources that are
available now or might become available in the foreseeable future. Such function
families exist in the form of standard block ciphers, for instance AES-256. The
best currently known quantum attack against AES-256 is based on Grover’s search
algorithm [65], which requires of the order of 2128 queries to succeed with high
probability. The security of the schemes discussed in Chapter 6 thus depends on the
heuristic assumption that AES-256 or similar block ciphers cannot be broken by a
quantum computer using realistic resources.
4.2 Encryption Schemes
Symmetric encryption provides ‘privacy’ for two parties that share a secret key. A
symmetric encryption scheme consists of three algorithms: key generation, encryption,
and decryption. A key generation algorithm produces a key that two parties need to
share prior to any communication. The key is then used by an encryption algorithm
that specifies how to produce the ciphertext from a plaintext. The ciphertext is
transmitted between the parties. Then a decryption algorithm specifies how to
recover the plaintext from the ciphertext by using the key.
60
4.2 Encryption Schemes
We denote a symmetric encryption scheme by SE = (K, E ,D). The key generation
algorithm is denoted by K. This is a randomised algorithm that takes no input, and
returns a key K. The key is chosen uniformly at random from a set of keys and
is usually a random bit string with an arbitrary size. We also often use the same
notation, K, with regards to the set of keys representing the key space. When the
key K is generated, it needs to be securely exchanged between two parties. How the
two parties securely exchange the key is beyond the scope of this thesis. However,
we refer to the work of Bellare and Rogaway [18, 19] for more details on secure ways
to exchange a key. Here we assume the two parties are in possession of the secret
key K.
A message spaceM⊂ {0, 1}∗ and a ciphertext space C ⊂ {0, 1}∗ are associated with
the symmetric encryption scheme SE . The encryption algorithm is denoted by E . It
may be either randomised or stateful. If the encryption algorithm E is stateful, then
the key generation algorithm K outputs the initial encryption and decryption states,
%0 ∈ Σ and ς0 ∈ Σ respectively, alongside the key K. The randomised encryption
E : K ×M→ C takes the key K ∈ K and a message m ∈M as input, and returns a
ciphertext c ∈ C. Note that the randomised E uses fresh coins each time it is invoked.
Therefore, invoking E on the same inputs twice may not yield the same results. The
stateful encryption E : K×M×Σ→ C×Σ takes the key K ∈ K, a message m ∈M,
and the current encryption state % ∈ Σ as input, then returns a ciphertext c ∈ C and
updates the encryption state.
The deterministic decryption algorithm is denoted by D. The decryption algorithm
D : K × C → M ∪ {⊥} takes the key K ∈ K and a ciphertext c ∈ C as input,
and returns either the corresponding message m ∈ M or the symbol ⊥ meaning
the ciphertext is invalid. If the encryption scheme is stateful then the decryption
algorithm D : K×C ×Σ→ (M∪ {⊥})×Σ takes the key K ∈ K, a ciphertext c ∈ C,
and the current state ς ∈ Σ as input, and returns either the corresponding message
m ∈M or the symbol ⊥, and updates the decryption state.
In this thesis we always consider a symmetric encryption scheme to be randomised,
unless otherwise stated. For any key K ∈ K, any sequence of messages mi ∈ M,
i ∈ [q], and any sequence of ciphertexts ci ← EK (mi), we expect that m′i ← DK (ci)
where mi = m
′
i with probability 1. In case of the stateful encryption scheme, for any
61
4.2 Encryption Schemes
key K ∈ K and initial states %0, ς0 ∈ Σ, any sequence of messages mi ∈ M, i ∈ [q],
and any sequence of ciphertexts
(ci, %i)← EK (mi, %i−1) , i ∈ [q] (4.2)
we expect that
(
m′i, ςi
)← DK (ci, ςi−1) (4.3)
where mi = m
′
i with probability 1.
4.2.1 Notions of Confidentiality
The security of a symmetric encryption scheme is examined against an adversary
that is not in possession of the secret key but has some prior information about
the plaintext. For example, the adversary might know the length of the plaintext,
or that it is an English word. The adversary also gets to see the ciphertext that
is transmitted between the honest parties. This information must not enable the
adversary to recover the secret key or gain any partial information about the plaintext.
For example, a (stateless) deterministic encryption scheme is considered insecure
in this sense because when an adversary observes two identical ciphertexts, it can
conclude that they both correspond to the same plaintext. Therefore it obtains
partial information about the plaintext without actually knowing the plaintext. This
is not the case of course, if the symmetric encryption scheme is randomised or stateful.
However, it is still possible that even a randomised or stateful symmetric encryption
scheme, due to its design for instance, leaks information about the plaintext.
Goldwasser and Micali [64] were the first to formally model the security of encryption
schemes. They introduced two notions of security, called semantic security and
polynomial security, and proved them to be equivalent. Initially, semantic security
was defined primarily for asymmetric encryption schemes in an asymptotic framework.
If a given encryption scheme is semantically secure, then an adversary should be
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unable to obtain any partial information about the plaintext from the ciphertext.
In practice, semantic security is what we desire. But in theory, semantic security is
complex and difficult to work with. However, there is an Indistinguishability-based
definition that is easier to work with. These two definitions are equivalent. This
means that we can analyse the security of a scheme in the indistinguishability model
while being convinced that the security properties we obtain are those that we expect
from semantic security.
Bellare et al. [12] introduced several Indistinguishability-based (IND) security models
for symmetric encryption schemes in a concrete framework. They presented two
new indistinguishability notions called Left-or-Right (LoR) and Real-or-Random
(RoR). The authors also gave an adaptation of semantic security notion (SEM),
and an adaptation of polynomial security, called Find-then-Guess (FtG) in an
indistinguishability-based security model. The four notions given by the authors
consider two different types of attack, called chosen plaintext attack (CPA) and
chosen ciphertext attack (CCA). In the former, an adversary is given an encryption
oracle, while in the latter, an adversary is given both an encryption oracle and a
decryption oracle. The adversary can query the encryption oracle on any plaintext
to obtain a corresponding ciphertext. Moreover, in CCA model the adversary can
query the decryption oracle, to obtain the corresponding plaintext.
In a model based on indistinguishability, an adversary is required to distinguish
between the encryptions of two different plaintexts. That is, the adversary merely
needs to find a bit corresponding to each plaintext rather than recovering the whole
plaintext.
We explain the four notions LoR, RoR, FtG, and SEM under both chosen plaintext
and chosen ciphertext attacks. Then we discuss the relations among these notions
given by Bellare et al. [12]. Moreover, we present a new indistinguishability-based
notion called Real-or-Permutation (RoP), and we prove that RoP and RoR are
equivalent.
The results given in this subsection are in the symmetric setting but they carry over
to the asymmetric setting.
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4.2.1.1 Left-or-Right Indistinguishability
The adversary plays two experiments, one for LoR-CPA and the other for LoR-CCA.
Both experiments begin by the challenger choosing a secret key K ∈ K and a random
bit b ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary is given access to a left-or-right encryption oracle which
it can adaptively query. The encryption oracle queries sent by the adversary are in
the form of (m0,m1) such that |m0| = |m1|. Upon arriving each encryption query,
the oracle encrypts one of the messages c ← EK (mb), and returns the ciphertext.
We call this ciphertext the challenge ciphertext. Additionally, in the LoR-CCA
experiment, the adversary is given access to a decryption oracle. The adversary may
query the decryption oracle on any ciphertext except the challenge ciphertext. The
decryption oracle returns a message m← DK (c) corresponding to each decryption
query. At some point the adversary outputs a bit b′, and the experiment returns b′
as well.
Definition 5 [LoR-CPA and LoR-CCA] Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric
encryption scheme. Define experiments Explor−cpa−bSE (A) and Exp
lor−cca−b
SE (A) for an
adversary A and a bit b as depicted in Figure 4.4. In both experiments, the adversary
A is given access to a left-or-right encryption oracle LoR (·). It is additionally given
access to a decryption oracle Dec (·) in the latter experiment. No restriction is
imposed on the adversary’s queries, except, it is assumed that the probability that
the adversary queries Dec (·) on previously returned ciphertexts by LoR (·) is zero.
In both experiments, the adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the
challenge bit b. The adversary wins if b′ = b. The corresponding advantages of an
adversary A are given by:
Advlor−cpaSE (A) = Pr
[
Explor−cpa−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Explor−cpa−0SE (A) = 1
]
,
Advlor−ccaSE (A) = Pr
[
Explor−cca−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Explor−cca−0SE (A) = 1
]
.
The advantage functions of the scheme are defined to be:
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Explor−cpa−bSE (A) Exp
lor−cca−b
SE (A)
K ← K
b′ ← ALoR(·) b′ ← ALoR(·),Dec(·)
return b′
LoR ((m0,m1))
if |m0| 6= |m1| then
return ⊥
else
c← EK (mb)
return c
end if
Dec (c)
m← DK (c)
return m
Figure 4.4: The LoR-CPA and LoR-CCA confidentiality notions. The boxed codes
are excluded in LoR-CPA experiment, whereas they replace the codes adjacent to
them in LoR-CCA experiment.
Advlor−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) = maxA
{
Advlor−cpaSE (A)
}
,
Advlor−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) = maxA
{
Advlor−ccaSE (A)
}
for any positive integers t, qe, µe, qd, µd. Here the maximum is over all adversaries A
with a running time of at most t, making at most qe queries to the encryption oracle,
totalling at most µe bits, and in case of Exp
lor−cca−b
SE (A), making at most qd queries
to the decryption oracle, totalling at most µd bits.
We say that the scheme SE is LoR-CPA (t, qe, µe)-secure (respectively LoR-CCA
(t, qe, µe, qd, µd)-secure) if Adv
lor−cpa
SE (A) (respectively Adv
lor−cca
SE (A)) is small for
all adversaries A using reasonable resources.
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4.2.1.2 Real-or-Random Indistinguishability
This notion can be seen as an adaptation of LoR notion. The difference is that
the adversary adaptively queries the real-or-random encryption oracle each time
on a single message m, instead of two messages (m0,m1). If b = 1, the encryption
oracle encrypts m and returns c← EK (m), otherwise the encryption oracle chooses a
random bit string r where |r| = |m| and returns c← EK (r). Therefore, the adversary
is required to distinguish between the ciphertext corresponding to its query and the
ciphertext of a redundant string. Now we give the formal definition.
Definition 6 [RoR-CPA and RoR-CCA] Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric
encryption scheme. Define experiments Expror−cpa−bSE (A) and Exp
ror−cca−b
SE (A) for
an adversary A and a bit b as depicted in Figure 4.5. In both experiments the
adversary A is given access to a real-or-random encryption oracle RoR (·). It is
additionally given access to a decryption oracle Dec (·) in the latter experiment. No
restriction is imposed on the adversary’s queries, except, it is assumed that the
probability that the adversary queries Dec (·) on previously returned ciphertexts c
by RoR (·) is zero.
In both experiments, the adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the
challenge bit b. The adversary wins if b′ = b. The corresponding advantages of an
adversary A are given by:
Advror−cpaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expror−cpa−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expror−cpa−0SE (A) = 1
]
,
Advror−ccaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expror−cca−1SE (A) = 1
]− Pr [Expror−cca−0SE (A) = 1] .
The advantage functions of the scheme are defined to be:
Advror−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) = maxA
{
Advror−cpaSE (A)
}
,
Advror−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) = maxA
{
Advror−ccaSE (A)
}
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Expror−cpa−bSE (A) Exp
ror−cca−b
SE (A)
K ← K
b′ ← ARoR(·) b′ ← ARoR(·),Dec(·)
return b′
RoR (m)
if b = 1 then
c← EK (m)
else
r ←$ {0, 1}|m|
c← EK (r)
end if
return c
Dec (c)
m← DK (c)
return m
Figure 4.5: The RoR-CPA and RoR-CCA confidentiality notions. The boxed codes
are excluded in RoR-CPA experiment, whereas they replace the codes adjacent to
them in RoR-CCA experiment.
for any positive integers t, qe, µe, qd, µd. Here the maximum is over all adversaries A
with a running time of at most t, making at most qe queries to the encryption oracle,
totalling at most µe bits, and in case of Exp
ror−cca−b
SE (A), making at most qd queries
to the decryption oracle, totalling at most µd bits.
We say that the scheme SE is RoR-CPA (t, qe, µe)-secure (respectively RoR-CCA
(t, qe, µe, qd, µd)-secure) if Adv
ror−cpa
SE (A) (respectively Adv
ror−cca
SE (A)) is small for
all adversaries A using reasonable resources.
4.2.1.3 Find-then-Guess Indistinguishability
The adversary plays two experiments FtG-CPA and FtG-CCA. Both experiments
begin by the challenger choosing a secret key K ∈ K and a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
In the previous two notions, LoR and RoR, the adversary runs in only one phase.
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In FtG, the adversary runs in two phases. It begins with the find phase, where
the adversary is given access to an encryption oracle. The adversary queries the
encryption oracle on adaptively chosen messages m, to which the encryption oracle
returns c← EK (m) in response. The aim of the find phase is for the adversary to
choose two equal length messages (m0,m1) upon which it wishes to be challenged.
The adversary also may preserve some state information s that might help it in the
later phase. Then the challenger sends the challenge ciphertext c← EK (mb) to the
adversary. In the guess phase the adversary tries to determine the message to which
c decrypts. Additionally, the adversary is given access to a decryption oracle in
FtG-CCA experiment. The decryption oracle can be queried by the adversary on
any message except the challenge ciphertext. Finally, the adversary outputs a bit b′,
and the experiment returns b′ as well.
Definition 7 [FtG-CPA and FtG-CCA] Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric en-
cryption scheme. Define experiments Expftg−cpa−bSE (A) and Exp
ftg−cca−b
SE (A) for an
adversary A and a bit b as depicted in Figure 4.6. In both experiments, the adversary
A is given access to an encryption oracle EK (·). The adversary is additionally given
access to a decryption oracle DK (·) in the latter experiment. The two messages
(m0,m1), output by the adversary at the end of the find phase, must be the same
length. No restriction is imposed on the adversary’s queries, except, it is assumed
that the probability that the adversary queries DK (·) on the challenge ciphertexts c
is zero.
In both experiments, the adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the
challenge bit b. The adversary wins if b′ = b. The corresponding advantages of an
adversary A are given by:
Advftg−cpaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expftg−cpa−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expftg−cpa−0SE (A) = 1
]
,
Advftg−ccaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expftg−cca−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expftg−cca−0SE (A) = 1
]
.
The advantage functions of the scheme are defined to be:
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Experiment Expftg−cpa−bSE (A)
K ← K
((m0,m1) , s)← AEK(·) (find)
c← EK (mb)
b′ ← AEK(·) (guess, c, s)
return b′
Experiment Expftg−cca−bSE (A)
K ← K
((m0,m1) , s)← AEK(·),DK(·) (find)
c← EK (mb)
b′ ← AEK(·),DK(·) (guess, c, s)
return b′
Figure 4.6: The FtG-CPA and FtG-CCA confidentiality notions in the left hand and
the right hand side, respectively.
Advftg−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) = maxA
{
Advftg−cpaSE (A)
}
,
Advftg−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) = maxA
{
Advftg−ccaSE (A)
}
for any positive integers t, qe, µe, qd, µd. Here the maximum is over all adversaries A
with a running time of at most t, making at most qe queries to the encryption oracle,
totalling at most (µe − |m0|) bits, and in case of Expftg−cca−bSE (A), making at most
qd queries to the decryption oracle, totalling at most µd bits.
We say that the scheme SE is FtG-CPA (t, qe, µe)-secure (respectively FtG-CCA
(t, qe, µe, qd, µd)-secure) if Adv
ftg−cpa
SE (A) (respectively Adv
ftg−cca
SE (A)) is small for
all adversaries A using reasonable resources.
4.2.1.4 Semantic Security
This notion captures the idea of security for an encryption scheme defined by Shannon
(see Section 2.2). This is, a secure encryption scheme should hide all information
about an unknown plaintext. In other words, an encryption scheme is secure if an
adversary is unable to obtain any partial information about the plaintext from the
ciphertext. The security in Shannon’s notion is computationally unconditional, but
in semantic security it depends on an adversary’s computational effort.
The adversary plays two experiments SEM-CPA and SEM-CCA. The experiments
are characterised by a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary runs in two phases. First, in
the select phase, the adversary is given access to an encryption oracle. It adaptively
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queries the encryption oracle, which returns the corresponding ciphertext c← EK (m).
At the end of this phase, the adversary outputs a message space. The message space
must be valid, this means all the messages with non-zero probability must have the
same length. The adversary may also retain some state information s that might
help it in the later phase. The challenger samples the message space to obtain two
messages m0 and m1. It then sends the challenge ciphertext c ← EK (m1) to the
adversary. In the second phase, the predict phase, the adversary is also given access
to the encryption oracle. At the end of this phase, the adversary outputs a function
f and a value α. Additionally, in SEM-CCA experiment the adversary is given access
to a decryption oracle in both phases. The decryption oracle can be adaptively
queried on any ciphertext except the challenge ciphertext. The adversary hopes
that if b = 1 then f (m1) = α, otherwise f (m0) = α. Note that if the latter is the
case, then the adversary has not seen the corresponding ciphertext. The encryption
scheme is semantically secure if the adversary succeeds about as often in the latter
case (f (m0) = α) as the former case.
The message space can be considered as a probabilistic algorithm which the adversary
outputs its code. Each time this program is executed, it samples and outputs two
messages. Moreover, the function f is deterministic to which the adversary outputs
its program.
Definition 8 [SEM-CPA and SEM-CCA] Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric
encryption scheme. Define experiments Expsem−cpa−bSE (A) and Exp
sem−cca−b
SE (A)
that are characterised by a bit b for an adversary A as depicted in Figure 4.7. In
both experiments the adversary A is given access to an encryption oracle EK (·).
The adversary is additionally given access to a decryption oracle DK (·) in the latter
experiment. No restriction is imposed on the adversary’s queries, except, it is assumed
that the probability that the adversary queries the challenge ciphertext c to DK (·)
is zero. At the end of the select phase, the adversary outputs a valid message space
M. Moreover, the adversary outputs a function f and a value α at the end of the
predict phase.
In both experiments, the adversary’s goal is to output a function f and a value α
such that f (mb) = α. Then the adversary wins. The corresponding advantages of
an adversary A are given by:
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Experiment Expsem−cpa−bSE (A)
K ← K
(M, s)← AEK(·) (select)
m0 ←M; m1 ←M
c← EK (m1)
(f, α)← AEK(·) (predict, c, s)
if f (mb) = α then
b′ ← 1
else
b′ ← 0
end if
return b′
Experiment Expsem−cca−bSE (A)
K ← K
(M, s)← AEK(·),DK(·) (select)
m0 ←M; m1 ←M
c← EK (m1)
(f, α)← AEK(·),DK(·) (predict, c, s)
if f (mb) = α then
b′ ← 1
else
b′ ← 0
end if
return b′
Figure 4.7: The SEM-CPA and SEM-CCA confidentiality notions in the left hand
and the right hand side, respectively.
Advsem−cpaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expsem−cpa−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expsem−cpa−0SE (A) = 1
]
,
Advsem−ccaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expsem−cca−1SE (A) = 1
]− Pr [Expsem−cca−0SE (A) = 1] .
The advantage functions of the scheme are defined to be:
Advsem−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) = maxA
{
Advsem−cpaSE (A)
}
,
Advsem−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) = maxA
{
Advsem−ccaSE (A)
}
for any positive integers t, qe, µe, qd, µd. Here the maximum is over all adversaries
A with a running time of at most t, making at most qe queries to the encryption
oracle, totalling at most µe bits, and in case of Exp
sem−cca−b
SE (A), making at most
qd queries to the decryption oracle, totalling at most µd bits. Note that the running
time t includes the maximum time required to sample from the message space, and
the maximum time required to run the function f on any string. Moreover, the
length of the encryption queries µe includes a sum over all sampled messages from
the message space M, also a sum over the size of the program for the message space,
the functionf , and the length of the value α.
We say that the scheme SE is SEM-CPA (t, qe, µe)-secure (respectively SEM-CCA
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(t, qe, µe, qd, µd)-secure) if Adv
sem−cpa
SE (A) (respectively Adv
sem−cca
SE (A)) is small for
all adversaries A using reasonable resources.
Semantic security is a very strong notion of security. Despite this, we show that
indistinguishability-based notions imply semantic security.
4.2.1.5 Real-or-Permutation Indistinguishability
We introduce a new notion of security that is very similar to the notion of RoR.
The adversary plays two experiments: RoP-CPA and RoP-CCA. Both experiments
begin with the challenger choosing a key K ← K and a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. In both
experiments, the adversary is given access to a real-or-permutation encryption oracle.
The adversary adaptively requests the encryption of messages m. The encryption
oracle response depends on the bit b. If b = 1 then the oracle returns the ciphertext
c← EK (m). Otherwise, the challenger chooses a random permutation function with
the same domain size as the message length, then applies the permutation function
to the message. Finally, the encryption oracle encrypts the permuted message and
returns the ciphertext. We call the ciphertext that is returned by the encryption
oracle, the challenge ciphertext. Additionally, in the RoP-CCA experiment, the
adversary is given access to a decryption oracle. The decryption oracle can be queried
on any ciphertext except the challenge ciphertext. The adversary is required to
distinguish between the encryption of a message and the encryption of a permutation
of that message.
Definition 9 [RoP-CPA and RoP-CCA] Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric
encryption scheme. Define experiments Exprop−cpa−bSE (A) and Exp
rop−cca−b
SE (A) for
an adversary A and a bit b as depicted in Figure 4.8. In both experiments, the
adversary A is given access to a real-or-permutation encryption oracle RoP (·), and
it is additionally given access to a decryption oracle Dec (·) in the latter experiment.
No restriction is imposed on the adversary’s queries, except, it is assumed that the
probability that the adversary queries Dec (·) on previously returned ciphertext by
RoP (·) is zero.
In both experiments, the adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the
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challenge bit b. The adversary wins if b′ = b. The corresponding advantages of an
adversary A are given by:
Advrop−cpaSE (A) = Pr
[
Exprop−cpa−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exprop−cpa−0SE (A) = 1
]
,
Advrop−ccaSE (A) = Pr
[
Exprop−cca−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exprop−cca−0SE (A) = 1
]
.
The advantage functions of the scheme are defined to be:
Advrop−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) = maxA
{
Advrop−cpaSE (A)
}
,
Advrop−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) = maxA
{
Advrop−ccaSE (A)
}
for any positive integers t, qe, µe, qd, µd. Here the maximum is over all adversaries A
with a running time of at most t, making at most qe queries to the encryption oracle,
totalling at most µe bits, and in case of Exp
rop−cca−b
SE (A), making at most qd queries
to the decryption oracle, totalling at most µd bits.
We say that the scheme SE is RoP-CPA (t, qe, µe)-secure (respectively RoP-CCA
(t, qe, µe, qd, µd)-secure) if Adv
rop−cpa
SE (A) (respectively Adv
rop−cca
SE (A)) is small for
all adversaries A using reasonable resources.
Next we show that RoP and RoR are equivalent. In Chapter 6 we will describe the
quantum analogue of distinguishability notions when the adversary is given quantum
superposition access to its oracles. We prove that the quantum analogue of the
RoP notion of security is achievable even against such a strong adversarial model.
Moreover, we will go on to prove that the quantum analogue of RoP implies the
quantum analogue of SEM.
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Exprop−cpa−bSE (A) Exp
rop−cca−b
SE (A)
K ← K
b′ ← ARoP(·) b′ ← ARoP(·),Dec(·)
return b′
RoP (m)
if b = 1 then
c← EK (m)
else
Π←$ Perm (|m|)
m′ ← Π (m)
c← EK (m′)
end if
return c
Dec (c)
m← DK (c)
return m
Figure 4.8: The RoP-CPA and RoP-CCA confidentiality notions. The boxed codes
are excluded in RoP-CPA experiment, whereas they replace the codes adjacent to
them in RoP-CCA experiment.
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RoP-ATK
Th. 9
Th. 10
RoR-ATK
Re. 3 Re. 4
LoR-ATK
Re. 5
Re. 6
FtG-ATK
Re. 8 Re. 7
SEM-ATK
Figure 4.9: Relations among confidentiality notions where ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA}. A
solid line denotes a security-preserving reduction from a notion to another, while a
dotted line denotes a reduction that is not security-preserving.
4.2.1.6 Relations Among Notions
Here we discuss the relations among different notions of security from a concrete
security perspective. The concrete results help us to see how strong a notion of
security is, compared to other notions to which it is asymptotically equivalent. Bellare
et al. [12] show the reduction among LoR, RoR, FtG, and SEM. It turns out that
LoR security implies other notions of security. On top of that we prove that RoP
implies RoR which means, as we can see below, RoP also implies LoR. The relations
among notions are illustrated in Figure 4.9.
We adopt the notations used by Bellare et al. [12]. We use A ⇒ B to denote a
security-preserving reduction from A to B, i.e., a reduction where the advantage
of an adversary against B is bounded by the advantage of an adversary against A
multiplied by a small constant factor. If a reduction from A to B is not security
preserving, we follow the work of Bellare et al. [12] and use the notation A → B.
Notice that even a not security-preserving reduction can lead to a secure scheme
if the security parameters are chosen suitably large. We examine the relations
simultaneously with respect to CPA and CCA. Therefore, we use the symbol ATK
instead of CPA and CCA.
The first two results show that LoR and RoR are equivalent.
Result 3 (RoR-ATK ⇒ LoR-ATK ([12] Theorem 1)) For any symmetric en-
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cryption scheme SE = (K, E ,D),
Advlor−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) ≤ 2 ·Advror−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) and
Advlor−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) ≤ 2 ·Advror−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) .
Result 4 (LoR-ATK ⇒ RoR-ATK ([12] Theorem 2)) For any symmetric en-
cryption scheme SE = (K, E ,D),
Advror−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) ≤ Advlor−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) and
Advror−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) ≤ Advlor−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) .
The next two results show that LoR security implies FtG security but the reduction
from FtG to LoR is not security-preserving. This is because the advantage of an
adversary against LoR security is bounded by the advantage of an adversary against
FtG security multiplied by the total number of encryption oracle queries, as shown
in Result 6. Hence the level of LoR security that can be achieved decreases as the
total number of encryption oracle queries increases.
Result 5 (LoR-ATK ⇒ FtG-ATK ([12] Theorem 3)) For any symmetric en-
cryption scheme SE = (K, E ,D),
Advftg−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) ≤ Advlor−cpaSE (t, qe + 1, µe) and
Advftg−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) ≤ Advlor−ccaSE (t, qe + 1, µe, qd, µd) .
Result 6 (FtG-ATK → LoR-ATK ([12] Theorem 4)) For any symmetric en-
cryption scheme SE = (K, E ,D),
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Advlor−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) ≤ qe ·Advftg−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) and
Advlor−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) ≤ qe ·Advftg−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) .
The following two results show that FtG security and SEM security are equivalent.
From the latter we can deduce that LoR security implies SEM security. This is
an important result because SEM security reflects the security we want in practice.
On the other hand, it is easier to analyse our scheme using the LoR notion of
security. Therefore, if we can prove that our scheme is LoR secure, then SEM security
automatically follows.
Result 7 (SEM-ATK ⇒ FtG-ATK ([12] Theorem 6)) For any symmetric en-
cryption scheme SE = (K, E ,D),
Advftg−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) ≤ Advsem−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) and
Advftg−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) ≤ Advsem−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) .
Result 8 (FtG-ATK ⇒ SEM-ATK ([12] Theorem 7)) For any symmetric en-
cryption scheme SE = (K, E ,D),
Advsem−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) ≤ 2 ·Advftg−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) and
Advsem−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) ≤ 2 ·Advftg−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) .
In the next two theorems we prove that RoR security and RoP security are equivalent.
Theorem 9 (RoP-ATK ⇒ RoR-ATK) For any symmetric encryption scheme
SE = (K, E ,D),
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Advror−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) ≤ Advrop−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) and
Advror−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) ≤ Advrop−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) .
Proof Assume that A is an adversary attacking SE = (K, E ,D) in RoR sense. We
construct a new adversary B, using A, that attacks SE in RoP sense.
B uses its oracles, RoP (·) and Dec (·), to provide a simulation of A’s oracles, LoR (·)
and Dec (·). The adversary B runs A.
When A makes an encryption oracle query, B will respond with the output from
its encryption oracle RoP (·). The output depends on the bit b. Note that in RoP
experiments, a permutation Π is chosen uniformly at random for each encryption
query if b = 0. Then applying Π to any message leads to a uniform probability
distribution of all messages. Therefore, the output is a random message which gets
encrypted by the encryption oracle. When A makes a decryption oracle query, B
will respond with the corresponding plaintext. It is assumed that the probability
that the adversary queries the decryption oracle on ciphertexts previously returned
by the encryption oracle is zero.
At some point, the adversary A outputs a bit b′.
For either case of b = 0 or b = 1, B provides a perfect simulation of RoR-CPA and
RoR-CCA experiments for A. So B succeeds with the same probability as A. Hence,
for B’s advantage we have:
Advrop−atkSE (B) = Pr
[
Exprop−atk−1SE (B) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exprop−atk−0SE (B) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Expror−atk−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expror−atk−0SE (A) = 1
]
= Advror−atkSE (A) . (4.4)
Both B and A use the same resources. They are running in time at most t, making
qe encryption and qd decryption oracle queries, totalling at most µe and µd bits
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respectively. Since A is an arbitrary adversary, then we have proven the claimed
relation between RoP-ATK and RoR-ATK.
Theorem 10 (RoR-ATK ⇒ RoP-ATK) For any symmetric encryption scheme
SE = (K, E ,D),
Advrop−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) ≤ Advror−cpaSE (t, qe, µe) and
Advrop−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) ≤ Advror−ccaSE (t, qe, µe, qd, µd) .
Proof Assume that B is an adversary attacking SE = (K, E ,D) in RoP sense. We
construct a new adversary A, using B, that attacks SE in RoR sense.
A uses its oracles, RoR (·) and Dec (·), to provide a simulation of B’s oracles, RoP (·)
and Dec (·). The adversary A runs B.
When B makes an encryption oracle query, A will respond with the output from
its encryption oracle RoR (·). The output depends on the bit b. When B makes
a decryption oracle query, A will respond with the corresponding plaintext. It is
assumed that the probability that the adversary queries the decryption oracle on
ciphertexts previously returned by the encryption oracle is zero.
At some point the adversary B outputs a bit b′.
For either case of b = 0 or b = 1, A provides a perfect simulation of RoP-CPA and
RoP-CCA experiments for B. So A succeeds with the same probability as B. Hence,
for A’s advantage we have:
Advror−atkSE (A) = Pr
[
Expror−atk−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expror−atk−0SE (A) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Exprop−atk−1SE (B) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exprop−atk−0SE (B) = 1
]
= Advrop−atkSE (B) . (4.5)
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Both A and B use the same resources. They are running at most in time t, making
qe encryption and qd decryption oracle queries, totalling at most µe and µd bits
respectively. Since B is an arbitrary adversary, then we have proven the claimed
relation between RoR-ATK and RoP-ATK.
4.2.2 Modes of Operation
In Subsection 4.1.1, we discussed block ciphers such as AES. Consider an AES
scheme with a fixed key. If we encrypt the same 128-bit block of message by
AES twice, we get the same ciphertext. Hence, an adversary could gain partial
information about the encrypted message. This is because AES, like all block ciphers,
is deterministic. Therefore, they neither satisfy the semantic security model nor any
indistinguishability-based security model, unless a new key is used to encrypt each
block of a message. That is very hard to achieve in practice, and rather an unrealistic
assumption. To be able to encrypt and decrypt multiple blocks of data, with the same
key, using block ciphers, we build encryption schemes, known as modes of operation.
A mode of operation is essentially a way of encrypting/decryption arbitrary length
plaintext/ciphertext using a block cipher. It can provide a cryptographic goal such as
confidentiality, authenticity, or both. Here we merely concentrate on confidentiality
modes of operation, but we refer to work of Rogaway [96] for further details.
A number of popular confidentiality modes of operation were standardised in 2001
by NIST in SP 800-38A [55]. Among them are Electronic Code Book (ECB), Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC), and Counter (CTR). The first one, ECB, is deterministic
and therefore it does not satisfy our SEM-CPA or LoR-CPA security models. Bellare
et al. [12] proved that CBC and CTR are LoR-CPA secure, therefore, SEM-CPA
secure also. However, they are not LoR-CCA secure, therefore not SEM-CCA secure.
Here we only describe CTR mode, which is regarded as the best choice among the set
of the confidentiality modes of operation [96]. We then evaluate its security against
the quantum computing attack.
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ctr
FK
m [i] ⊕
c [i]
ctr
FK
c [i] ⊕
m [i]
Figure 4.10: Counter mode of operation. Encryption and decryption processes are
shown in the left and right hand side, respectively.
4.2.2.1 Counter Mode
CTR mode, as depicted in Figure 4.10, turns a block cipher into a stream cipher.
That is, a counter value is encrypted using the block cipher, and then the result
is XORed with the plaintext. After encryption of each block, the counter value is
updated. It is usually incremented by one.
CTR mode has two variants: stateful and randomised. We use CTR to denote stateful
counter mode, where the counter is maintained as the state of encryption. We use
CTR$ to denote randomised counter mode, where the counter is a bit string chosen
uniformly at random for each ciphertext. In either of these variants, given a counter
value and an arbitrary length message, a key stream is created. This is done by
calculating the message’s number of block, and then iterating encryption of successive
values of the counter using the block cipher accordingly. Concatenation of the block
cipher outputs yields a key stream at least as long as the arbitrary length message.
To encrypt, the message is XORed with the key stream in the one-time pad fashion.
To decrypt, the same procedure is taken to produce a key stream which is then
XORed with the ciphertext. We describe randomised CTR mode first.
Construction 1 (Randomised CTR Mode (CTR$)) Let F : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}l →
{0, 1}l be a family of functions, possibly a block cipher but not necessarily. CTR mode
over F with a random starting point is a probabilistic, stateless symmetric encryption
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CTR$-K
K ←$ {0, 1}k
return K
CTR$-EK (m)
r ←$ {0, 1}l
Parse m as m [1] · · ·m [n]
for i = 1, . . . , n do
c [i] = FK (r + i)⊕m [i]
end for
c← c [1] · · · c [n]
return (r, c)
CTR$-DK (c)
Parse c as c [1] · · · c [n]
for i = 1, . . . , n do
m [i] = FK (r + i)⊕ c [i]
end for
m← m [1] · · ·m [n]
return m
Figure 4.11: Randomised CTR mode
scheme CTR$ [F ] = (CTR$-K,CTR$-E ,CTR$-D) as shown in Figure 4.11. The
message m to be encrypted is regarded as a sequence of l-bit blocks, m = m [1] · · ·m [n].
Accordingly, the ciphertext c is a sequence of l-bit blocks c = c [1] · · · c [n].
The following result shows LoR-CPA (t, q, µ)-security of CTR$ mode.
Result 11 (Security of CTR$ Mode Using a PRF ([12] Theorem 11)) Let
F : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be a block cipher. For any CTR$ [F ] scheme, we have:
Advlor-cpaCTR$[F ] (t, q, µ) ≤ 2 ·AdvprfF
(
t′, q′
)
+
µ2
2l
,
where t′ = t+ (q + lµ) and q′ = µ.
We now describe stateful CTR mode.
Construction 2 (Stateful CTR Mode (CTR)) Let F : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}l → {0, 1}l
be a family of functions, possibly a block cipher but not necessarily. CTR mode
over F with a counter starting point is a stateful symmetric encryption scheme
CTR [F ] = (CTR-K,CTR-E ,CTR-D) as shown in Figure 4.12. The message m to be
encrypted is regarded as a sequence of l-bit blocks, m = m [1] · · ·m [n]. Accordingly,
the ciphertext c is a sequence of l-bit blocks c = c [1] · · · c [n]. The encryption counter
%0 and decryption counter ς0 are initially zero. Total number of encrypted blocks is
restricted to be at most 2l.
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CTR-K
K ←$ {0, 1}k
return (K, 0, ε)
CTR-EK (m, %)
c [0]← %
Parse m as m [1] · · ·m [n]
if c [0] + n ≥ 2n then
return ⊥
else
for i = 1, . . . , n do
c [i] = FK (c [0] + i)⊕m [i]
end for
c← c [0] c [1] · · · c [n]
return (%+ n, c)
end if
CTR-DK (c, ς)
Parse c as c [0] c [1] · · · c [n]
if ς + n ≥ 2n then
return ⊥
else
for i = 1, . . . , n do
m [i] = FK (c [0] + i)⊕ c [i]
end for
m← m [1] · · ·m [n]
return (ς,m)
end if
Figure 4.12: Stateful CTR mode
The following result shows LoR-CPA (t, q, µ)-security of CTR mode that is different
from Result 11.
Result 12 (Security of CTR Mode Using a PRF ([12] Theorem 13)) Let
F : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be a block cipher. For any CTR [F ] scheme we have:
Advlor-cpaCTR[F ] (t, q, µ) ≤ 2 ·AdvprfF
(
t′, q′
)
,
where t′ = t+ (q + lµ) and q′ = µ.
Note the difference between Result 11 and Result 12. The former shows that CTR$
is insecure regardless of the security of F as a PRF if the scheme encrypts more than
µ = 2l/2 blocks of messages with the same key. This is due to the birthday attack on
block ciphers where the prf-advantage of A may be as large as µ2/2l. In contrast,
this is not the case for CTR mode where it might be secure as long as the number of
blocks queried is at most 2l.
4.2.3 Quantum Computation Attack
In Section 3.2 and Subsection 3.4.1, we explained that quantum algorithms can be
a threat to the supposed security of modern cryptosystems. This threat is more
83
4.2 Encryption Schemes
serious against asymmetric cryptosystems where quantum algorithms such as Shor’s
algorithm [103] might solve their underlying hard problems using reasonable resources.
In contrast, this threat has never been seriously considered against symmetric
cryptosystems, where the best known quantum algorithms need an exponentially
large amount of resources to break them. For instance, quantum algorithms such as
Grover’s algorithm [65], and that of Brassard et al. [34, 33], despite being faster than
their classical counterparts, still need
√
N oracle queries to recover the secret key
and
(
3
√
N/r
)
oracle queries to find a collision for an r-to-one function, respectively.
We believe this is the reason for the lack of a formal security analysis of symmetric
schemes against quantum computation attacks. At first glance, this might make
sense, but we argue that this approach takes a modern cryptosystem as a black-box,
therefore it might miss out on the flaws the scheme might have in its construction.
With the latter in mind, we give a formal security analysis of CTR mode against
quantum computation attacks. We first discuss LoR-CPA security of CTR mode,
and then security of CTR$ mode. Note that, as it turns out, the following security
proofs are essentially identical to the security proofs of Counter mode in classical
setting given by Bellare et al. [12].
Theorem 13 (Security of CTR Mode Using a QPRF) Let
F : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be a block cipher. For any CTR [F ], assume A is a
quantum adversary attacking CTR [F ] in a LoR-CPA sense, with a running time of
at most t, making at most q queries to the encryption oracle, and the size of the
classical output µ bits, and having advantage
Advlor-cpaCTR[F ] (A) ≥  .
Then there exists a quantum adversary B attacking F with a running time of at most
t′ = t+ (q + lµ), making at most q′ = µ queries to the oracle, and having advantage
AdvqprfF (B) ≥

2
.
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Proof We first prove the security of CTR [F ] against a quantum adversary A when
F is replaced by a random function f . Then we look at A’s probability of success
when F is our given family of functions. Finally we reduce the security of the scheme
to QPRF security of F .
Recall Construction 2. Consider the construction CTR [f ] where the function F
is replaced with a random function f ←$ Func (l, l). The function f takes distinct
counter values as input. The output of f on successive counter values yields a truly
random and unpredictable sequence of bits. This bit string is XORed with the
message in an one-time pad fashion. Therefore the quantum adversary A does not
gain any information about the encrypted messages. This is an information theoretic
result which stands regardless of the computing power and computing time of the
adversary. Hence,
Advlor-cpaCTR[f ] (A) = 0 . (4.6)
Next, we look at the security of CTR [F ] where F is the given family of functions.
The adversary plays the experiment Explor-cpaCTR[F ]. The adversary’s advantage is:
Advlor-cpaCTR[F ] = Pr
[
Explor-cpa-1CTR[F ] (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Explor-cpa-0CTR[F ] (A) = 1
]
. (4.7)
Now assume A is a quantum adversary attacking LoR-CPA security of CTR [F ]. We
construct a new quantum adversary B, using A, to attack QPRF security of F . B
uses its oracle to provide a simulation of A’s oracle.
The quantum adversary B runs A. The adversary B maintains a counter (we assume
that B does this perfectly) and a bit d←$ {0, 1}. Then, upon receiving an encryption
query (m0,m1) from A, B queries its oracle on a counter value and XORs the result
with the message md. It then sends the ciphertext to A. Eventually A outputs a bit
b′. The quantum adversary B outputs 1 if b′ = d, otherwise it outputs 0.
When b = 1 we have:
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Pr
[
Expqprf -1F (B) = 1
]
=
1
2
+
1
2
·Advlor-cpaCTR[F ] (A) . (4.8)
And when b = 0 we have:
Pr
[
Expqprf -0F (B) = 1
]
=
1
2
+
1
2
·Advlor-cpaCTR[f ] (A) . (4.9)
Hence,
AdvqprfF (B) = Pr
[
Expqprf -1F (B) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expqprf -0F (B) = 1
]
=
1
2
·Advlor-cpaCTR[F ] (A)−
1
2
·Advlor-cpaCTR[f ] (A)
=
1
2
·Advlor-cpaCTR[F ] (A) . (4.10)
This concludes the proof. The adversary B needs to query its oracle q′ = |mb| /l
times, which is equal to µ. B runs in time at most t′ = t + (q + lµ) that is equal
to the maximum running time of A plus the overhead for answering the encryption
oracle queries.
We now discuss LoR-CPA security of CTR$ mode.
Theorem 14 (Security of CTR$ Mode Using a QPRF) Let
F : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}l → {0, 1}l be a block cipher. For any CTR$ [F ] scheme, assume A
is a quantum adversary attacking CTR$ [F ] with a running time of at most t, making
at most q queries to the encryption oracle, and the size of the classical output µ bits,
and having advantage
Advlor-cpaCTR$[F ] (A) ≥  .
Then there exists a quantum adversary B attacking F with a running time of at most
t′ = t+ (q + lµ), making at most q′ = µ queries to the oracle, and having advantage
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AdvqprfF (B) ≥
1
2
(
− µ
2
2l
)
.
Proof We first prove the security of CTR$ [F ] against a quantum adversary A when
F is replaced by a random function f . Then we look at A’s probability of success
when F is our given family of functions. Finally we reduce the security of the scheme
to QPRF security of F .
Recall Construction 1. Consider the construction CTR$ [f ] where f ←$ Func (l, l) is
a random function. The function f takes counter values, that may not be distinct, as
input. Let r is the initial encryption counter. The security is achieved (or precisely,
the advantage of the adversary is 0) as long as each block of a message is XORed
with the output of f (r + i) where the value of r + i was never taken by f as input.
Therefore, this encryption has the same effect as encrypting with one-time pad. To
prove LoR-CPA security of CTR$ [f ] we explore the probability of the value r + i
repeating more than once, which would mean that the encryption could not be
considered as one-time pad.
The adversary makes q oracle queries in the form of (m0,m1) where |m0| = |m1|.
We use (mi,0,mi,1) to denote the i-th encryption query. Each mi,0 or mi,1 contains
ni number of blocks. We use mi,b [j] to denote the value of the j-th l-bit block
mi,b where b ∈ {0, 1}. The challenge ciphertext is denoted by ci. We can show the
encryption of messages as
mi,b = mi,b [1]mi,b [2] · · ·mi,b [ni] and (4.11)
ci = (ri, ci [1] ci [2] · · · ci [ni]) , (4.12)
where i ∈ [q], and ri ←$ {0, 1}l is chosen by the encryption oracle. Now we define
Col to be the event that the following n1 + · · ·+ nq values contain at least two values
that are the same:
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r1, r1 + 1, · · · , r1 + n1 − 1
r2, r2 + 1, · · · , r2 + n2 − 1
...
...
rq, rq + 1, · · · , rq + nq − 1 .
(4.13)
Also we define ¬Col to be the event that the above values are all distinct. We can see
that in LoR-CPA game, Col might happen regardless of which message is encrypted,
because r is chosen by the encryption oracle independently of the encrypted message.
Moreover, we can see that in the case of ¬Col, the advantage of the adversary is 0,
because the encryption oracle encrypts messages in a one-time pad fashion. We now
calculate the advantage of the adversary if Col is true.
Advlor-cpaCTR$[f ] (A) = Pr
[
Explor-cpa-1CTR$[f ] (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Explor-cpa-0CTR$[f ] (A) = 1
]
=
(
Pr
[
Explor-cpa-1CTR$[f ] (A) = 1
∣∣∣Col] · Pr [Col]
+Pr
[
Explor-cpa-1CTR$[f ] (A) = 1
∣∣∣¬Col] · Pr [¬Col])
−
(
Pr
[
Explor-cpa-0CTR$[f ] (A) = 1
∣∣∣Col] · Pr [Col]
+Pr
[
Explor-cpa-0CTR$[f ] (A) = 1
∣∣∣¬Col] · Pr [¬Col])
=
(
Pr
[
Explor-cpa-1CTR$[f ] (A) = 1
∣∣∣Col]
−Pr
[
Explor-cpa-0CTR$[f ] (A) = 1
∣∣∣Col]) · Pr [Col]
≤ Pr [Col] . (4.14)
Above, the parenthesised term has an upper bound of 1. Now we need to calculate
Pr [Col]. Recall Equation 4.13. We use Coli to denote the event that a collision exists
among the first i rows of Equation 4.13. We also use ¬Coli to denote the event that
no collision exists in the first i rows. Then we have:
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Pr [Col] = Pr [Colq]
= Pr [Colq−1] + Pr [Colq|¬Colq−1] · Pr [¬Colq−1]
≤ Pr [Colq−1] + Pr [Colq|¬Colq−1]
≤ ...
≤ Pr [Col1] +
q∑
i=2
Pr [Coli|¬Coli−1]
=
q∑
i=2
Pr [Coli|¬Coli−1] . (4.15)
We are now required to find an upper bound for the probability of a collision upon
receiving the i-th query, given that no collision happened in the first i− 1 queries.
We begin with a simple case when i = 1, 2. Upon receiving the first query, the
probability of a collision is 0, because there is no previous row in Equation 4.13.
Upon receiving the second query, we need to find out the probability that one of the
values r2+1, · · · , r2+n2 is equal to one of the values in the first row r1+1, · · · , r1+n1.
Note that r1 is fixed. Therefore we can see that a collision can happen if and only if,
r1 − n2 + 1 ≤ r2 ≤ r1 + n1 − 1 . (4.16)
Hence,
(r1 + n1 − 1)− (r1 − n2 + 1) + 1 = n1 + n2 − 1 (4.17)
choices of r2 exist that could yield a collision. Then we can calculate the following
probability,
Pr [Col2|¬Col1] ≤ (n1 + n2 − 1)
2l
. (4.18)
Given this intuition, we now extend Equation 4.18 for the case where 2 ≤ i ≤ q
and we assume that no collision happened in the first i− 1 rows. A collision might
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happen between row i and each of the first i− 1 rows, therefore:
Pr [Coli|¬Coli−1] ≤ (ni + n1 − 1) + (ni + n2 − 1) + · · ·+ (ni + ni−1 − 1)
2l
=
(i− 1)ni + ni−1 + · · ·+ n1 − (i− 1)
2l
. (4.19)
We drop the last negative term in the above equation to get:
Pr [Col] ≤
q∑
i=2
Pr [Coli|¬Coli−1]
≤
q∑
i=2
(i− 1)ni + ni−1 + · · ·+ n1
2l
. (4.20)
Note that in the above equation, ni occurs with weight i− 1 in the i-th term of the
sum. Also it occurs with weight 1 in the j-th term of the sum where j = i+ 1, . . . , q.
Therefore its total weight is (i− 1) + (q − i) = q − 1, so we get:
Pr [Col] =
(q − 1) (n1 + · · ·+ nq)
2l
. (4.21)
Finally the advantage of the adversary is
Advlor-cpaCTR$[f ] (A) ≤ Pr [Col]
≤ (q − 1) (n1 + · · ·+ nq)
2l
≤ µ
2
2l
. (4.22)
Next, we look at the security of CTR$ [F ] where F is the given family of functions.
The adversary plays LoR-CPA game. The adversary’s advantage is:
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Advlor-cpaCTR$[F ] (A) = Pr
[
Explor-cpa-1CTR$[F ] (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Explor-cpa-0CTR$[F ] (A) = 1
]
. (4.23)
Now assume A is a quantum adversary attacking LoR-CPA security of CTR$ [F ].
We construct a new quantum adversary B, using A, to attack QPRF security of F .
B uses its oracle to provide a simulation of A’s oracle.
The quantum adversary B runs A. The adversary B chooses a bit d←$ {0, 1}. Then,
upon receiving an encryption query (m0,m1), B queries its oracle on (r + i) where
i ∈ [n], r ←$ {0, 1}l, and then XORs the result with the message md. It then sends
the ciphertext to A. The adversary B chooses a fresh r for each query. Here we
assume that B simulates the encryption oracle for A perfectly. Eventually A outputs
a bit b′. The adversary B outputs 1 if b′ = d, otherwise it outputs 0.
When b = 1 we have:
Pr
[
Expqprf -1F (B) = 1
]
=
1
2
+
1
2
·Advlor-cpaCTR$[F ] (A) . (4.24)
And when b = 0 we have:
Pr
[
Expqprf -0F (B) = 1
]
=
1
2
+
1
2
·Advlor-cpaCTR$[f ] (A) . (4.25)
Hence,
AdvqprfF (B) = Pr
[
Expqprf -1F (B) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expqprf -0F (B) = 1
]
=
1
2
·Advlor-cpaCTR$[F ] (A)−
1
2
·Advlor-cpaCTR$[f ] (A)
=
1
2
(
Advlor-cpaCTR$[F ] (A)−
µ2
2l
)
. (4.26)
This concludes the proof. The adversary B needs to query its oracle |mb| /l = µ
times. B runs in time at most t′ that is equal to the maximum running time of A
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plus the overhead for answering the encryption oracle queries.
We note that proofs of Theorems 13 and 14, given above, are similar to their classical
counterparts. In other words, classical security proofs of CTR$ mode and CTR mode
carry over to a quantum setting where, quantum computation attacks are considered.
If we look at the characterisation of these types of security proofs, then we can break
them into two parts. In the first part, the security of an idealised scheme is assessed.
This analysis is merely a probabilistic process and the type of adversary, whether it
is classical or quantum, has nothing to do with it. The second part is a reduction.
In this, the advantage of the adversary distinguishing between the ideal scheme and
the real scheme which we are interested in its security, is bounded by the advantage
of the adversary breaking the underlying primitive using comparable resources. This
is where the type of the adversary matters and one must consider possible attacks
that are unique to a quantum adversary.
More rigorously, Theorems 13 and 14 can be seen as black-box reductions [69]. That
is, if the theorem states that the security of P implies the security of S, then S can
be constructed from P , merely using P as a black-box and regardless of the specifics
of how P works. Moreover, the security reduction is also black-box. Because, an
algorithm for breaking P can be constructed from a black-box for breaking S.
To elaborate, and for the sake of concrete security framework, we give an example.
Consider CTR$ mode in Construction 1. According to Result 11, the security bound
of this scheme against a classical adversary A is:
Advlor-cpaCTR$[F ] (A) ≤ 2 ·AdvprfF (B) +
µ2
2l
. (4.27)
Theorem 14 shows the security bound of this scheme against an adversary A that
can mount quantum computation attack. This is:
Advlor-cpaCTR$[F ] (A) ≤ 2 ·AdvqprfF (B) +
µ2
2l
. (4.28)
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Now suppose the function F : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l where l = 128. Also assume the
adversary, whether classical or quantum, makes q = 230 encryption oracle queries. If
each query is 213 bits long (which is a kilobyte) then the total amount of encrypted
data is 243 bits which is µ = 236 128-bit blocks. The question is whether CTR$ [F ]
mode is secure against the adversary, given this information. To calculate the
advantage of the adversary, we need to calculate prf-advantage or qprf-advantage of
F . We first consider the classical case. Result 11 tells us that the security of the
scheme against a classical adversary A is bounded above by the prf-advantage of
F against another classical adversary B. The classical adversary B makes q = 236
queries, and to best of our knowledge, the best known classical attack against PRF
security of F is the birthday attack. Therefore we assume B’s advantage is no more
than q2/2128. Hence we can get:
Advlor-cpaCTR$[F ] (A) ≤ 2 ·
µ2
2128
+
µ2
2128
≤ 1
255
. (4.29)
Now we consider the quantum case. Analogously, Theorem 14 tells us that the
security of the scheme against a quantum adversary A is bounded above by the
qprf-advantage of F against another quantum adversary B. Similarly to the classical
case, the best attack the adversary B can mount against QPRF security of F is the
birthday attack. Therefore we get the same security bound as above for the quantum
adversary:
Advlor-cpaCTR$[F ] (A) ≤ 2 ·
µ2
2128
+
µ2
2128
≤ 1
255
. (4.30)
Note, one might think that the best quantum attack on QPRF security of F is the
quantum collision finding algorithm [34, 33]. In Subsection 3.2.2, we explained that
the work of Brassard et al. [34, 33], based on Grover’s algorithm, gives a quantum
algorithm to find collisions in an arbitrary r-to-one function after O
(
3
√
N/r
)
oracle
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queries. Hence, to find a collision for a two-to-one function F , one only needs O
(
3
√
N
)
evaluations of the function F . With regards to the latter and Equation 3.25, one
could say that B’s advantage is no more than 4 · q3/2l, under the assumption that
the best attack the quantum adversary B can mount against QPRF security of F is
the quantum collision finding algorithm. Therefore in the case of F , where l = 128,
we would get:
Advlor-cpaCTR$[F ] (A) ≤ 8 ·
µ3
2128
+
µ2
2128
≤ 8 · 2
108
2128
+
272
2128
≤ 1
217
. (4.31)
Equation 4.31 suggests that CTR$ [F ] provides little security against this quantum
adversary. However, we emphasize that this is not true. The collision finding
algorithm [34, 33] uses Grover’s algorithm to evaluate the function. To do so, the
algorithm needs superposition access to the function. In this case the adversary
needs superposition access to F . Since the adversary is only given classical access
to its oracle then the security bound given in Equation 4.30 holds. Therefore, from
this example we can deduce that the security bounds of CTR$ mode are the same
for both classical and quantum adversaries. The same follows for CTR mode.
A natural question regarding the above would be whether all similar classical security
proofs carry over to this quantum setting. Or what class of classical security proofs
carry over to this quantum setting. There are a number of works with regards to this
question. For instance, Cre´peau [41] and Yao [112] showed that the quantum oblivious
transfer can be seen as a construction of quantum oblivious transfer from a black-box
for bit commitment. Damgaard and Lunemann [44], and Lunemann and Nielsen [84]
prove that a few classical protocols are quantum secure. Hallgren et al. [67] formalise
a family of classical security proofs that carry over to the quantum setting against
efficient quantum adversaries under reasonable computational assumptions. Moreover,
Watrous [109] and Unruh [106] discuss quantum zero-knowledge and quantum proofs
of knowledge, respectively. In the case of a classical symmetric encryption scheme,
we believe the classical security proofs carry over as we have shown it for CTR$ mode
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and CTR mode. But a general formalisation of that needs further work and we leave
it as an open problem.
4.3 Message Authentication Code
Until now, we have explored cryptographic ways and tools that enable us to achieve
confidentiality. That is, encryption can help two parties to establish a private
communication which prevents an eavesdropper or an active adversary from gaining
partial information about messages sent over an unprotected communication channel.
However, this does not guarantee the identity of the origin of encrypted messages.
Moreover, this does not prevent adversaries from tampering with encrypted messages
as long as the results decrypt to valid messages. For example, assume we want
to send an order to our bank to transfer some money to another account. All the
communication between us is encrypted using the secret key we have shared with the
bank. It turns out that privacy is not enough to protect our order, as an adversary
can tamper with ciphertexts sent to the bank. For instance, it can flip some bits in
ciphertexts which then might directly effects the corresponding bits in the decrypted
messages. In this way, the adversary might be able to, say, change the amount of
money in our order. It does not know the new amount but it surely has changed
our original order. Therefore, upon receiving an order, the bank’s goal should be to
check two things. First, did the order really comes from us? And second, is it the
exact order that we issued? These goals are called message integrity (or message
authentication). And message authentication code (MAC) is a mechanism to achieve
it.
Here we consider symmetric message authentication. Formally, a message authenti-
cation scheme MA = (K, T ,V) consists of three algorithms. The randomised key
generation algorithm K takes no input and output a key K. The tagging algorithm
T , which may be randomised or stateful, takes a key K ∈ K and an arbitrary length
message m from the message space M as input, and returns a tag τ ∈ {0, 1}∗. The
deterministic verification algorithm V takes as input the secret key K, the message
m, and a candidate tag τ ′, and returns a bit v. For completeness, we require that
for any key K ∈ K and any message m ∈M
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Pr [τ ← TK (m) : VK (m, τ) = 1] = 1 . (4.32)
We merely consider message authentication schemes whose tagging algorithm is
deterministic and stateless such as MAC. A generally accepted security definition for
MACs is called existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack.
That is, an adversary using reasonable resources should not be able to create a valid
tag for a new message that was not previously tagged (or authenticated) by honest
parties. In this security model, the adversary is given access to a MAC oracle which
it can query on any message to see the corresponding tag. A message authentication
scheme is considered broken if the adversary can produce a valid tag τ for a message
m where VK (m, τ) = 1 and the message m was not queried to MAC oracle before.
Boneh and Zhandry [30] give a security definition for quantum-secure MACs. That
is, an adaptation of the existential unforgeability notion where a quantum adversary
is given quantum superposition access to the MAC oracle, but it submits classical
pairs of (m, τ) to the challenger. A MAC is said to be quantum-secure if after q
queries to the MAC oracle, the adversary cannot submit q + 1 valid and distinct
classical pairs of (m, τ) to the challenger.
In general, a MAC can be constructed from a PRF where the PRF takes the role
of the tagging algorithm. In practice, this approach leads to constructions such as
HMAC [11] and CBC-MAC [2].
4.4 Authenticated Encryption
We discussed how to separately achieve the cryptographic goals of privacy and
integrity. But there are scenarios where we need both simultaneously. For instance,
the example that we discussed in the previous section about communicating with
our bank is one scenario where both confidentiality and authenticity of data is
required. Encryption schemes include authenticity assurances are called authenticated
encryption. In practice, there are many protocols, such as SSL/TLS [49] and
IPSec [73], that use authenticated encryption to provide secure private communication.
Many attacks on these protocols are due to misuse of authenticated encryption
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schemes or lack of it [45].
A simple way to construct an authenticated encryption scheme is to combine an
encryption scheme with a MAC. Bellare and Namprempre [17] formally analyse the
security of three generic compositions of a given symmetric encryption and a given
MAC. The compositions are: Encrypt-and-MAC (EaM), MAC-then-Encrypt (MtE),
and Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM).
In EaM, the sender produces a MAC tag for the message and sends it along with the
ciphertext of the message to the receiver. The receiver first decrypts the ciphertext
and then checks whether the tag verifies correctly on the resulting message. If so,
it returns the message. Otherwise it returns ⊥. In MtE, the sender produces a
MAC tag of the message, then concatenates the tag and the message together and
encrypts the result. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext to recover the message and
its tag. If the tag verifies correctly on the message, then the receiver outputs the
message. Otherwise it outputs ⊥. In EtM, the sender first encrypts the message,
then produces a MAC tag on the ciphertext. The receiver checks whether the tag
verifies correctly on the ciphertext. If so, it decrypts the ciphertext and outputs the
resulting message. Otherwise it returns ⊥. Bellare and Namprempre [17] show that
EtM provides LoR-CCA security, given that both the encryption and authentication
schemes meet the required security properties.
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In this chapter, we show how powerful a quantum adversary might get when it is
given quantum superposition access to its oracles. While block ciphers are considered
to be secure against quantum computation attacks, we illustrate that a class of them
will not provide any security whatsoever if the quantum adversary is given quantum
superposition access to them. We first discuss an extremely simple block cipher and
a known classical attack on it. Then we show how we can exploit this attack in a
quantum setting. Finally, we discuss an extension of our attack to apply to other
variants of block ciphers.
5.1 The Even-Mansour Scheme
Block ciphers, such as AES (see Subsection 4.1.1), mostly have an iterated structure.
Their structure consists of XORing a secret key with their internal state, and then
applying some publicly known permutation that is chosen randomly. The number of
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m ⊕
K1
F c⊕
K2
Figure 5.1: The Even-Mansour scheme
iterations varies depending on each specific block cipher and the security properties
they offer.
Even and Mansour [57] defined and analysed the simplest possible construction of
a block cipher. In the Even-Mansour scheme (EM), depicted in Figure 5.1, the
ciphertext is obtained by first XORing the plaintext with an n-bit key K1, then
applying a publicly known random permutation F and XORing the output with a
second n-bit key K2, i.e.,
E (m) = F (m⊕K1)⊕K2 . (5.1)
Even and Mansour assumed that the adversary is allowed to perform two types of
queries: (i) queries to a full encryption/decryption oracle that computes either E (m)
or E−1 (m); and (ii) queries to a permutation oracle that computes either F (m) or
F−1 (m). Given this assumption, they proved that in order to attack the scheme with
a given probability of success, one must have DT = O (2n), where D is the number
of queries to the encryption/decryption oracle and T is the number of queries to the
F -oracle. Even and Mansour gave a lower bound for the number of queries needed
to break their scheme, thus providing a formal security proof. Moreover, Dunkelman
et al. [54] showed that EM can even be further simplified into a single-key variant
with half as many key bits, while still having exactly the same provable security.
Despite its simplicity, the EM scheme is not merely a theoretical construct, but is
implicit in other ciphers. For instance, there are other works that study the security
of iterated EM with more than one round [78, 50, 25]. These works, in their security
analysis, consider different numbers of rounds and keys. A similar construction is
also used to construct tweakable block ciphers [79]. Moreover, a generalised variant of
EM known as key-alternating cipher is given by Daemen and Rijmen [43]. A general
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m ⊕
K1
F1 ⊕
K2
F2 Fr ⊕
Kr+1
c
Figure 5.2: An r-round key-alternating cipher
r-round key-alternating cipher, depicted in Figure 5.2, consists of F1, . . . , Fr public
random permutations and r + 1 distinct secret n-bit keys K1, . . . ,Kr+1,
E(m) = Fr(Fr−1(· · ·F2(F1(m⊕K1)⊕K2) · · · )⊕Kr)⊕Kr+1 . (5.2)
Bogdanov et al. [28] give a formal security proof for the latter scheme, demonstrating
that an adversary needs to make at least 22n/3 queries to the underlying permutations
to be able to distinguish this scheme from random.
5.2 Slide with a Twist Attack
Biryukov and Wagner [26] introduce a cryptanalytic attack, called slide attack, to
break iterated cryptosystems with an arbitrary number of rounds by exploiting their
self similarity under small shift. They then extend the basic slide attack to make
it applicable to larger classes of ciphers. One of the extended methods introduced
by Biryukov and Wagner [27] is called the slide with a twist attack. They describe
the slide with a twist attack on the EM scheme, and show that it achieves the lower
bound up to a factor of
√
2. Here we explain the main idea of the slide with a twist
attack on the EM scheme, which is also discussed in work of Dunkelman et al. [54].
Assume that two plaintexts m,m′ satisfy
m⊕m′ = K1 . (5.3)
Therefore we can write their encryptions as,
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E (m) = F (m⊕K1)⊕K2 = F
(
m′
)⊕K2 , and (5.4)
E
(
m′
)
= F
(
m′ ⊕K1
)⊕K2 = F (m)⊕K2 . (5.5)
By XORing the above equations (see also Figure 5.3) we get
E (m)⊕ E (m′) = F (m)⊕ F (m′) , (5.6)
or equivalently,
E (m)⊕ F (m) = E (m′)⊕ F (m′) . (5.7)
Given these relations, an adversary can query the E-oracle and F -oracle on the same
2(n+1)/2 values of known plaintexts m1,m2, . . .. The adversary then stores the results
of E (mi)⊕ F (mi) in a table sorted by this value. The adversary looks for collisions
E (mi)⊕F (mi) = E (mj)⊕F (mj). When found, it checks the guess K1 = mi⊕mj
and K2 = E (mi)⊕ F (mj).
Each pair of plaintexts (mi,mj) that satisfies mi ⊕mj = K1 is called a slid pair.
The probability that the collision happens for a random pair of plaintexts is 2−n.
Therefore the table is expected to contain only a few collisions such that with regards
to the birthday paradox at least one of them with high probability is induced by
the slid pair which yields the correct values of K1 and K2. The data complexity of
the attack is DT = 2n+1 where D = 2(n+1)/2 is the number of known plaintexts and
T = 2(n+1)/2 is the number of queries to the F -oracle.
5.3 Quantum Superposition Attack
Assuming the existence of a scalable quantum computer, Shor’s algorithm [103]
breaks the most widely used public key encryption schemes, including RSA [94].
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m m′⊕
K1
F c⊕
K2
m′ m⊕
K1
F c′⊕
K2
Figure 5.3: The slide with a twist attack on the EM scheme
On the other hand, quantum computing appears to have very little impact on
symmetric cryptography. The generic quantum attack on block ciphers using Grover’s
algorithm [65] requires O(2n/2) queries for key length n and thus can be countered
by doubling the key length.
To mount a generic Grover attack on a block cipher, an adversary does not need
access to an encryption oracle, but only to (i) a single valid plaintext/ciphertext pair,
and (ii) an implementation of the encryption algorithm on a quantum computer.
Since any classical algorithm can be converted efficiently into a quantum algorithm
(see Subsection 3.1.1), an adversary in possession of a scalable quantum computer
can satisfy requirement (ii) as long as the encryption algorithm is publicly known.
In contrast to the above, here we assume a security model where the adversary is
given quantum superposition access to an encryption oracle. See Section 3.4 for the
definition of quantum adversary. So far there has been little discussion, however, of
the security of existing symmetric schemes in this security model. Our work is a
contribution to this question. We show that some specific symmetric constructions
offer no security at all against an adversary with superposition access to an encryption
oracle.
A prerequisite for superposition access is that the encryption oracle must be imple-
mented on a quantum computer. Our result therefore poses no threat to existing
classical implementations of block ciphers. More generally, the security model on
which our result is based is of no practical relevance for present-day security en-
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vironments. It is conceivable that this could change in a future environment (the
‘quantum internet’) in which communication channels between quantum computers
need to be secured. Or, classical encryption schemes running on a quantum computer
might need to be secured against, say, quantum malwares running on the same
quantum computer. At present, the main interest of our result is that it establishes
that some specific symmetric schemes are vulnerable against quantum adversaries
independently of the generic attack using Grover’s algorithm.
Our attack against the Even-Mansour scheme makes use of a slight generalisation of
Simon’s algorithm [104]. Simon’s algorithm is also at the heart of the quantum related
key attack against a general block cipher discovered by Ro¨tteler and Steinwandt [98].
They show that the cipher’s secret key can be extracted efficiently if the quantum
adversary is allowed to query superposition of related keys. In contrast, in our
attack, the quantum adversary queries superposition of messages, but the attack
works only against specific schemes. Our work is done independently from work
of Kuwakado and Morii [77] which also discusses security of the EM scheme if run
on a quantum computer. Both works exploit Simon’s algorithm to break the EM
scheme. However, Kuwakado and Morii do not question the assumption that Simon’s
algorithm can be used, while we calculate the precise probability of getting a slid
pair (see Subsection 5.3.2), showing that Simon’s problem is only partially satisfied.
We also extend our results to two variants of iterated EM with more than one round.
5.3.1 Quantum Oracle for the Even-Mansour Scheme
The aim of our quantum attack will be to recover the secret key K1. Since K2 =
E(m)⊕ F (m⊕K1) and E and F are known, finding K2 is trivial once K1 is known.
We assume that the quantum adversary is allowed to make superposition queries to
both the encryption oracle E(m) and the permutation oracle F (m). Formally this
means that the two oracles act as unitary transformations satisfying
|m〉 ⊗ |0〉 −→ |m〉 ⊗ |E(m)〉 and |m〉 ⊗ |0〉 −→ |m〉 ⊗ |F (m)〉 (5.8)
for all computational basis states |m〉. The action of the encryption oracle on an
103
5.3 Quantum Superposition Attack
arbitrary superposition with coefficients cm is then
∑
m
cm|m〉 ⊗ |0〉 −→
∑
m
cm|m〉 ⊗ |E(m)〉 (5.9)
and similarly for the permutation oracle.
5.3.2 Partially Satisfying the Assumptions of Simon’s Problem
Our quantum attack is based on Simon’s problem which we explained in Subsec-
tion 3.2.1. In order for Simon’s algorithm to give us the desired answer for K1, we
exclude K1 = 0
n from the set of possible values for K1. We make use of the following
fact, that is given by the slide with a twist attack on the Even-Mansour scheme.
Define the function
X(m) = F (m)⊕ E(m) . (5.10)
Since
X(m) = F (m)⊕ F (m⊕K1)⊕K2 , (5.11)
we have that, for all m ∈ {0, 1}n,
X(m⊕K1) = X(m) . (5.12)
The function X thus satisfies part of the assumptions made in Simon’s problem. To
fully satisfy the assumptions of Simon’s problem, one also needs that X(m) = X(m′)
implies m′ ∈ {m,m⊕K1}. This is not true in our case because, for any given string
l, there can be more than two solutions to
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X (m) = l . (5.13)
The solutions to Equation 5.13 do come in pairs {m,m⊕K1}, however. Let M be a
subset of {0, 1}n of size 2n−1 such that
{0, 1}n =
⋃
m∈M
{m,m⊕K1} . (5.14)
Equation 5.11 and the fact that the permutation F is chosen randomly imply that
the probability that X (m) = l for given m ∈ M and l ∈ {0, 1}n is equal to 2−n.
Assuming that X (m) can be approximated by a random function (see [88] for a
justification), the probability p1 that Equation 5.13 has exactly one solution m ∈M
is therefore given by
p1 = 2
n−1 2−n
(
1− 2−n
)2n−1−1 ' 1
2
√
e
. (5.15)
This equation holds for any K1 6= 0n. Similarly, the probability pr that Equation 5.13
has exactly r solutions m ∈M can be found [88] to be approximately
pr ' 1
2r r!
√
e
. (5.16)
We have p1 > 0.3 for any value of n. This means that, for given l, the probability
that Equation 5.13 has exactly two solutions m and m⊕K1 is greater than 0.3. It
turns out that the existence of this bound allows us to apply Simon’s algorithm to
the problem of extracting the key K1.
5.3.3 The Quantum Attack
The quantum adversary begins by preparing four n-qubit registers in the state
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|ψ1〉 = 1√
2n
∑
m∈{0,1}n
|m〉 ⊗ |0n〉 ⊗ |0n〉 ⊗ |0n〉 . (5.17)
Applying first the permutation oracle and then the encryption oracle to the appro-
priate registers results in the state
|ψ2〉 = 1√
2n
∑
m∈{0,1}n
|m〉 ⊗ |F (m)〉 ⊗ |E (m)〉 ⊗ |0n〉 . (5.18)
Applying XOR to the second and third register and placing the result in the fourth
register gives
|ψ3〉 = 1√
2n
∑
m∈{0,1}n
|m〉 ⊗ |F (m)〉 ⊗ |E(m)〉 ⊗ |X(m)〉 . (5.19)
Now let rl denote the number of solutions m ∈M to Equation 5.13 and define
Lr = {l ∈ {0, 1}n : rl = r}. (5.20)
The expected value of |Lr| is given by
E (|Lr|) = pr 2n , (5.21)
which decreases rapidly as r increases, and is effectively zero for r ≥ n. We can
rewrite the state in terms of the set Lr as follows:
|ψ3〉 = 1√
2n
∑
r>0
∑
l∈Lr
r∑
i=1
(
|mli〉+ |mli ⊕K1〉
)
⊗ |F (mli)〉 ⊗ |E(mli)〉 ⊗ |l〉 , (5.22)
where mli ∈M and X(mli) = X(mli ⊕K1) = l for all l and i = 1, . . . , rl.
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The next step is a measurement of the fourth register in the computational basis.
We denote the measurement outcome by l∗. The state of the first register after the
measurement is
|ψ4〉 = 1√
2r∗
r∗∑
i=1
(|m∗i 〉+ |m∗i ⊕K1〉) , (5.23)
where we have used the abbreviated notation r∗ = rl∗ and m∗i = m
l∗
i . For any r ≥ 1,
the probability Pr(r∗ = r) of getting an outcome l∗ such that r∗ = r is equal to 2−n
times the expectation value of the number of terms in the sum (see Equation 5.22)
for the given value of r. We have thus
Pr(r∗ = r) = 2−n E(|Lr|)× 2r = 2rpr ' 1
2r−1 (r − 1)!√e . (5.24)
In particular, Pr(r∗ = 1) = 2p1 ≥ 0.6. Now the adversary applies the n-qubit
Hadamard transformation to the first register, resulting in the state
|ψ5〉 = 1√
2r∗ 2n
r∗∑
i=1
( ∑
a∈{0,1}n
(−1)m∗i ·a|a〉+
∑
a∈{0,1}n
(−1)(m∗i⊕K1)·a|a〉
)
(5.25)
=
1√
r∗ 2n+1
r∗∑
i=1
∑
a∈{0,1}n
(−1)m∗i ·a
(
1 + (−1)K1·a
)
|a〉 (5.26)
=
1√
r∗ 2n−1
r∗∑
i=1
∑
a:K1·a=0
(−1)m∗i ·a|a〉 . (5.27)
The last step is a measurement of the first register in the computational basis. As in
the standard Simon algorithm, we are guaranteed to obtain a bit string a such that
K1 · a = 0 mod 2 . (5.28)
In the standard version of Simon’s problem, we always have that r∗ = 1. This means
that the string a resulting from the measurement is random, subject to the constraint
107
5.3 Quantum Superposition Attack
m ⊕
K
F (1) ⊕
K
F (2) F (r) ⊕
K
c
Figure 5.4: The r-round EM scheme with a single permutation and identical round
keys
given by Equation 5.28. The algorithm is run repeatedly until among the strings
a so obtained, there are n− 1 linearly independent ones. The key K1 can then be
extracted from the system of linear Equations 5.28 using Gaussian elimination. Given
a set of strings a which span a subspace of dimension less than n− 1, the probability
that the next (random) string is outside that subspace is at least 1/2. This means
that O(n) repetitions of Simon’s algorithm will, with probability exponentially close
to 1, result in a set of equations that determines K1.
In the Even-Mansour case, for every run of the algorithm, we also get a string a
such that Equation 5.28 is satisfied. Whenever r∗ turns out to be equal to 1, which
happens with probability greater than 0.6, the string a will be random. This means
that the analysis of the previous paragraph still applies: given a set of strings which
span a subspace of dimension less than n− 1, the probability that the next string
returned by the algorithm is outside that subspace is now bounded below by 0.3.
After O(n) repetitions of the algorithm we will, with probability exponentially close
to one, have a set of equations that determines K1.
5.3.4 Generalisation to Multiple Rounds
A natural question is whether our O(n) attack extends to more general ciphers with
multiple rounds. Although the answer appears to be ‘no’ in general, it turns out that
our attack can be applied to two special cases of the multiple-round Even-Mansour
scheme. These are the case of arbitrarily many rounds using a single permutation
and identical round keys, and the case of two rounds using a single permutation
and round keys derived from a very basic key schedule. Chen et al. [36] recently
described slide with a twist attacks against these schemes.
Consider first the r-round Even-Mansour scheme with a single permutation F and
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identical round keys as shown in Figure 5.4. The encryption of an arbitrary message
m is
E(m) = F (r)(F (r−1)(· · ·F (2)(F (1)(m⊕K)⊕K) · · · )⊕K)⊕K , (5.29)
where K denotes the common key, and
F (1) = F (2) = . . . = F (r) = F (5.30)
denote identical permutations, labelled to distinguish between rounds for clarity. We
have
F (E(m)) = F (F (r)(F (r−1)(· · ·F (2)(F (1)(m⊕K)⊕K) · · · )⊕K)⊕K)
= F (r)(F (r−1)(· · ·F (1)(F (m⊕K)⊕K) · · · )⊕K)⊕K)
= E(F (m⊕K))⊕K , (5.31)
where we have relabelled the permutations using Equation 5.30. Now define
X(m) = E(F (m))⊕ F (E(m)) . (5.32)
Given access to both E and F oracles, X(m) can be evaluated by the adversary.
Using Equation 5.31, this gives
X(m) = E(F (m))⊕ E(F (m⊕K))⊕K . (5.33)
Therefore X(m) = X(m⊕K). The rest of the analysis and the details of the quantum
attack are almost identical to the single round case above. As before, the key K can
be recovered with constant probability using O(n) queries.
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We now move on to the single-permutation two-round Even-Mansour scheme with a
key-schedule where the round keys K0,K1,K2 are derived from a secret n-bit master
key K and public n-bit constants t0, t1, t2 via a simple XOR, Ki = K ⊕ ti. This is
depicted in Figure 5.5.
The encryption of an arbitrary message m is
E(m) = F (F (m⊕K0)⊕K1)⊕K2 . (5.34)
We have
E(F (m)⊕ t0 ⊕ t1) = F (F (F (m)⊕ t0 ⊕ t1 ⊕K0)⊕K1)⊕K2
= F (F (F (m)⊕ t1 ⊕K)⊕K1)⊕K2
= F (F (F (m)⊕K1)⊕K1)⊕K2 , (5.35)
and
F (E(m)⊕ t1 ⊕ t2) = F (F (F (m⊕K0)⊕K1)⊕K2 ⊕ t1 ⊕ t2)
= F (F (F (m⊕K0)⊕K1)⊕K ⊕ t1)
= F (F (F (m⊕K0)⊕K1)⊕K1) . (5.36)
Hence
E(F (m⊕K0)⊕ t0 ⊕ t1) = F (E(m)⊕ t1 ⊕ t2)⊕K2 . (5.37)
Now define
X(m) = E(F (m)⊕ t0 ⊕ t1)⊕ F (E(m)⊕ t1 ⊕ t2) . (5.38)
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m ⊕
K0
F ⊕
K1
F ⊕
K2
c
K
⊕ ⊕ ⊕t0 t1 t2
Figure 5.5: The 2-round EM scheme with a single permutation and a simple key-
schedule
Given access to the constants t0, t1, t2 as well as both E and F oracles, X(m) can be
evaluated by the adversary. Using Equation 5.37, the function can be rewritten as
X(m) = E(F (m)⊕ t0 ⊕ t1)⊕ E(F (m⊕K0)⊕ t0 ⊕ t1)⊕K2 . (5.39)
It follows that X(m) = X(m ⊕ K0). Again, the analysis and the details of the
quantum attack are almost identical to the single round case above, and the key
K = K0 ⊕ t0 can be recovered with constant probability using O(n) queries.
Our attack depends crucially on Simon’s algorithm, and to apply it, a property
equivalent to Equation 5.12 needs to hold for a function X that can be evaluated
by the adversary. This is no longer the case in more general ciphers such as key-
alternating schemes with more than one permutation [43, 28]. Already when the
publicly known permutation in the single-round Even-Mansour scheme is replaced by
a keyed permutation as in DESX [74], the adversary loses the ability to evaluate F (m)
and therefore X(m) in Equation 5.10 and Equations 5.32 or 5.38. This means that
additional techniques would be required in order to extend the methods described
here to more general encryption schemes.
Quantum superposition attacks are very powerful, but in the next chapter we show
a number of notions of confidentiality that are achievable against them.
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In this chapter, we address the security of symmetric encryption schemes against
quantum superposition attacks. We will consider both quantum superposition chosen
plaintext attack (qsCPA), where a quantum adversary is given superposition access to
an encryption oracle, and quantum superposition chosen ciphertext attack (qsCCA),
where the adversary in addition has superposition access to a decryption oracle. We
will discuss achievability of different confidentiality notions in this setting. We prove
that RoP-qsCPA and RoP-qsCCA are achievable by showing two generic symmetric
schemes that satisfy these notions. We also discuss semantic security in this setting
and prove a reduction from RoP to SEM. Our security analysis is in a concrete security
framework. Here we only discuss symmetric cryptosystems, but the discussion for
asymmetric schemes is similar and our results apply.
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6.1 Introduction
We studied notions of confidentiality in the quantum computation setting in Chapter 4.
In this chapter we study notions of confidentiality in the quantum superposition
setting where quantum queries are allowed. There has not been a systematic
exploration of how existing classical security notions translate into this quantum
world. A natural question in this setting is to see whether notions of confidentiality
arise from their classical counterparts, or whether they are needed to be rethought
from scratch.
We explore two routes to define notions of confidentiality in the quantum superposition
setting. One route is to start from a generalisation of semantic security to this setting.
To have a meaningful semantic security notion, it is required to properly define the
message space in the quantum superposition setting. And also it is essential to take
necessary restrictions into account to prevent the quantum adversary from winning
trivially. In Section 6.3 we give our definition of semantic security against a quantum
adversary.
Another route is to start from a generalisation of indistinguishability notions to the
quantum superposition setting.
Boneh and Zhandry [29] discuss a notion of CPA security where quantum encryption
queries are allowed. They define a quantum analogue of LoR-CPA arisen from its
classical counterpart (Definition 4.1 in [29]) where the adversary is allowed to make
chosen message queries on superpositions of message pairs. For a given symmetric
encryption scheme SE = (K, E ,D) and a chosen bit b ←$ {0, 1}, the encryption
queries are in the form of:
∑
m0,m1,c
αm0,m1,c |m0,m1, c〉 −→
∑
m0,m1,c
αm0,m1,c |m0,m1, c⊕ EK (mb)〉 . (6.1)
Boneh and Zhandry go on to prove that this notion of CPA security is not achievable.
113
6.1 Introduction
Result 15 ([29] Theorem 4.2) No symmetric encryption scheme SE satisfies the
quantum analogue of the LoR-CPA notion defined in [29].
The nature of their proof for Result 15 is that depending on which message gets
encrypted, the register containing that message is entangled with the ciphertext
response. Therefore, the quantum adversary can exploit this entanglement to dis-
tinguish between encrypted messages. Based on the same intuition, it turns out
that quantum analogues of RoR-CPA and FtG-CPA, if arisen from their classical
counterparts, are also not achievable in the quantum superposition setting. For
instance, in RoR-CPA, for a given symmetric encryption scheme SE = (K, E ,D) and
a chosen bit b←$ {0, 1}, the encryption queries are either in the form of:
∑
m,c
αm,c |m, c〉 −→
∑
m,c
αm,c |m, c⊕ EK (m)〉 , (6.2)
if b = 1; or in the form of:
∑
m,c
αm,c |m, c〉 −→
∑
m,c
αm,c |m, c⊕ EK (r)〉 , (6.3)
if b = 0; where r ←$ {0, 1}|m|.
Therefore, in RoR-CPA, the message queried by the adversary is either encrypted
or not. In either case, the quantum adversary can distinguish between encrypted
messages by just checking whether the ciphertext response is entangled with the
register or not. Hence, we can conclude that LoR-CPA, RoR-CPA, and FtG-CPA
need to be rethought from scratch in the quantum superposition setting. This is as
opposed to the RoP notion of confidentiality in this setting which arises from its
classical counterpart as we prove in the next section.
In this chapter, we define indistinguishability notions as well as a semantic security
notion where all queries, including challenge queries, allow quantum superpositions.
We show that our notions are achievable both under a quantum superposition chosen
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plaintext attack (qsCPA) and a quantum superposition chosen ciphertext attack
(qsCCA), and our semantic security notion implies our indistinguishability notion.
6.2 Real-or-Permutation Indistinguishability in a Quantum
Setting
We introduced the classical version of RoP in Subsection 4.2.1.5. We also proved
that RoP and RoR are equivalent in a classical setting (see Theorems 9 and 10 in
Subsection 4.2.1.6). It follows that RoP also implies semantic security SEM. We now
introduce the quantum analogue of RoP, and we prove that it is achievable even
against a quantum superposition adversary.
6.2.1 Quantum Superposition Chosen Plaintext Attack
Assume a quantum adversary that plays the experiment RoP-qsCPA shown in
Figure 6.1. The experiment begins with choosing a key K ← K and a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
The quantum adversary is given quantum superposition access to an encryption
oracle. The quantum adversary adaptively requests encryptions of quantum queries
of its choice. The encryption oracle responds to each encryption query by applying
a unitary transformation to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the adversary’s quantum
register, where n is the length of the encryption query and nr is the length of the
randomness used by the oracle to encrypt this query. The transformation depends
on the bit b. If b = 1, the encryption oracle applies the unitary EK (·):
∑
m,x
λm,x |m,x〉
UEK (·)−−−−−−→
∑
m,x
λm,x |m,x⊕ EK (m)〉 . (6.4)
Otherwise, the challenger chooses a permutation Π uniformly at random from the
set of all permutations of {0, 1}n, and then the encryption oracle applies the unitary
EK (Π (·)):
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∑
m,x
λm,x |m,x〉
UEK (·)UΠ(·)−−−−−−−→
∑
m,x
λm,x |m,x⊕ EK (Π (m))〉 . (6.5)
We call the ciphertext returned by the encryption oracle the challenge ciphertext. At
some point, the quantum adversary outputs a bit b′.
The goal of the quantum adversary is to distinguish between the encryption of its
query and the encryption of its permuted query. This can also be interpreted as
the goal of the quantum adversary being to find out whether the ciphertext is the
encryption of its query directly or whether a unitary transformation was applied to
its query before encryption.
Definition 10 [RoP-qsCPA] Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme. Define experiment Exprop−qscpa−bSE (A) for a quantum adversary A and
a bit b as depicted in Figure 6.1. In the experiment, the adversary A is given
quantum superposition access to a real-or-permutation encryption oracle RoPQA ().
The encryption oracle responds to each query by applying a unitary transformation
to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the adversary’s quantum register QA.
The adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the challenge bit b, and the
experiment returns b′ as well. The corresponding advantage of a quantum adversary
A is given by:
Advrop−qscpaSE (A) = Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−0SE (A) = 1
]
.
This advantage refers to a specific quantum adversary using resources as discussed
in Section 3.4.
We now give a symmetric encryption construction, and we prove that it can achieve
RoP-qsCPA.
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Exprop−qscpa−1SE (A)
K ← K
b′ ← ARoPQA ()
return b′
Exprop−qscpa−0SE (A)
K ← K
b′ ← ARoPQA ()
return b′
RoPQA ()
if b = 1 then
Apply UEK(·) to QA
else
Π←$ Perm (n)
Apply UΠ(·) to QA
Apply UEK(·) to QA
end if
return
Figure 6.1: The RoP-qsCPA confidentiality notion
Construction 3 Let F be a family of pseudorandom functions. We construct the
following symmetric encryption scheme SE = (E ,D) where:
E (K,m) : r ←$ {0, 1}n
c← FK (r)⊕m
output (r, c)
D (K, r, c) :m← FK (r)⊕ c
output (m)
In Construction 3, the encryption algorithm is randomised. Moreover, if it is
implemented on a quantum computer, then the encryption algorithm uses a single
fresh randomness for the entire superposition query, see Section 3.4.
The following theorem establishes that RoP-qsCPA security is achievable. In the
concrete security framework adopted here this means the following. The theorem
provides a straightforward reduction: if our Construction 3 can be broken by a
specific quantum adversary, the reduction establishes the existence of a quantum
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adversary using similar resources that can break the underlying QPRF. But as we
discuss in Subsection 4.1.2, a QPRF based on a suitably chosen block cipher is
currently thought to be secure against quantum attacks.
Theorem 16 (RoP-qsCPA security is achievable) Consider the scheme SE in
Construction 3 based on a family of pseudorandom functions F . Assume A is a
quantum adversary attacking SE in RoP-qsCPA sense, with a running time of at
most t, making at most q queries to the encryption oracle, and having advantage
Advrop−qscpaSE (A) ≥  .
Then there exists a quantum adversary B attacking F with a running time of at
most t′ = t+ q · TΠ, making at most q queries to the encryption oracle, and having
advantage
AdvqprfF (B) ≥
1
2
(
− q
2
2nr
)
.
Here, TΠ is the maximum required time to apply a permutation Π.
Proof We first prove the security of the scheme when F is replaced by a truly
random function f . Next, we claim that if the scheme is insecure when F was used,
then there exists a quantum adversary which can distinguish F from a truly random
function f .
We use S˜E =
(
E˜ , D˜
)
to denote an encryption scheme that is the same as SE in
Construction 3, except that a truly random function f is used instead of F . Consider
the following RoP-qsCPA experiment that the quantum adversary A plays.
The challenger maintains an encryption oracle to which the quantum adversary is
given quantum superposition access.
A adaptively requests encryption of quantum queries of its choice. The encryption
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oracle responds to each encryption query by choosing a random r ←$ {0, 1}nr and
then applying a unitary transformation to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the adversary’s
quantum register. If b = 1, then the encryption oracle applies
∑
m
αm |m, 0, 0〉
Uf(r)
−−−−−−→
∑
m
αm |m, f (r)⊕m, r〉 . (6.6)
Otherwise the encryption oracle chooses a permutation Π ←$ Perm (n), and then
applies UΠ(m) on the first 2n qubits of the adversary’s quantum register, followed by
applying Uf(r) on the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the quantum register:
∑
m
αm |m, 0, 0〉
Uf(r)UΠ(m)
−−−−−−−−−→
∑
m
αm |m, f (r)⊕Π (m) , r〉 . (6.7)
Note that each encryption query receives a single r for the entire query superposition,
meaning that the encryption oracle uses the same randomness r for every message in
the superposition. Hence the encryption oracle can answer any encryption query by
making a single query to f on r. At some point, A outputs a guess b′ for b.
We claim that the advantage of the quantum adversary A is:
Advrop−qscpaS˜E (A) ≤
q2
2nr
. (6.8)
To justify Equation 6.8, see that
Advrop−qscpaS˜E (A) = Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−1S˜E (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−0S˜E (A) = 1
]
.
(6.9)
A random r∗ might be used more than once by the encryption oracle, giving the
quantum adversary partial information about the encrypted message. To denote this
event, we define Repeat. Therefore we have
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Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−1S˜E (A) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−1S˜E (A) = 1 ∧ Repeat
]
(6.10)
+ Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−1S˜E (A) = 1 ∧ ¬Repeat
]
.
Similarly,
Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−0S˜E (A) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−0S˜E (A) = 1 ∧ Repeat
]
(6.11)
+ Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−0S˜E (A) = 1 ∧ ¬Repeat
]
.
Therefore,
Advrop−qscpaS˜E (A) =
(
Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−1S˜E (A) = 1 ∧ Repeat
]
−Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−0S˜E (A) = 1 ∧ Repeat
])
+
(
Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−1S˜E (A) = 1 ∧ ¬Repeat
]
−Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−0S˜E (A) = 1 ∧ ¬Repeat
])
. (6.12)
The first difference is at most the probability of the event Repeat happening. Since
r∗ is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}nr , it follows by the birthday bound
that the probability of the event Repeat is bounded by q2/2nr where q is the number
of encryption queries made by the quantum adversary. The second difference, on
the other hand, is zero, because with a true random function there is a one-to-
one mapping between every random choice, which makes the value of f (r) ⊕ m
or f (r)⊕Π (m) completely random, and hence indistinguishable for the quantum
adversary. Note that the encryption acts the same as a one-time pad, and is thus
information theoretically secure (see Section 2.2), even against a quantum adversary,
as long as the value of f (r) is not repeated for the other superposition queries during
the encryption.
Now, assume A is attacking SE of Construction 3 in the RoP-qsCPA sense. We
construct a quantum adversary B, using A, to attack the QPRF security of F . The
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quantum adversary B uses its oracles to provide a simulation of A’s oracles. B runs
A.
The challenger maintains QPRF experiment. The quantum adversary B chooses a bit
d←$ {0, 1}. When A adaptively makes quantum encryption queries, B will respond
with the output from its oracle. B does this by choosing an r ←$ {0, 1}nr and then
queries its oracle on r. The oracle responds by either s = FK (r) if b = 1, or, s = f (r)
otherwise, where f ←$ Func (n, n). If d = 1, then B applies a unitary transformation
to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of A’s quantum register to prepare
∑
m αm |m, s⊕m, r〉.
Otherwise B chooses a permutation Π←$ Perm (n), and applies the unitary UΠ(·) to
the first 2n qubits of A’s quantum register. This is followed by applying a unitary
transformation to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of A’s quantum register to prepare∑
m αm |m, s⊕Π (m) , r〉.
Eventually A outputs a bit d′ for d. If d = d′, then B outputs 1. Otherwise it outputs
0.
For the advantage of B, we have:
AdvqprfF (B) = Pr
[
Expqprf−1F (B) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expqprf−0F (B) = 1
]
. (6.13)
When b = 0 it is easy to see that B simulates the RoP-qsCPA experiment for A when
it is attacking S˜E . Therefore:
Pr
[
Expqprf−0F (B) = 1
]
=
1
2
+
1
2
·Advrop−qscpaS˜E (A) . (6.14)
Moreover, when b = 1 we can see that B simulates the RoP-qsCPA experiment for A
when it is attacking SE . Therefore:
Pr
[
Expqprf−1F (B) = 1
]
=
1
2
+
1
2
·Advrop−qscpaSE (A) . (6.15)
Hence,
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AdvqprfF (B) =
1
2
·Advrop−qscpaSE (A)−
1
2
·Advrop−qscpaS˜E (A)
2 ·AdvqprfF (B) ≥ Advrop−qscpaSE (A)−
q2
2nr
2 ·AdvqprfF (B) +
q2
2nr
≥ Advrop−qscpaSE (A) . (6.16)
Since it is assumed that
Advrop−qscpaSE (A) ≥  , (6.17)
then
AdvqprfF (B) ≥
1
2
(
− q
2
2nr
)
. (6.18)
B runs in time at most t′ = t+ q · TΠ where t is the upper bound for the running
time of A and TΠ is the maximum required time to apply a permutation Π by B. A
and B make at most q oracle queries. This concludes the proof.
6.2.2 Quantum Superposition Chosen Ciphertext Attack
For indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack definitions in the classical
setting, one could assume that the adversary does not query the decryption oracle
on ciphertexts that it receives from the encryption oracle. In the other words, the
probability that the adversary makes the challenge decryption query is 0. However,
this assumption is not enough to prevent an adversary from trivially winning in the
quantum setting. This is because a quantum adversary can make a decryption query
(a quantum superposition query) that is different from the challenge ciphertext (that
received from the encryption oracle) but still very close to it, helping the quantum
adversary to win the game with high probability.
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In order to define indistinguishability under a quantum superposition chosen cipher-
text attack (IND-qsCCA), we restrict the quantum adversary to make sure that it
cannot query the decryption oracle with any of the challenge ciphertexts. Given that
the quantum challenge ciphertexts are of the form
∑
c
λc |mc, c〉 , (6.19)
then for each challenge ciphertext we define the projector as:
Projc =
∑
x
|x, c〉〈x, c| . (6.20)
We also use ρ to denote the state of the adversary’s quantum register, Q, before
any decryption query. We assume the following condition holds for any quantum
adversary:
Tr (Projc ρ) = 0 ∀c such that λc 6= 0 . (6.21)
We first present the notion of RoP-qsCCA security. Then we prove that it is
achievable.
Assume a quantum adversary that plays the experiment RoP-qsCCA shown in
Figure 6.2. The experiment begins with choosing a key K ← K and a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
The quantum adversary is given quantum superposition access to an encryption
oracle. The quantum adversary adaptively requests encryptions of quantum queries
of its choice. The encryption oracle responds to each encryption query by applying
a unitary transformation to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the quantum adversary’s
quantum register, where n is the length of the encryption query and nr is the
length of the randomness used by the encryption oracle to encrypt the query. The
transformation depends on the bit b. If b = 1, then the encryption oracle applies the
unitary EK (·):
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∑
m,x
λm,x |m,x〉
UEK (·)−−−−−−→
∑
m,x
λm,x |m,x⊕ EK (m)〉 . (6.22)
Otherwise, the challenger chooses a permutation Π uniformly at random from the
set of all permutations of {0, 1}n, and then the encryption oracle applies the unitary
EK (Π (·)):
∑
m,x
λm,x |m,x〉
UEK (·)UΠ(·)−−−−−−−→
∑
m,x
λm,x |m,x⊕ EK (Π (m))〉 . (6.23)
We call the ciphertext returned by the encryption oracle the challenge ciphertext.
Additionally, the quantum adversary is given quantum superposition access to a
decryption oracle. The quantum adversary can query the decryption oracle on any
ciphertext as long as the condition given in Equation 6.21 is satisfied. At some point
the quantum adversary outputs a bit b′.
Definition 11 [RoP-qsCCA] Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme. Define experiment Exprop−qscca−bSE (A) for a quantum adversary A and
a bit b as depicted in Figure 6.2. In the experiment, the adversary A is given quan-
tum superposition access to a real-or-permutation encryption oracle RoPQA (). The
encryption oracle responds to each query by applying a unitary transformation to the
first (2n+ nr) qubits of the adversary’s quantum register QA. The adversary A is
additionally given quantum superposition access to a decryption oracle, DecQA (). For
any challenge ciphertext
∑
c λc |mc, c〉 we define the projector Projc =
∑
x |x, c〉〈x, c|.
No restriction is imposed on the quantum adversary’s queries, rather than it is
assumed that
Pr [∃c : λc 6= 0 and Tr (Projc ρ) 6= 0] = 0 ,
where ρ is the state of QA before making any decryption query.
The adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the challenge bit b, and the
experiment returns b′ as well. The advantage of a quantum adversary A is given by:
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Exprop−qscca−1SE (A)
K ← K
b′ ← ARoPQA (),DecQA ()
return b′
Exprop−qscca−0SE (A)
K ← K
b′ ← ARoPQA (),DecQA ()
return b′
RoPQA ()
if b = 1 then
Apply UEK(·) to QA
else
Π←$ Perm (n)
Apply UΠ(·) to QA
Apply UEK(·) to QA
end if
return
DecQA ()
Apply UDK(·) to QA
return
Figure 6.2: The RoP-qsCCA confidentiality notion
Advrop−qsccaSE (A) = Pr
[
Exprop−qscca−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exprop−qscca−0SE (A) = 1
]
.
This advantage refers to a specific quantum adversary using resources as discussed
in Section 3.4.
We now give a symmetric encryption construction, and prove that it can achieve
RoP-qsCCA security. Here we construct an RoP-qsCCA secure symmetric encryption
scheme using the Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) paradigm.
Construction 4 Let SE = (E ,D) be a symmetric encryption scheme and let F be
a family of pseudorandom functions. We construct the following encryption scheme
SE ′ = (E ′,D′) where:
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E ′ ((K1,K2) ,m) : c← EK1 (m) , τ ← FK2 (c)
output (c, τ)
D′ ((K1,K2) , c, τ) : τ ′ ← FK2 (c) , m← DK1 (c)
if τ = τ ′, output (m)
otherwise, output ⊥
In Construction 4, the encryption algorithm is randomised. Moreover, if it is
implemented on a quantum computer, then the encryption algorithm uses a single
fresh randomness for the entire superposition query.
Theorem 17 (RoP-qsCCA security is achievable) Consider the scheme SE ′
in Construction 4 based on a family of pseudorandom functions F and an encryption
scheme SE. Assume A is a quantum adversary attacking SE ′ in the RoP-qsCCA sense
with a running time of at most t, making at most qe encryption and qd decryption
queries to the oracle, and having advantage
Advrop−qsccaSE ′ (A) ≥  .
Then there exist quantum adversaries B and J attacking SE and F respectively, as
follows. B has running time of at most t and makes at most qe encryption oracle
queries. J has running time of at most t and makes at most qd oracle queries. The
advantages satisfy:
Advrop−qscpaSE (B) + 2 ·AdvqprfF (J ) ≥ − 2
(
1 + 2q2d
)
2−nτ/4 ,
where nτ is the length of tag τ as defined in Construction 4.
Proof To prove Theorem 17, we first modify Construction 4 by replacing F with
f which is a true random function. Next we show that the modified construction
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is indistinguishable from the original construction. If the quantum adversary can
distinguish between these two constructions, then it can break QPRF security of F .
We first construct a new scheme S˜E which is similar to SE ′ in Construction 4 except
that FK2 is replaced by f , where f ←$ Func (n, n) is a true random function. Hence
the S˜E =
(
E˜ , D˜
)
where:
E˜ ((K1) ,m) : c← EK1 (m) , τ ← f (c)
output (c, τ)
D˜ ((K1) , c, τ) : τ ′ ← f (c) , m← DK1 (c)
if τ = τ ′, output (m)
otherwise, output ⊥
Consider the following RoP-qsCCA experiment that the quantum adversary A plays
with regards to S˜E .
The challenger maintains the experiment. The quantum adversary, A, makes adaptive
quantum queries of its choice. The queries can be either encryption or decryption
queries. The oracles respond to each query by applying a unitary transformation to
the adversary’s quantum register.
In the case of encryption queries, the unitary transformation depends on the bit b.
If b = 1, then the encryption oracle applies the unitary UEK1 , followed by Uf .
∑
m
αm |m, 0, 0〉
Uf(·)UEK1 (·)−−−−−−−−−→
∑
m
αm |m, EK1 (m) , f (EK1 (m))〉 , (6.24)
where c = EK1 (m) and τ = f (EK1 (m)).
If b = 0, the encryption oracle chooses a permutation Π ←$ Perm (n), and applies
the unitary UEK1 (Π(·)), followed by Uf .
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∑
m
αm |m, 0, 0〉
Uf(·)UEK1 (Π(·))−−−−−−−−−→
∑
m
αm |m, EK1 (Π (m)) , f (EK1 (Π (m)))〉 , (6.25)
where c = EK1 (Π (m)) and τ = f (EK1 (Π (m))).
In the case of decryption queries, the decryption oracle applies the unitary UD˜K1 (·,·)
to the adversary’s quantum register
∑
c,τ
αc,τ |c, τ, 0〉
UD˜K1 (·,·)−−−−−−−−−→
∑
c,τ
αc,τ
∣∣∣c, τ, D˜K1 (c, τ)〉 , (6.26)
where
D˜K1 (c, τ) =
{
m← DK1 (c) if f (c) = τ
⊥ otherwise .
Eventually the quantum adversary A outputs a guess b′ for b.
Claim 1 The advantage of A in the RoP-qsCCA experiment with regards to S˜E is:
Advrop−qsccaS˜E (A) ≤ Adv
rop−qscpa
SE (B) + 2
(
1 + 2 q2d
)
2−nτ/4 . (6.27)
Proof of Claim 1. In the classical setting, since f is a true random function, the
probability that an adversary forges a valid tag for a ciphertext, which it has not been
given by the encryption oracle before, is qd/2
nτ . Hence, the classical adversary, with
high probability, gets ⊥ most of the time in response to its decryption queries. In this
case, the decryption oracle is not useful for the classical adversary and the security
of the construction reduces to RoP-CPA security of the SE = (E ,D). However this
is not the case in the quantum setting, where quantum superposition queries are
allowed. For instance, the quantum adversary could query all the possible tags for
a ciphertext, by just one superposition query. Then it might be able to somehow
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extract the valid tag from the encryption oracle’s response. This leads the quantum
adversary to be able to decrypt a ciphertext that helps it to win the game.
We use two scenarios, denoted by Q0 and Q1, to see the advantage of A in the
RoP-qsCCA experiment with regards to S˜E . For every ciphertext c, the tag τ = f (c)
is a string randomly chosen from the set {0, 1}nτ , i.e., the tag is a random nτ -bit
string. Assume the quantum adversary makes qe encryption queries and qd decryption
queries.
Q0: In this scenario, we first assume the decryption oracle of the construction S˜E
always returns ⊥ in response to the quantum adversary’s decryption queries. Let
the unitary V˜i denote the decryption oracle’s action on the adversary’s quantum
register in the i-th decryption query, where i = 1, . . . , qd. The action of the quantum
adversary can be written as:
UqdV˜qd . . .U2V˜2U1V˜1U0 |s〉 . (6.28)
This is followed by a binary measurement whose outcome is the guess b′. The input
state |s〉 is the result of some initialisation. The unitaries Ui describe the evolution
of the quantum adversary between decryption queries and include the actions of the
encryption oracle.
The quantum register state consists of three sections, the first one for the message,
the second one for the ciphertext, and the third one for the tag. The action of the
decryption oracle V˜i on a register state |m, c, τ〉 is:
V˜i |m, c, τ〉 = |m⊕⊥, c, τ〉 . (6.29)
Note that ⊥ is some fixed string that is outside the message space.
Since the decryption oracle always return ⊥, it is not useful for A. Therefore, the
security of the construction in scenario Q0 is reduced to RoP-qsCPA security of SE .
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Assume A attacks RoP-qsCCA security of S˜E . We construct another adversary B,
using A, to attack RoP-qsCPA security of SE .
B runs A, and uses its oracles to provide a simulation of A’s oracles in the RoP-
qsCCA experiment. The game is straight forward and it is easy to see the advantage
of the quantum adversary in the scenario Q0:
AdvQ0S˜E (A) = Pr
[
Exprop−qscca−1S˜E (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exprop−qscca−0S˜E (A) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−1SE (B) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exprop−qscpa−0SE (B) = 1
]
≤ Advrop−qscpaSE (B) . (6.30)
Q1: Now assume the decryption oracle of the construction S˜E works as it is supposed
to, meaning, it checks the tag for each ciphertext and decrypts if the tag was valid.
Let the unitary Vi denote the decryption oracle’s action on the quantum adversary’s
quantum register in the i-th decryption query, where i = 1, . . . , qd. The action of the
quantum adversary can be written as:
UqdVqd . . .U2V2U1V1U0 |s〉 . (6.31)
This is followed by a binary measurement whose outcome is the guess b′. The input
state |s〉 is the result of some initialisation. The unitaries Ui describe the evolution
of the adversary between decryption queries and include the actions of the encryption
oracle.
The quantum register state consists of three sections, the first one for the message,
the second one for the ciphertext, and the third one for the tag. The action of the
decryption oracle Vi on a register state |m, c, τ〉 is:
Vi |m, c, τ〉 = |m⊕DK1 (c) , c, τ〉 if f (c) = τ , (6.32)
Vi |m, c, τ〉 = |m⊕⊥, c, τ〉 . (6.33)
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Here DK1 (c) is the decryption of the ciphertext c, and ⊥ is some fixed string that is
outside the message space.
Since, in general, the unitaries Ui entangle the adversary’s quantum register with
its internal registers, one cannot assume that the quantum register is in a pure
state during decryption queries. Denote by C the set of all ciphertexts c. For any
ciphertext c ∈ C, define the projector
Projc =
∑
m,τ
|m, c, τ〉〈m, c, τ | = I ⊗ |c〉〈c| ⊗ I . (6.34)
Denote by ρei the state of the quantum register after the i-th encryption query in
scenario Q1. Let C′ be the set of all ciphertexts that do not result from any encryption
query. That is, ciphertexts that have zero weight in all encryption queries. Formally,
C′ = {c ∈ C : Tr (Projcρei ) = 0 , i = 1, . . . , qe} . (6.35)
We can now define the set Cvalid as the set of pairs (c, τ) that do not result from any
encryption query,
Cvalid =
{
(c, τ) : c ∈ C′} . (6.36)
Given a ciphertext c ∈ C′, trying to guess τ = f (c) leads to a valid pair with very
small probability:
|Cvalid| = 2−nτ
∣∣C′ × {0, 1}nτ ∣∣ . (6.37)
The results of the qe encryption queries contain no information about the set Cvalid.
Now let ρdi be the state of the quantum register before the i-th decryption query in
scenario Q1, and define
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Projvalid =
∑
(c,τ)∈Cvalid
|c, τ〉〈c, τ | . (6.38)
We can now define Wval,i as the total weight of terms belonging to Cvalid in the i-th
decryption query (i = 1, . . . , qd),
Wval,i = Tr
(
ρdi Projvalid
)
. (6.39)
Equivalently, let
∣∣ψdi 〉 be the state of the totality of the adversary’s quantum registers
immediately before the i-th decryption query in scenario Q1,
∣∣∣ψdi 〉 = Ui−1Vi−1 . . .U1V1U0 |s〉 (6.40)
=
∑
j,m,c,τ
λj,m,c,τ |j,m, c, τ〉 , (6.41)
where j labels the computational basis states of all internal registers (i.e., all registers
in addition to the quantum register). We then have
Wval,i =
〈
ψdi
∣∣∣Projvalid ∣∣∣ψdi 〉 = ∑
j,m,c
∣∣λj,m,c,f(c)∣∣2 = 1− ∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
|λj,m,c,τ |2 . (6.42)
The probability that a direct measurement after the i-th decryption query gives a
string (c, τ) ∈ Cvalid is then given by the expectation value E (Wval,i).
Now the optimal way of searching for a string (c, τ) ∈ Cvalid is Grover’s algorithm. As
long as i is less than the minimum number of queries required for Grover’s algorithm
to succeed with certainty (which is approximately pi4
√
2nτ ), the best probability with
which any quantum algorithm can find a string (c, τ) ∈ Cvalid using i queries is exactly
the probability PrGrover achieved by running Grover’s algorithm with i queries [113, 6]
(also see Subsection 3.2.2). That probability is equal to PrGrover = sin
2
((
i+ 12
)
θ
)
,
where sin θ2 =
√
2−nτ [89]. To a very good approximation,
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PrGrover = 4i
2 2−nτ . (6.43)
By measuring the quantum register after the i-th query and then stopping, the quan-
tum adversary can find a string (c, τ) ∈ Cvalid with probability E (Wval,i). Therefore
we must have
E (Wval,i) ≤ 4i2 2−nτ (6.44)
for i = 1, . . . , qd. What we actually need is a bound on the probabilities for
√
Wval,i.
For any random variable X ≥ 0, it holds that E
(√
X
)
≤√E (X). This follows from
E (X)−
(
E
(√
X
))2
= Var
(√
X
)
≥ 0. Hence,
E
(√
Wval,i
)
≤ 2i 2−nτ/2 . (6.45)
Now we want to compare the probability of outputting the guess b′ = 1 in scenario
Q0 and the probability of outputting the guess b′ = 1 in scenario Q1. Let
∣∣ψdi 〉 denote
the state immediately before the i-th decryption query in scenario Q1 as before and,
similarly, let
∣∣∣ψ˜di 〉 = Ui−1V˜i−1 . . .U1V˜1U0 |s〉 (6.46)
denote the state immediately before the i-th decryption query in scenario Q0. We
have
Vi
∣∣∣ψdi 〉 = ∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
λj,m,c,τVi |j,m, c, τ〉+
∑
j,m,c,τ=f(c)
λj,m,c,τVi |j,m, c, τ〉
=
∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
λj,m,c,τ |j,m⊕⊥, c, τ〉
+
∑
j,m,c,τ=f(c)
λj,m,c,τ |j,m⊕DK1 (c) , c, τ〉 , (6.47)
133
6.2 Real-or-Permutation Indistinguishability in a Quantum Setting
and
V˜i
∣∣∣ψdi 〉 = ∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
λj,m,c,τV˜i |j,m, c, τ〉+
∑
j,m,c,τ=f(c)
λj,m,c,τV˜i |j,m, c, τ〉
=
∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
λj,m,c,τ |j,m⊕⊥, c, τ〉
+
∑
j,m,c,τ=f(c)
λj,m,c,τ |j,m⊕⊥, c, τ〉 . (6.48)
Putting these together and using Equation 6.42 twice, we get the following for the
fidelity of these two states:
∣∣∣〈ψdi ∣∣∣ V˜†iVi ∣∣∣ψdi 〉∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
|λj,m,c,τ |2
+
∑
j,m,m′,c
λ∗j,m′,c,f(c)λj,m,c,f(c)
〈
m′ ⊕⊥|m⊕DK1 (c)
〉∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
|λj,m,c,τ |2 +
∑
j,m,c
λ∗j,m⊕DK1 (c)⊕⊥,c,f(c)λj,m,c,f(c)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j,m,c,τ 6=f(c)
|λj,m,c,τ |2
∣∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j,m,c
λ∗j,m⊕DK1 (c)⊕⊥,c,f(c)λj,m,c,f(c)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= 1−Wval,i −
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j,m,c
λ∗j,m⊕DK1 (c)⊕⊥,c,f(c)λj,m,c,f(c)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ 1−Wval,i −
√∑
j,m,c
∣∣∣λj,m⊕DK1 (c)⊕⊥,c,f(c)∣∣∣2√∑
j,m,c
∣∣λj,m,c,f(c)∣∣2
= 1−Wval,i −
√
Wval,i
√
Wval,i
= 1− 2 Wval,i . (6.49)
This implies that the trace distance (see Subsection 2.3.6) of these two states is
bounded as
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D
(
Vi
∣∣∣ψdi 〉 , V˜i ∣∣∣ψdi 〉) ≤√1− (1− 2 Wval,i)2 ≤ 2√Wval,i . (6.50)
Before the first decryption query, the states of the adversary in both scenario Q0
and Q1 is identical,
∣∣ψd1〉 = U0 |s〉. Before the second decryption query, the states
are
∣∣∣ψ˜d2〉 = U1V˜1 ∣∣ψd1〉 and ∣∣ψd2〉 = U1V1 ∣∣ψd1〉, respectively. Therefore, for the trace
distance we have
D
(∣∣∣ψd2〉 , ∣∣∣ψ˜d2〉) = D(V1 ∣∣∣ψd1〉 , V˜1 ∣∣∣ψd1〉) ≤ 2√Wval,1 . (6.51)
For arbitrary i > 0, the triangle inequality gives us
D
(
|ψi+1〉 ,
∣∣∣ψ˜i+1〉) = D(UiVi |ψi〉 ,UiV˜i ∣∣∣ψ˜i〉)
= D
(
Vi |ψi〉 , V˜i
∣∣∣ψ˜i〉)
≤ D
(
Vi |ψi〉 , V˜i |ψi〉
)
+ D
(
V˜i |ψi〉 , V˜i
∣∣∣ψ˜i〉)
= D
(
Vi |ψi〉 , V˜i |ψi〉
)
+ D
(
|ψi〉 ,
∣∣∣ψ˜i〉)
≤ 2√Wval,i + D(|ψi〉 , ∣∣∣ψ˜i〉) . (6.52)
By induction, it follows that
D
(
|ψqd〉 ,
∣∣∣ψ˜qd〉) ≤ 2 qd−1∑
i=1
√
Wval,i . (6.53)
This implies that, for any measurement, the probabilities for b′ = 1 in both scenario
can not differ by more than 2
∑qd−1
i=1
√
Wval,i.
Pr
[
ExpQ1S˜E (A) = 1
]
≤ Pr
[
ExpQ0S˜E (A) = 1
]
+ 2
qd−1∑
i=1
√
Wval,i . (6.54)
Now the expectation of that quantity is
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E
(
2
qd−1∑
i=1
√
Wval,i
)
= 2
qd−1∑
i=1
E
(√
Wval,i
)
≤ 2−nτ/24
qd−1∑
i=1
i
≤ 2q2d 2−nτ/2 . (6.55)
Using the Markov inequality, this implies
Pr
(
2
qd−1∑
i=1
√
Wval,i ≥ ξ
)
≤ 1
ξ
E
(
2
qd−1∑
i=1
√
Wval,i
)
≤ 2
ξ
q2d 2
−nτ/2 . (6.56)
That is, with probability at least 1− 2ξ q2d 2−nτ/2, we have that
Pr
[
ExpQ1S˜E (A) = 1
]
=
(
Pr
[
ExpQ1S˜E (A) = 1
∣∣∣∣∣2
qd−1∑
i=1
√
Wval,i ≥ ξ
]
·Pr
[
2
qd−1∑
i=1
√
Wval,i ≥ ξ
])
+
(
Pr
[
ExpQ1S˜E (A) = 1
∣∣∣∣∣2
qd−1∑
i=1
√
Wval,i < ξ
]
·Pr
[
2
qd−1∑
i=1
√
Wval,i < ξ
])
≤ 1 · 2
ξ
q2d 2
−nτ/2 +
(
Pr
[
ExpQ0S˜E (A) = 1
]
+ ξ
)
· 1 . (6.57)
Hence
Pr
[
ExpQ1S˜E (A) = 1
]
≤ Pr
[
ExpQ0S˜E (A) = 1
]
+ ξ +
2
ξ
q2d 2
−nτ/2 . (6.58)
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We can now choose ξ so that this has the best form. One possibility is ξ = 2−nτ/4,
which leads to
Pr
[
ExpQ1S˜E (A) = 1
]
≤ Pr
[
ExpQ0S˜E (A) = 1
]
+
(
1 + 2 q2d
)
2−nτ/4 . (6.59)
This bound holds irrespective of the chosen bit b in the experiment. Since the
advantages are defined as
AdvQ1S˜E (A) = 2 Pr
[
ExpQ1S˜E (A) = 1
]
− 1 , (6.60)
and similarly
AdvQ0S˜E (A) = 2 Pr
[
ExpQ0S˜E (A) = 1
]
− 1 . (6.61)
Therefore
AdvQ1S˜E (A) ≤ Adv
Q0
S˜E (A) + 2
(
1 + 2 q2d
)
2−nτ/4 . (6.62)
From Equation 6.30 we get
Advrop−qsccaS˜E (A) ≤ Adv
rop−qscpa
SE (B) + 2
(
1 + 2 q2d
)
2−nτ/4 (6.63)
which concludes the proof of the claim.
Now we look at the original experiment. Assume that A is attacking RoP-qsCCA
security of SE ′ in Construction 4. The challenger maintains the experiment.
The quantum adversary, A, makes adaptive quantum queries of its choice. The
queries can be either encryption or decryption queries. The oracles responds to each
query by applying a unitary transformation to the adversary’s quantum register.
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In the case of encryption queries, the unitary transformation depends on the bit b.
If b = 1, then the encryption oracle applies the unitary UEK1 , followed by UFK2 :
∑
m
αm |m, 0, 0〉
UFK2 (·)
UEK1 (·)−−−−−−−−−→
∑
m
αm |m, EK1 (m) , FK2 (EK1 (m))〉 , (6.64)
where c = EK1 (m) and τ = FK2 (EK1 (m)).
If b = 0, the encryption oracle chooses a permutation Π ←$ Perm (n), and applies
the unitary UEK1 (Π(·)), followed by UFK2 :
∑
m
αm |m, 0, 0〉
UFK2 (·)
UEK1 (Π(·))−−−−−−−−−→
∑
m
αm |m, EK1 (Π (m)) , FK2 (EK1 (Π (m)))〉 ,
(6.65)
where c = EK1 (Π (m)) and τ = FK2 (EK1 (Π (m))).
In the case of decryption queries, the decryption oracle applies the unitary UD′K1,K2 (·,·)
to the adversary’s quantum register:
∑
c,τ
αc,τ |c, τ, 0〉
UD′K1,K2 (·,·)−−−−−−−−−→
∑
c,τ
αc,τ
∣∣c, τ,D′K1,K2 (c, τ)〉 , (6.66)
where
D′K1,K2 (c, τ) =
{
m← DK1 (c) if FK2 (c) = τ
⊥ otherwise .
Eventually the quantum adversary A outputs a guess b′ for b. The advantage of the
adversary is
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Advrop−qsccaSE ′ (A) = Pr
[
Exprop−qscca−1SE ′ (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exprop−qscca−0SE ′ (A) = 1
]
.
(6.67)
Assume that A is attacking RoP-qsCCA security of SE ′ in Construction 4. We
construct a new quantum adversary J , using A, to attack QPRF security of F . J
runs A, and uses its oracle to provide a simulation of A’s oracles in RoP-qsCCA
experiment.
The challenger maintains the QPRF experiment. The quantum adversary J chooses
a bit d←$ {0, 1} and a key K1 ←$K. It is also assumed that J simulates E and D
of Construction 4 perfectly. A adaptively makes encryption or decryption quantum
queries.
In the case of encryption queries, if d = 1 then J applies UEK1 on the first 2n
qubits of A’s quantum register. Otherwise, when d = 0, J applies UEK1 (Π(·)) to A’s
quantum register, where Π←$ Perm (n) is chosen by J . Then J sends the quantum
register to its oracle. The oracle applies the unitary UFK2 or Uf to the last 2n bits
of the quantum register when b = 1 or b = 0 respectively.
In the case of decryption queries, J sends A’s quantum register to the oracle where
it applies UFK2 or Uf to the register when b = 1 or b = 0 respectively,
∑
c
αc |0, c, τ, 0〉
Uf(c) or UFK2 (c)−−−−−−−−−→
∑
c
αc
∣∣0, c, τ, τ ′〉 . (6.68)
Then J applies UD˜K1 (c) to the quantum register:
∑
c
αc
∣∣0, c, τ, τ ′〉 UD˜K1 (c)−−−−−−−−−→∑
c
αc
∣∣∣D˜K1 (c) , c, τ, τ ′〉 , (6.69)
where
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D˜K1 (c) =
{
m← DK1 (c) if τ = τ ′
⊥ otherwise .
Eventually A outputs a bit d′ for d. If d = d′, J outputs 1. Otherwise it outputs 0.
For the advantage of J we have:
AdvqprfF (J ) = Pr
[
Expqprf−1F (J ) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expqprf−0F (J ) = 1
]
. (6.70)
When b = 0, we can see that J simulates the RoP-qsCCA experiment for A when A
is attacking S˜E . Then
Pr
[
Expqprf−0F (J ) = 1
]
=
1
2
+
1
2
·Advrop−qsccaS˜E (A) . (6.71)
When b = 1, we can see that J simulates the RoP-qsCCA experiment for A when A
is attacking SE ′. Then,
Pr
[
Expqprf−1F (A) = 1
]
=
1
2
+
1
2
·Advrop−qsccaSE ′ (A) . (6.72)
Hence,
AdvqprfF (J ) =
1
2
·Advrop−qsccaSE ′ (A)−
1
2
·Advrop−qsccaS˜E (A)
2 ·AdvqprfF (J ) ≥ Advrop−qsccaSE ′ (A)−Advrop−qsccaS˜E (A)
Advrop−qsccaSE ′ (A) ≤ 2 ·AdvqprfF (J ) + Advrop−qscpaSE (B) + 2
(
1 + 2q2d
)
2−nτ/4 .
(6.73)
Finally we get
Advrop−qscpaSE (B)+2·AdvqprfF (J ) ≥ Advrop−qsccaSE ′ (A)−2
(
1 + 2q2d
)
2−nτ/4 , (6.74)
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which concludes the proof.
6.3 Semantic Security in a Quantum Setting
The idea of semantic security (see Subsection 4.2.1.4) is that having access to a
ciphertext should not provide any advantage to an adversary A who is trying to obtain
information about the plaintext. This is formalised in a game where the adversary
chooses a function f and tries to predict the value f(m) for a message m chosen at
random from a set M, where M is also chosen by the adversary. The adversary’s
advantage is defined by comparing its success probability in two experiments, one
in which A is provided with the encryption of m, and one in which A is provided
instead with the encryption of a message m′ which is also chosen randomly, and
independently of m, from the set M. For this definition to be meaningful, the set
M must be valid in the sense that all messages in M must have the same length.
We now give a closely analogous definition of semantic security against a quantum
adversary. The main difference from the original definition is that we allow the set
M to contain quantum superpositions of messages. As in the classical definition, it
will be necessary to restrict the set M in order to arrive at a meaningful definition.
Definition 12 Let M be a set of superpositions of n-bit messages of the form
|ψ〉 =
2n−1∑
m=0
αm |m〉 , (6.75)
and let Perm (n) be the set of all permutations of {0, 1}n. The set M is called valid
if there is a state |ψ〉 and a subset P ⊆ Perm (n) such that
M = {UΠ |ψ〉 : Π ∈ P} , (6.76)
where UΠ is a unitary transformation. In other words, M is valid if all its elements
are permutations of a given quantum state |ψ〉.
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Our definition of valid sets is just one of many possibilities. It is strictly larger
than the set of classical messages, which here would correspond to choosing a
computational basis state for |ψ〉. It is probably not the largest possible set that
leads to an achievable notion. Which choices of message space lead to an achievable
notion of semantic security remains an open question.
Here is an example that shows why there must be some restriction on the allowed
sets M. Let m0 be some message, and let |ψ+〉 = 2−n/2
∑
m |m〉 be the equal
superposition of all 2n messages. Then, for a permutation Π←$ Perm (n), we have
UΠ |ψ+〉 = |ψ+〉 , (6.77)
i.e., |ψ+〉 is invariant under any permutation. On the other hand,
〈m0|UΠ|m0〉 = 0 (6.78)
with probability close to 1. Thus, a quantum adversary can easily tell which of the
two states |m0〉 and |ψ+〉 was encrypted. This example is similar to the proof of
Theorem 4.2 in [29].
Before explaining the definition, we define a number of notations. In Subsection 3.1.1,
we explained that a quantum circuit is a quantum gate sequence. The size of a
quantum circuit is the number of the elementary quantum gates in the circuit, where
the elementary quantum gates are chosen from a universal set of gates. We stipulate
that a quantum circuit is executed by a particular universal quantum circuit evaluator,
or UQE. The action of our UQE consists of applying a quantum operation specified
by a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗ to a quantum register Q. We will denote this action by
UQE (x,Q). Optionally, the universal quantum circuit evaluator returns an output
string y, which we will indicate by y ← UQE (x,Q). The output y depends on the
input quantum circuit, but in general, y will be randomised, simply because in order
to get the output from a quantum computation, one has to make a measurement.
Assume a quantum adversary that plays the experiments SEM-qsCPA and SEM-
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qsCCA shown in Figure 6.3. Both experiments begin by choosing a bit b ∈ {0, 1}
that parametrises the experiments, and a key K ← K. The quantum adversary runs
in two phases, select and predict, where it is given quantum superposition access to
its oracles.
During the select phase, the quantum adversary adaptively requests encryptions of
quantum queries of its choice. The encryption oracle responds to each encryption
query by applying the unitary UEK(·) to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the quantum
adversary’s quantum register, where n is the length of the encryption query and
nr is the length of the randomness used by the encryption oracle to encrypt the
query. Additionally, the quantum adversary is given quantum superposition access
to a decryption oracle in the SEM-qsCCA experiment. The quantum adversary can
query the decryption oracle on any ciphertext. At the end of the select phase, the
quantum adversary outputs a classical description of a set P of permutations as well
as a quantum circuit description R of a state |ψ〉.
At the beginning of the predict phase, the challenger executes UQE (R,QA), prepar-
ing the state |ψ〉 in the adversary’s quantum register QA. The challenger then chooses
two permutations Π0 and Π1 at random from the set P , executes UQE (Π0, QA),
thus applying the unitary UΠ0 to QA, and finally applies the encryption oracle EK to
QA. Note that Π0 and Π1 are in the form of quantum circuit descriptions. The adver-
sary’s quantum register now contains the state UEK |ψ0〉, where |ψb〉 = UΠb |ψ〉 ∈ M
and b ∈ {0, 1}. We call this the challenge ciphertext. During the predict phase,
the quantum adversary is again given superposition access to the encryption oracle.
Additionally, the quantum adversary is given quantum superposition access to a
decryption oracle in the SEM-qsCCA experiment. The quantum adversary can
query the decryption oracle on any ciphertext as long as the condition given in
Equation 6.21 is satisfied. At the end of this phase, the quantum adversary outputs
the description of a quantum circuit V , and a bit z.
The challenger now executes UQE (R,QA), again preparing the state |ψ〉 in the
register QA. The challenger then runs UQE (Πb, QA), thus applying the unitary
UΠb to QA, which means that QA now contains the state |ψb〉 ∈ M. Finally, the
challenger runs z′ ← UQE (V,QA), thus generating an output bit z′. The experiment
then returns 1 (‘success’) if z′ = z, i.e., if the adversary guessed z′ correctly, and 0
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otherwise.
Definition 13 [SEM-qsCPA and SEM-qsCCA] Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a sym-
metric encryption scheme. Define experiment Expsem−qscpa−bSE (A) and experiment
Expsem−qscca−bSE (A) for a quantum adversary A and a bit b as depicted in Figure 6.3.
In the experiments, the adversary A is given quantum superposition access to an en-
cryption oracle. The encryption oracle responds to each query by applying a unitary
transformation to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the adversary’s quantum register QA.
The adversary A is additionally given quantum superposition access to a decryption
oracle in the latter experiment. For any challenge ciphertext
∑
c λc |mc, c〉, we define
the projector Projc =
∑
x |x, c〉〈x, c|. No restriction is imposed on the quantum
adversary’s queries, except, it is assumed that
Pr [∃c : λc 6= 0 and Tr (Projc ρ) 6= 0] = 0 ,
where ρ is the state of QA before making any decryption query.
The corresponding advantages of a quantum adversary A are given by:
Advsem−qscpaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expsem−qscpa−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expsem−qscpa−0SE (A) = 1
]
,
Advsem−qsccaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expsem−qscca−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expsem−qscca−0SE (A) = 1
]
.
These advantages refer to a specific quantum adversary using resources as discussed
in Section 3.4.
The relevant resources for the quantum adversary A include the running time t,
which includes the maximum running time of V where the maximum is taken over
all states |ψ〉 inM, the numbers qe of encryption and qd of decryption oracle queries,
and the size of the classical output, µ = µV +µR +µP bits, where µV and µR are the
maximum number of bits required for the description of V and R respectively and
µP = 2 · µΠ, where µΠ is the maximum number of bits required for a permutation Π
output by P .
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Experiment Expsem−qscpa−bSE (A) Experiment Expsem−qscca−bSE (A)
K ← K
(R,P )← AEK,QA () (select) (R,P )← AEK,QA (),DK,QA () (select)
Π0 ←$P ; Π1 ←$P
Run UQE (R,QA)
Run UQE (Π0, QA)
Apply UEK to QA
(V, z)← AEK,QA () (predict) (V, z)← AEK,QA (),DK,QA () (predict)
Run UQE (R,QA)
Run UQE (Πb, QA)
z′ ← UQE (V,QA)
if z = z′ then
b′ ← 1
else
b′ ← 0
end if
return b′
EK,QA ()
Apply UEK(·) to QA
return
DK,QA ()
Apply UDK(·) to QA
return
Figure 6.3: The SEM-qsCPA and SEM-qsCCA confidentiality notions. The boxed
codes are excluded in SEM-qsCPA experiment, whereas they replace the codes
adjacent to them in SEM-qsCCA experiment.
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6.4 Relations Among Notions
In Subsection 4.2.1.6, we proved that classical RoP and RoR security notions are
equivalent. From this, we can deduce that classical RoP also implies SEM security.
Here we prove that the quantum analogue of RoP also implies our quantum analogue
of SEM security.
Theorem 18 (RoP-qsATK ⇒ SEM-qsATK) For any scheme SE = (K, E ,D),
assume that A2 is a quantum adversary attacking SE in the SEM-qsATK sense, with
a running time of at most t2, making at most qe encryption and (in the CCA case)
qd decryption queries to the oracle, and the size of the classical output of µ2 bits, and
having advantage
Advsem−qscpaSE (A2) ≥ 2 ,
Advsem−qsccaSE (A2) ≥ 2 .
Then there exists a quantum adversary A1 attacking SE in the RoP-qsATK sense,
with a running time t1 of at most t2 + qec
(
3
2µ2 + µΠ′
)
, making at most qe encryption
and (in the CCA case) qd decryption queries to the oracle, and the size of the classical
output of µ1 = µ2 + 2µΠ′ bits, and having advantage
Advrop−qscpaSE (A1) ≥
2
4
,
Advrop−qsccaSE (A1) ≥
2
4
.
Here, c is a constant, and µΠ′ is the maximum number of bits required for the
description of a permutation Π′.
Before proving Theorem 18, we propose two more notions that will help us in the
proof. We name these new notions ‘FtG’ and ‘LoR’.
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Assume a quantum adversary that plays the experiments FtG-qsCPA and FtG-
qsCCA shown in Figure 6.4. Both experiments begin with choosing a key K ← K
and a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. The quantum adversary runs in two phases, find and guess,
where it is given quantum superposition access to its oracles.
During the find phase the quantum adversary adaptively requests encryptions of
quantum queries of its choice. The encryption oracle responds to each encryption
query by applying the unitary UEK(·) to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the quantum
adversary’s quantum register, where n is the length of the encryption query and
nr is the length of the randomness used by the encryption oracle to encrypt the
query. Additionally, the quantum adversary is given quantum superposition access
to a decryption oracle in the FtG-qsCCA experiment. The quantum adversary can
query the decryption oracle on any ciphertext. At the end of the find phase, the
quantum adversary outputs quantum circuit descriptions of two permutations Π0,
Π1 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and also it prepares an n qubit quantum query in its quantum
register.
At the beginning of the guess phase, the challenger executes UQE (Πb, QA) which
applies UΠb to the adversary’s quantum register. Then the challenger applies
the unitary UEK(·) to the adversary’s quantum register. We call the result the
challenge ciphertext. During the guess phase, the quantum adversary is again
given superposition access to the encryption oracle. Additionally, the quantum
adversary is given quantum superposition access to a decryption oracle in the FtG-
qsCCA experiment. The quantum adversary can query the decryption oracle on any
ciphertext as long as the condition given in Equation 6.21 is satisfied. At the end of
this phase, the quantum adversary outputs a bit b′.
Definition 14 [FtG-qsCPA and FtG-qsCCA] Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a sym-
metric encryption scheme. Define experiment Expftg−qscpa−bSE (A) and experiment
Expftg−qscca−bSE (A) for a quantum adversary A and a bit b as depicted in Figure 6.4.
In the experiments, the adversary A is given quantum superposition access to an en-
cryption oracle. The encryption oracle responds to each query by applying a unitary
transformation to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the adversary’s quantum register QA.
A is additionally given quantum superposition access to a decryption oracle in the
latter experiment. For any challenge ciphertext
∑
c λc |mc, c〉, we define the projector
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Projc =
∑
x |x, c〉〈x, c|. No restriction is imposed on the quantum adversary’s queries,
except, it is assumed that
Pr [∃c : λc 6= 0 and Tr (Projc ρ) 6= 0] = 0 ,
where ρ is the state of QA before making any decryption query.
The adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the challenge bit b, and the
experiment returns b′ as well. The corresponding advantages of a quantum adversary
A are given by:
Advftg−qscpaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expftg−qscpa−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expftg−qscpa−0SE (A) = 1
]
,
Advftg−qsccaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expftg−qscca−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expftg−qscca−0SE (A) = 1
]
.
These advantages refer to a specific quantum adversary using resources as discussed
in Section 3.4.
We now give the LoR notion. Assume a quantum adversary that plays the experiments
LoR-qsCPA and LoR-qsCCA shown in Figure 6.5. Both experiments begin with
choosing a key K ← K and a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. The quantum adversary is given quantum
superposition access to an encryption oracle. The quantum adversary adaptively
requests encryptions of quantum queries of its choice. Also, for each query, the
quantum adversary outputs quantum circuit description of two permutations Π0,
Π1 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. The challenger executes UQE (Πb, QA), which applies UΠb
to the adversary’s quantum register. Then the challenger applies the unitary UEK(·)
to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the adversary’s quantum register. We call the result,
the challenge ciphertext.
Additionally, the quantum adversary is given quantum superposition access to a
decryption oracle in the LoR-qsCCA experiment. The quantum adversary can query
the decryption oracle on any ciphertext as long as the condition given in Equation 6.21
is satisfied. At some point the quantum adversary outputs a bit b′.
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Experiment Expftg−qscpa−bSE (A) Experiment Expftg−qscca−bSE (A)
K ← K
((Π0,Π1) , QA)← AEK,QA () (find)
((Π0,Π1) , QA)← AEK,QA (),DK,QA () (find)
Run UQE (Πb, QA)
Apply UEK(·) to QA
b′ ← AEK,QA () (guess) b′ ← AEK,QA (),DK,QA () (guess)
return b′
EK,QA ()
Apply UEK(·) to QA
return
DK,QA ()
Apply UDK(·) to QA
return
Figure 6.4: The FtG-qsCPA and FtG-qsCCA confidentiality notions. The boxed
codes are excluded in FtG-qsCPA experiment, whereas they replace the codes adjacent
to them in FtG-qsCCA experiment.
Definition 15 [LoR-qsCPA and LoR-qsCCA] Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a sym-
metric encryption scheme. Define experiment Explor−qscpa−bSE (A) and experiment
Explor−qscca−bSE (A) for an adversary A and a bit b as depicted in Figure 6.5. In the
experiments, A is given quantum superposition access to a left-or-right encryption
oracle LoRQA (·). The encryption oracle responds to each query by applying a unitary
transformation to the first (2n+ nr) bits of the adversary’s quantum register QA.
The adversary A is additionally given quantum superposition access to a decryption
oracle, DecQA (), in the latter experiment. For any challenge ciphertext
∑
c λc |mc, c〉,
we define the projector Projc =
∑
x |x, c〉〈x, c|. No restriction is imposed on the
quantum adversary’s queries except, it is assumed that
Pr [∃c : λc 6= 0 and Tr (Projc ρ) 6= 0] = 0 ,
where ρ is the state of QA before making any decryption query.
The adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the challenge bit b, and the
experiment returns b′ as well. The corresponding advantages of a quantum adversary
A are given by:
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Explor−qscpa−bSE (A) Explor−qscca−bSE (A)
K ← K
b′ ← ALoRQA (·) b′ ← ALoRQA (·),DecQA ()
return b′
LoRQA (Π0,Π1)
Run UQE (Πb, QA)
Apply UEK(·) to QA
return
DecQA ()
Apply UDK(·) to QA
return
Figure 6.5: The LoR-qsCPA and LoR-qsCCA confidentiality notions. The boxed
codes are excluded in LoR-CPA experiment, whereas they replace the codes adjacent
to them in LoR-CCA experiment.
Advlor−qscpaSE (A) = Pr
[
Explor−qscpa−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Explor−qscpa−0SE (A) = 1
]
,
Advlor−qsccaSE (A) = Pr
[
Explor−qscca−1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Explor−qscca−0SE (A) = 1
]
.
These advantages refer to a specific quantum adversary using resources as discussed
in Section 3.4.
Proof of Theorem 18. We prove this theorem in four steps.
Step 1 (RoP-qsATK ⇒ LoR-qsATK): For any scheme SE = (K, E ,D), assume that
A4 is a quantum adversary attacking SE in the LoR-qsATK sense, with a running
time of at most t4, making at most qe encryption and (in the CCA case) qd decryption
queries to the oracle, and the size of the classical output of µ4 bits, and having
advantage
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Advlor−qscpaSE (A4) ≥ 4 ,
Advlor−qsccaSE (A4) ≥ 4 .
Then there exists a quantum adversary A1 attacking SE in the RoP-qsATK sense,
with a running time of at most t1 = t4 + qec
µ4
2 , making at most qe encryption and
(in the CCA case) qd decryption queries to the oracle, and the size of the classical
output of µ1 = µ4 bits, and having advantage
Advrop−qscpaSE (A1) ≥
4
2
,
Advrop−qsccaSE (A1) ≥
4
2
.
Assume A4 is a quantum adversary attacking SE in the LoR-qsATK sense. We
construct a new quantum adversary A1, using A4, that attacks SE in the RoP-qsATK
sense. A1 runs A4, using its oracles to provide a simulation of A4’s oracles. The
RoP challenger maintains the experiment.
A1 selects a bit b′ ←$ {0, 1}, independently from bit b. A4 adaptively requests
encryptions of quantum queries of its choice. Also for each query, it places quantum
circuit descriptions of two permutations Π′0, Π′1 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n in its classical
register. A1 reads A4’s classical register. Then it executes UQE
(
UΠ′
b′
, QA4
)
,
and invokes RoPQA4 (·). If b = 0, the encryption oracle chooses a permutation
Π←$ Perm (n). Then it applies UEK(Π(·)) to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the given
quantum register. If b = 1, the encryption oracle applies the unitary UEK(·) to the
first (2n+ nr) qubits of the given quantum register. We call the result of this type
of query the challenge ciphertexts.
Moreover, A4 adaptively requests decryption of quantum queries of its choice. When
this happens, the decryption oracle Dec (·) applies the unitary UDK(·) to the quantum
register.
A4 eventually outputs a bit d. If b′ = d then A1 outputs 1. Otherwise it outputs
0. Note that, for any challenge ciphertext
∑
c λc |mc, c〉, we define the projector
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Projc =
∑
x |x, c〉〈x, c|. We use ρ to denote the state of A4’s quantum register before
making any decryption query. Then we assume that
Pr [∃c : λc 6= 0 and Tr (Projc ρ) 6= 0] = 0 ,
for all quantum adversaries A4. For A1’s advantage we have:
Advrop−qsatkSE (A1) = Pr
[
Exprop−qsatk−1SE (A1) = 1
]
−Pr
[
Exprop−qsatk−0SE (A1) = 1
]
.
(6.79)
In the case that b = 1, A1 provides a perfect simulation for A4. Hence, A1 succeeds
with the same probability as A4. Therefore we have to calculate
Pr
[
Exprop−qsatk−1SE (A1) = 1
]
(6.80)
which we can rewrite based on A4’s probability of success,
Pr
[
Exprop−qsatk−1SE (A1) = 1
]
=
1
2
· Pr
[
Explor−qsatk−1SE (A4) = 1
]
+
1
2
· Pr
[
Explor−qsatk−0SE (A4) = 1
]
. (6.81)
On the other hand, in the case where b = 0, the encryption oracle first applies the
permutation Π to the given quantum register, which results in a random permutation
in the register regardless of whether it was maintained in the case b′ = 0 or b′ =
1. Therefore, A1 provides a simulation for A4 where A4’s encryption oracle in
Explor−qsatk−0 and in Explor−qsatk−1 returns identically distributed answers. Hence,
A1 outputs a random bit and succeeds with probability 12 . Therefore,
Pr
[
Exprop−qsatk−0SE (A1) = 1
]
=
1
2
. (6.82)
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Then we have that,
Advrop−qsatkSE (A1) = Pr
[
Exprop−qsatk−1SE (A1) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exprop−qsatk−0SE (A1) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Exprop−qsatk−1SE (A1) = 1
]
− 1
2
=
1
2
· Pr
[
Explor−qsatk−1SE (A4) = 1
]
+
1
2
· Pr
[
Explor−qsatk−0SE (A4) = 0
]
− 1
2
=
1
2
· Pr
[
Explor−qsatk−1SE (A4) = 1
]
+
1
2
·
(
1− Pr
[
Explor−qsatk−0SE (A4) = 1
])
− 1
2
=
1
2
·
(
Pr
[
Explor−qsatk−1SE (A4) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Explor−qsatk−0SE (A4) = 1
])
=
1
2
·Advlor−qsatkSE (A4) . (6.83)
The running time of A1 is at most t1 = t4 + TΠ′ , where TΠ′ = qecµ42 is the maximum
required time to apply a permutation Π′. A1 makes at most qe encryption and (in
the CCA case) qd decryption oracle queries, the size of the classical output is µ1 = µ4
bits where µ4 = 2 · µΠ′ .
Step 2 (LoR-qsATK ⇒ FtG-qsATK): For any scheme SE = (K, E ,D), assume that
A3 is a quantum adversary attacking SE in the FtG-qsATK sense, with a running
time of at most t3, making at most qe encryption and (in the CCA case) qd decryption
queries to the oracle, and the size of the classical output of µ3 bits, and having
advantage
Advftg−qscpaSE (A3) ≥ 3 ,
Advftg−qsccaSE (A3) ≥ 3 .
Then there exists a quantum adversary A4 attacking SE in the LoR-qsATK sense,
with a running time of at most t4 = t3, making at most qe encryption and (in the
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CCA case) qd decryption queries to the oracle, and the size of the classical output of
µ4 = µ3 + 2µΠ′ bits, and having advantage
Advlor−qscpaSE (A4) ≥ 3 ,
Advlor−qsccaSE (A4) ≥ 3 .
Assume A3 is a quantum adversary attacking SE in the FtG-qsATK sense. We
construct a new quantum adversary A4, using A3, that attacks SE in the LoR-qsATK
sense. A4 runs A3, using its oracles to provide a simulation of A3’s oracles. The
LoR challenger maintains the experiment.
A4 runs A3 in the find phase. A3 adaptively makes quantum queries of its choice.
These can be either encryption or decryption queries. In the case of encryption
queries, for each quantum query, A4 places quantum circuit descriptions of two
permutations Π′0 and Π′1 in its classical register. We assume these permutations are
identity functions. The encryption oracle LoRQA3 (·) is invoked. The encryption oracle
responds to each query by first executing UQE (Πb, QA3), and then applying the
unitary UEK(·) to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the adversary’s quantum register. At
the end of the find phase, A3 requests encryption of a quantum query for which it also
places quantum circuit descriptions of two permutations Π0, Π1 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n in
its classical register. To respond, the encryption oracle executes UQE (Πb, QA3) and
then applies the unitary UEK(·) to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the quantum register
QA3 . Without loss of generality, we call the results of all encryption queries made
by A3 the challenge ciphertexts. In the case of decryption queries, the decryption
oracle DecQA3 () applies the unitary UDK(·) to the quantum register. At some point,
A3 returns a bit d which A4 outputs as its guess.
Note that for any challenge ciphertext
∑
c λc |mc, c〉, we define the projector Projc =∑
x |x, c〉〈x, c|. We use ρ to denote the state of A3’s quantum register before making
any decryption query. Then we assume that
Pr [∃c : λc 6= 0 and Tr (Projc ρ) 6= 0] = 0 ,
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for all quantum adversaries A3. For either case of b = 0 or b = 1, A4 provides a
perfect simulation for A3. Therefore, A4 succeeds with the same probability as A3.
Hence, for A4’s advantage we have
Advlor−qsatkSE (A4) = Pr
[
Explor−qsatk−1SE (A4) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Explor−qsatk−0SE (A4) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Expftg−qsatk−1SE (A3) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expftg−qsatk−0SE (A3) = 1
]
= Advftg−qsatkSE (A3) . (6.84)
A4 runs in time at most t4 = t3, and makes at most qe encryption and (in the CCA
case) qd decryption queries, and the size of the classical output is µ4 = µ3 + 2µΠ′
bits.
Step 3 (FtG-qsATK ⇒ SEM-qsATK): For any scheme SE = (K, E ,D), assume that
A2 is a quantum adversary attacking SE in the SEM-qsATK sense, with a running
time of at most t2, making at most qe encryption and (in the CCA case) qd decryption
queries to the oracle, and the size of the classical output of µ2 bits, and having
advantage
Advsem−qscpaSE (A2) ≥ 2 ,
Advsem−qsccaSE (A2) ≥ 2 .
Then there exists a quantum adversary A3 attacking SE in the FtG-qsATK sense,
with a running time t3 of at most t2 + qecµ2, making at most qe encryption and (in
the CCA case) qd decryption queries to the oracle, and the size of the classical output
of µ2 = µ3 bits, and having advantage
Advftg−qscpaSE (A3) ≥
2
2
,
Advftg−qsccaSE (A3) ≥
2
2
.
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Assume A2 is a quantum adversary attacking SE in the SEM-qsATK sense. We
construct a new quantum adversary A3, using A2, that attacks SE in the FtG-qsATK
sense. A3 runs A2, and uses its oracles to provide a simulation of A2’s oracles. The
FtG challenger maintains the experiment.
A3 runs A2 in its select phase. A2 adaptively makes quantum queries of its choice.
The queries can be either encryption or decryption queries. In the case of encryption
queries, the encryption oracle responds to each query by applying the unitary UEK(·)
to the first (2n+ nr) qubits of the adversary’s quantum register. At the end of
the select phase, A2 outputs a classical description of P , a set of permutations, as
well as R a quantum circuit description of a state |ψ〉. Together, R and P define a
distribution M of quantum queries. A3 reads A2’s classical register. It then samples
permutations Π0 ←$P and Π1 ←$P . Also, A3 executes UQE (R,QA2) to prepare
its quantum register in the state |ψ〉. A3 places the description of two permutations
Π0 and Π1 in its classical register. The encryption oracle executes UQE (Πb, QA2)
and then applies the unitary UEK(·) to the first (2n+ nr) bits of A2’s quantum
register. We call the result of this type of query, the challenge ciphertexts.
In the case of decryption queries, the decryption oracle applies the unitary UDK(·).
Note that for any challenge ciphertext
∑
c λc |mc, c〉, we define the projector Projc =∑
x |x, c〉〈x, c|. We use ρ to denote the state of A2’s quantum register before making
any decryption query. Then we assume that
Pr [∃c : λc 6= 0 and Tr (Projc ρ) 6= 0] = 0 ,
for all quantum adversaries A2. At some point, A3 runs A2 in its predict phase. A2
outputs a description of a quantum circuit V and a guess z. Then, A3 executes
UQE (R,QA2) to prepare the quantum register in the state |ψ〉, and executes
UQE (V,QA2) to obtain a value z′. If z = z′, A3 returns 0. Otherwise, it returns a
random bit.
When b = 0 we have
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Pr
[
Expsem−qsatkSE (A2) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Expsem−qsatk−0SE (A2) = 1
]
. (6.85)
Then,
Pr
[
Expftg−qsatk−0SE (A3) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Expsem−qsatk−0SE (A2) = 1
]
+
1
2
·
(
1− Pr
[
Expsem−qsatk−0SE (A2) = 1
])
=
1
2
· Pr
[
Expsem−qsatk−0SE (A2) = 1
]
+
1
2
. (6.86)
When b = 1 we have
Pr
[
Expsem−qsatkSE (A2) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Expsem−qsatk−1SE (A2) = 1
]
. (6.87)
Then,
Pr
[
Expftg−qsatk−1SE (A3) = 1
]
= Pr
[
Expsem−qsatk−1SE (A2) = 1
]
+
1
2
·
(
1− Pr
[
Expsem−qsatk−1SE (A2) = 1
])
=
1
2
· Pr
[
Expsem−qsatk−1SE (A2) = 1
]
+
1
2
. (6.88)
Hence, from the above equations, for the advantage of A3 we have,
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Advftg−qsatkSE (A3) = Pr
[
Expftg−qsatk−1SE (A3) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expftg−qsatk−0SE (A3) = 1
]
=
1
2
− Pr
[
Expftg−qsatk−0SE (A3) = 1
]
=
1
2
· Pr
[
Expsem−qsatk−1SE (A2) = 1
]
+
1
2
− 1
2
· Pr
[
Expsem−qsatk−0SE (A2) = 1
]
+
1
2
=
1
2
·
(
Pr
[
Expsem−qsatk−1SE (A2) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expsem−qsatk−0SE (A2) = 1
])
=
1
2
·Advsem−qsatkSE (A2) . (6.89)
A3 runs in time at most t3 = t2 + TP + TR where TP = qecµP2 is the maximum time
required for a permutation Π output by P , and TR = qecµR is the maximum time
required to prepare a quantum register in the state |ψ〉. Also A3 makes at most qe
encryption and (in the CCA case) qd decryption oracle queries, and the size of the
classical output is µ3 = µ2 bits.
Step 4 (RoP-qsATK ⇒ SEM-qsATK): Assume A2 is a quantum adversary attacking
SE = (K, E ,D) in the SEM-qsATK sense. We construct a new quantum adversary
A1, using A2, that attacks SE in the RoP-qsATK sense.
From the previous three steps we can see that RoP-qsATK ⇒ SEM-qsATK. For the
advantage of A2 we have that,
Advsem−qsatkSE (A2) ≤ 2 ·Advftg−qsatkSE (A3)
≤ 2 ·Advlor−qsatkSE (A4)
≤ 4 ·Advrop−qsatkSE (A1) . (6.90)
Since it is assumed that
Advsem−qsatkSE (A2) ≥ 2 , (6.91)
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then we can show that
Advrop−qsatkSE (A1) ≥
2
4
. (6.92)
A1 runs in time at most t1 = t2 + TP + TΠ′ + TR where
t1 = t2 + TP + TΠ′ + TR
≤ t2 + qec
(µ4
2
+ µ2
)
≤ t2 + qec
(µ2
2
+ µ2 + µΠ′
)
≤ t2 + qec
(
3
2
µ2 + µΠ′
)
. (6.93)
Moreover, A1 makes at most qe encryption and (in the CCA case) qd decryption
oracle queries, and the size of the classical output is µ1 = µ2 + 2µΠ′ . This concludes
the proof.
159
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In the case of quantum computation, we explored how existing classical confidentiality
notions translate into this model. We showed that the security proofs of Counter
mode carry over to the quantum computation model. This serves two goals. First,
this means that existing security notions, such as LoR-CPA, are achievable in this
model. And second, the proofs are a showcase of a class of classical black-box security
proofs that can go through in the quantum computation model.
Our results of quantum superposition attacks show that some cryptographic schemes,
while secure even against generic quantum computation attacks, might fall apart
in this model. We discussed that block ciphers such as the Even-Mansour scheme
offer no security in the quantum superposition model. It would be interesting to
see if this were the case for other symmetric cryptosystems such as hash functions.
Therefore we stress that the security of modern cryptosystems need to be reassessed
in the quantum superposition model, given that one day we might use a ‘quantum
internet’ or run our cryptosystems on quantum computers.
To be able to formally assess the security of modern cryptosystems in the quantum
superposition model, meaningful notions of security are required. We discussed why
the existing classical confidentiality notions need to be modified in this model. Then
we defined a new notion of confidentiality, named Real-or-Permutation (RoP). We
showed the implication between RoP and the existing classical security notions to
prove that they are equivalent. But then we proved that the quantum analogues
of RoP, such as RoP-qsCPA and RoP-qsCCA, are achievable in the quantum su-
perposition model. Moreover, we defined a notion of semantic security (SEM) in
this model, and proved that RoP implies SEM in the quantum superposition model.
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These notions can serve us as tools to formally analyse the security of any cryptosys-
tem, symmetric or asymmetric, in this model. Therefore we can have a meaningful
understanding of the security of modern cryptosystems in the quantum superposition
model. It is also interesting to see whether other existing classical notions of security,
such as integrity, can be translated into the quantum superposition model. By having
notions of confidentiality and integrity in the quantum superposition model, one can
discuss how to construct quantum-secure secure channels in this model.
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